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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the role of civil society in promoting good governance and 
development in Zimbabwe. This is done through a case study of the National Constitutional 
Assembly (NCA). Specifically, the thesis looks at the role of constitutionalism as a tool in 
promoting good governance and development by situating the Zimbabwean struggle for 
constitutional reform within the context of an unprecedented socio-economic and 
humanitarian crisis that engulfed Zimbabwe at the beginning of 2000. One of the central 
questions explored in this thesis is that of the value of the concept of civil society in 
understanding African post-colonial situations in general and the Zimbabwean situation in 
particular. The thesis looks at the history of constitutionalism in order to assess if the 
Zimbabwean crisis could be understood within the context of a constitutional crisis. 
Therefore, the thesis ventures into the complex dynamics of state-civil society relations 
while at the same time examining the formation, structure and programmes of the NCA. 
This is meant to highlight how the NCA’s internal governance system, its leadership style 
and accountability worked as well as if it reflected good governance or not. An analysis of 
NCA’s relationship with donors is also presented in order to dispel or validate claims that 
civil society is just a front for western interests to effect regime change in Zimbabwe. Of 
critical importance in this study is how civil society (represented by the NCA) interacted with 
the government and the opposition political parties. The NCA actively participated in 
opposition politics coming in the open to urge its supporters to vote for the opposition and 
later ditched the opposition when they had disagreements but their reputation as impartial 
actors had been destroyed. The thesis concludes by questioning the strategies that are used 
by civil society in engaging with the government and that in their present structure they 
should not be antagonistic to the state but should work in tandem with the state for the 
attainment of good governance and development. Civil society organisations should be 
politically neutral in their pursuit of developmental goals and ought to practice what they 
preach by being democratic and accountable themselves. 
KEY WORDS 
Civil Society Organisations, Constitution-making process, Good governance, Development, 
Neoliberalism 
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CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
1.1 Background to the Study 
This research study is largely motivated by what has come to be known as the Zimbabwean 
crisis. Zimbabwe’s dramatic changes in the economic, political and social landscape since 
the early 2000 have become known as the Zimbabwe crisis. Raftopoulos (2004) defines the 
Zimbabwe crisis as a particular configuration of political and economic processes that has 
engulfed the country and concentrated the attention of the region since the year 2000. This 
crisis takes place against the background of deeply entrenched structural impediments 
which hinder the development of democracy and good governance in Zimbabwe. According 
to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003), the crisis is a consequence of blocked democratic transition at 
the turn of the century. The crisis is a reflection that the dominant nationalist ideology that 
guided the liberation struggle had become bankrupt. In general the country is facing a 
serious crisis of governance. The crisis also takes place on the backdrop of the emergence of 
an authoritarian nationalist state confronted with increasing internal dissent. Since the year 
2000, the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) party has 
carried out a series of political and economic interventions marked by widespread violence 
but conducted through the tropes of anti-colonial redress and anti-imperialist critique that 
has also found widespread resonance in the region and the African continent (Raftopoulos 
2004). 
In order to understand the genesis of the crisis, it is important to outline the Zimbabwe 
political culture. Zimbabwe’s political culture is largely a product of four main influences 
that is the pre-colonial, colonial, the armed liberation struggle and the independence ZANU 
PF rule. The pre-colonial era was characterised by non-competitive politics. Competition for 
power was considered to be illegitimate and could prove fatal. Those who sought power had 
to find their polity elsewhere (Ndlovu-Gasheni 2003). “During this period there were 
kingship and chieftainships who when ordained would only lose power upon death. Such an 
idea easily translates to a life presidency. Thus even to this day, political competition in 
Zimbabwe is viewed with suspicion and open hostility” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003). The colonial 
period that succeeded the pre-colonial times was even more autocratic as a system of 
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governance. There was racial discrimination and political participation was the prerogative 
of the whites only. Blacks were not allowed anywhere near the spheres of governance. The 
armed liberation struggle period was more or less shaped by the preceding systems of 
governance. Every African was expected to embrace the ideals of the liberation war and 
every one had to toe the line. This generated and institutionalised a culture of fear, 
conformity and unquestionable support. The nationalist parties and their armies were never 
democratically structured and did not operate in a democratic fashion (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2003). They were highly commandist and authoritarian.  Kagoro (2003) also argues that the 
militarisation of the liberation struggle also created a unique use of coercion as an 
instrument of mobilisation. Therefore in a very significant way the liberation struggle 
emphasised a non-consensual means of legitimisation. The nationalist movements paid 
scant attention to the issues of individual and civic rights in fashioning their vision of a 
liberated Zimbabwe. They were preoccupied with the transfer of power from the white 
minority regime to the black hands rather than with the contradictions in which such power 
should be exercised (Kagoro 2003). This hegemonic approach gave rise to a legacy of 
repressive and monolithic state politics in the post-colonial era that was suspicious and 
intolerant of the notions of pluralism and independent associational life. Pluralism and 
dissent of any kind continues to this day to be characterised as anti-revolutionary and 
divisive. 
Although the various party structures of the liberation movements claimed to engage in and 
encourage participation and the active involvement of party members in decision making 
process, the militarist approach tended to brook no dissent. The liberation movements thus 
were regimentalist rather than democratic in their operations and management style 
(Makumbe 2003). It therefore explains why the ruling ZANU PF party in post-independence 
Zimbabwe became vulnerable to authoritarianism and personalised rule. 
The independence or post-colonial state is a direct successor to the brutal and authoritarian 
settler colonial state as well as a product of a protracted armed struggle. The ZANU PF 
government that swept into power at independence was also permeated by the culture of 
intolerance, intimidation and violence derived from the liberation struggle. The liberation 
struggle instilled in many political leaders and their supporters a militaristic conception and 
perception of politics and political process (Ndlovu-Gastheni 2003). Up until the height of 
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the Zimbabwe crisis, ZANU PF was still priding itself in its violent past and its capacity to 
deploy its infrastructure on violent politics on any one who dared to challenge them. In fact 
the period until 2008, saw ZANU PF unleashing its structures including the military in 
perpetuating an ogre of violence that left the nation severely traumatised. Thus the 
character of the post-colonial Zimbabwe state was shaped by these historical realities 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003). These were basically shaped by coercion, violence and 
authoritarianism.  
The conclusion of the liberation war was supposed to help the new nation in heralding the 
country’s first opportunity and ideal chance to build democratic institutions that would 
really put people first and promote a democratic culture of governance. The people 
expected a break from the tradition of the liberation war violence and were looking up to 
more expanded democratic spaces, to the protection of their human rights and tangible 
material benefits. In other ways the African nationalist struggles were expected to install a 
‘people’s state or ‘people’s government in place of the violent colonial state. This was not 
achieved because the post-colonial African state became a ‘regulator’ or social ‘gendarme’ 
whose main preoccupation was to moderate and contain the very contradictions of which it 
was a product, so as to maintain order and cohesion (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009). By so doing, 
the post-colonial state upheld the interests of the classes that dominated the social order 
and acquired its process in the process (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003). Therefore in its nature, 
structure and outlook, the post-colonial state is not people centred, it does not conform to 
the notions of putting people first but pursues the interests of the triumphant petit-
bourgeois nationalists who led the struggle for independence (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003). 
Thus, the post-colonial state under ZANU PF failed dismally to make a break from the 
tradition of the nationalist authoritarian and guerrilla violence as well as that of the colonial 
settler repression. The ruling party having been a product of the liberation war military 
structure failed to demilitarise itself in both practice and attitude as well as in managing civil 
institutions and the state at large. This had severe implications for democracy and good 
governance. From the outset the people’s aspirations for democracy and good governance 
clashed with the different authoritarian legacies from the nationalist and liberation war. The 
new government thwarted the chances of the formation of new civic structures outside the 
ruling party and government patronage representing the different voices of civil society. The 
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government inherited the colonial and violent repressive legal machinery of the colonial 
state. This, taken together with the tradition of the African nationalist authoritarianism, a 
new intolerant state emerged. This explains why militarism and violence became part and 
parcel of the nascent Zimbabwe state (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2003). Thus ZANU PF’s adherence 
to socialist party organisational structures and systems of operational management has 
resulted in its failure to transform itself into a democratic political party (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2009) with clear democratic ideals for the nation. 
The focus of the new independence government in the early 1980s was on majoritarian 
issues and state led development programmes. This approach mocked the advocacy of civil 
and political rights as a veiled attempt to subvert genuine efforts by the state to empower 
the newly liberated black populace. Such advocacy work related to civil and political rights 
was labelled anti-state, anti-people and anti development. The ruling party moved away 
from the identification with the basic aspiration of the people. The government leadership 
pursued its own enrichment at the expense of the people. Corruption and primitive wealth 
accumulation became rife. Opposing views were muzzled.  
The emergence of the post 1990 pro-democracy movements in Zimbabwe was in part linked 
to the contextual changes in the global political economy as well as explicit donor 
interventions rather than to direct interventions by the state or the state creating conducive 
environment for operations. By the 1990s the government adopted the neo-liberal 
structural adjustment programme without consulting the people. The introduction of these 
programmes led to massive retrenchments as well as removal of subsidies on goods and 
services. As a result the economy took a severe knock. Thus the introduction of the neo-
liberal structural adjustment programme demonstrated that the people had been 
abandoned by the government. Instead of opening up political space, the government 
tightened its grip on power through being very intolerant towards the opposition. 
Kagoro (2003) also traces the Zimbabwe crisis to the dismal failure of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank (WB) structural adjustment policies that were adopted by 
the government in the 1990s and resulted in the impoverishment of Zimbabweans as well as 
the capture of the state by corrupt, self-seeking and authoritarian elite. The crisis was also 
caused by the contradictory nature of neoliberal democracy that prescribed the weakening 
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of the state at precisely the moment that human development deficits accumulated during 
the colonial and cold war eras required the intervention of the state. This in part 
compounded the inability of the state to redistribute resources in a coherent and orderly 
manner, hence the crisis of legitimacy and politics of chaos. The rise of the crisis of 
‘followership’ caused by the failure of the post-independence leadership patronage systems 
based on political affiliation also led to the demise of competitive economics. These factors 
have had their manifestations in the endemic political violence and human rights violations 
as well as unbridled corruption that have resulted in assert stripping and poor stewardship 
of natural resources (Kagoro 2003). 
In 2000, ZANU PF was confronted with the first real challenge to its rule and they radically 
restructured the terrain of Zimbabwean politics towards the politics of frontal assault that 
targeted the former colonial power, Britain, the local white population (especially the 
commercial farmers), the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the civil 
society, farm workers and the urban populations among whom the opposition had 
developed its major support. Thus the legacy of this form of politics would be new problems 
that began to manifest in the Zimbabwean political economy. A particularly damaging 
feature of the ruling party’s response to the Zimbabwean crisis has been the state’s 
overarching articulations of intolerant, selective and racialised nationalist discourse 
(Raftopoulos 2004). This has been done through the deployment of patriotic history 
accompanied by an ideological attack on citizens perceived to be enemies as part of the 
project of delegitimising the opposition. The outcome has been the narrowing of a usable 
national past as well as the loss of democratic space in which to conduct national dialogue 
about both the colonial past and the post-colonial present.  
Therefore, the Zimbabwean crisis which forms the background of this study is basically that 
of legitimacy, governance and economic decay. It is also a crisis born out of the frustrations 
of the independence aspirations going horribly wrong for the masses. The liberation war 
ideals have lost resonance and the state has become very brutal and even more autocratic. 
The crisis is worsened by the fact that the democratic embers are now trapped by the 
bankrupt and violent nationalist backlash. This is demonstrated by the widening polarisation 
between the government and civil society. The people are crying for a better life and 
protection from poverty, hunger and disease. The ZANU PF government’s legitimacy is 
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under serious scrutiny and critique. Even the threat of violence has failed to silence the 
masses critique of the existing failure of the government. The mismanagement of the 
economy has rendered the country a basket case from being a bread basket of the region.  
The constitutional debate that took centre stage in the country between 1998 and 2000 and 
continued until 2013 was therefore one of the several attempts to reach a breakthrough to 
the Zimbabwean crisis. Of critical importance to the debate is the fact that it was led by civil 
society as a means of unlocking a political logjam and a way of facilitating its role as a key 
player in promoting good governance and development. The crisis was real and the only 
way to come out of it was a collaborative approach and civil society was simply playing its 
central role as the third arm in governance. Civil society had been able to diagnose the 
problem that was plunging the country into a crisis and had come up with a prescription. 
The only way to move towards a new dispensation was to use constitutionalism as a means 
towards good governance and socio-economic development. The process for the first time 
since independence involved a popular national process and discussion.  
Sadly however, the process that had begun with so much potential to move the country 
towards a new constitutional dispensation ended in the politics of bitter division with the 
ruling party using its defeat in the 2000 constitutional referendum to impose new 
authoritarian politics on the country’s citizenry. It is thus the aim of this research to explore 
the roles that the civil society has played in the promotion of good governance and 
development especially against this background of state authoritarianism as manifested by 
the Zimbabwean crisis. As mentioned above, the civil society in Zimbabwe is one of the first 
role players to try and bring about a solution by the promotion and debate around the 
constitution as a way to solve the crisis of governance and foster national development in 
order to improve the quality of life of Zimbabweans. 
1.2 Problem Statement and Rationale 
The failure by mostly African countries to achieve development despite large sums of aid 
having been poured has been problematic among development specialists. This has led to 
arguments as to whether development should be state led or if the state should embrace 
other partners in the quest for development and improve the people’s lives. It has been 
noted that underlying the litany of Africa’s development problems is a crisis of governance 
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(Ndulo 2001). Good governance would result in institutions that are more likely to adopt 
economic policies that would resolve the constraints that hinder economic development.  
The United Nations (UN) and all the other lending institutions reports are unanimous in 
noting that Africa’s inability to realise its potential is largely attributable to lack of good 
governance. There is a growing consensus concerning the central role that a good, efficient 
and capable government plays in the economic and social development of a country. The 
UN General Assembly has recognised that democratic, transparent and accountable 
governance and administration in all sectors of society are indispensable foundations for the 
realisation of social and people centred sustainable development can be laid upon. The 
answer to Africa’s development quagmire lies in establishing democratic systems of good 
governance. It calls for a critical examination of the question of governance in Africa with 
the view of identifying the obstacles to its development and the possible approaches to the 
development of systems of governance that gives space to all groups as partners thereby 
avoiding conflict and instability.   
The normative nature of the terms democracy and civil society have been highly debatable 
among different societies in space and time (Mafeje 1998). The renewal of interest in 
democracy and good governance has thrust the concept of civil society into a prominent 
position in both social science theory and development policy. Civil society organisations are 
seen as key players in the development and democratization process of any country 
especially given that they manufacture political consent and therefore are a source of 
legitimisation of state power. Development practitioners have come to the realization that it 
is not just the state institutions that essentially ensure a high standard of democratic 
governance but also that the civil society has a role to play. It has also been noted across the 
developing world that states with limited finances and riddled with poor governance and 
corruption have failed to lead development for all of their citizens. Within this context, 
alternative forms of development have been pursued and civil society organisations have 
increasingly been advocated as a means through which the gulf between the citizens’ needs 
and existing services can be bridged. 
The concept of governance describes certain forms of interaction between the state and the 
society. Such a mode of politics is considered modern in which the plurality of actors is 
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acknowledged. Societal problems are not solved by state institutions only but rather the 
state interacts with other actors such as the private sector and civil society organisations. 
This interaction is necessary because the quality of those problems exceeds the capacity of 
the state. This holds true for social problems for example in the context of poverty 
reduction. Therefore the governance perspective has not only changed the perception of 
civil society organisations has contributed to a re-evaluation of this sphere (de Weijer and 
Kilnes 2012). 
The concept of civil society can be applied in order to change and enhance the relationship 
between citizens and the state as well as policy formulations and the implementations in 
the state sphere. In the present era of globalization, the state and the market economy is 
essentially important whilst the civil society and other transnational forces are increasingly 
and equally influential as well. This is because all these factors have led the state to play a 
role to promote national interest in relation to the international funding institutions. For the 
developing countries, the concern is to strengthen the role of the states and enhance the 
efficiency of the state apparatus through good governance in order to cope with the force of 
globalization and to achieve development goals. Civil society is an important force in the 
democratization process because it provides a link between citizens and the state. It also 
creates an environment that can be used to enhance community bond and decision making 
which is vital to civil participation and its development.  
Civil society cannot replace the state but has a complimentary role by engaging the 
government to be more productive and efficient. Thus civil society has reached out its 
position as a common forum for addressing a range of public issues. It can thus be called a 
mouth piece of the nation. A country is therefore said to be more democratic where civil 
society organisations are active, vociferous and have no biases. The assumption is that civil 
society and good governance are mutually reinforcing. On one hand the reinforcement of 
good governance opens up new spaces for citizen participation and on the other hand an 
enabling environment is the key to allow civil organisations to become change agents that 
influence public policy in favour of democracy. 
Civil society organisations has three main functions in the development and democratization 
process that is to articulate citizens’ interest and demands, to defend citizens’ rights and to 
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provide goods and services to the needy. Therefore, in the event that the state policies and 
programmes do not address the needs and aspirations of the society, civil society 
organisations must come in and represent the interests of the society. Thus in Zimbabwe 
the relationship between the state and civil society has been characterised by continuity 
and change (Raftopoulos 2000). The continuity has been characterised by the growing 
interdependence of the two in the context of a weakening state capacity faced with 
declining resources and the growing poverty levels that has forced the government to rely 
on welfarist interventions of civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). The change however has been seen in the state seeking to cover its capacity 
weakness by introducing greater control over civil society activities and the growing 
willingness of civil society to develop a more confrontational approach in their dealings with 
the state.  
The state alone cannot bring about development without the assistance of other non-state 
actors thus there is need for non-state actors to complement government efforts. In the 
case of Zimbabwe, issues of mismanagement of the economy, state sponsored violence and 
corruption where the country is lowly rated in the corruption indices by organisations like 
the Transparency International and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation as well as natural disasters 
such as perennial droughts means that the civil society has an even bigger role to play in the 
state development efforts. Civil society can make a significant contribution to the 
development process both on its own as a third sector of the society as well as by working in 
partnership with the government. The concept of civil society embraces the action of people 
who join forces to achieve interests of a common good. The government operations should 
also rely on the civil society organisations as intermediaries for reaching the poor. In most 
countries especially in the developed world, governments are increasingly recognizing the 
civil society organizations’ potential for working with the poor and their capacity for 
advancing small grassroots solutions that require considerable direct involvement which 
often achieves greater effectiveness than government executing agencies. Thus several 
governments are now favoring transferring programs and responsibilities to the domains of 
the civil society and the private sector.  
In Zimbabwe, state driven development had dismally failed and hence non state actors 
emerge as part of the salvation. The years of independence had not brought tangible and 
10 
 
meaningful development more so with the government seemingly drifting away from being 
the government of the people, for the people and by the people. The populace had become 
desperate for ways that could transform their lives for the better. Thus the formation of the 
National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) should be seen in this light. The other problem in 
the road to developmentalism in Zimbabwe is that people began to openly discuss on what 
was the pre- requisite to a truly sustainable development. As such constitutionalism and 
rule of law was seen as important pre-requisites for the attainment of any meaningful 
development. The constitution had several loopholes which affected the country’s 
governance and was seen as the main cause of violence, rampant corruption and stagnation 
in terms of development. Therefore to curb these problems there was need for the country 
to have a new constitution written by Zimbabweans for Zimbabweans which will defend the 
people and spell out the ideals of a nation in order to achieve good governance and 
development.  
The proliferation of civil society in Zimbabwe is also linked to the adoption of the economic 
structural adjustment programme in line with the neo-liberal agenda of the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank policies. The pronouncement in the neoliberal agenda was 
that state led development had failed and the best way to improve the people’s livelihoods 
was through the active involvement of the civil society. The truth to the Zimbabwean 
situation was also that before the deregulation of the economy, the country’s economy was 
a bit stable and liberalisation caused a lot of suffering to the people. So on one hand the 
liberalisation of the economy caused the economic downfall whilst on the other hand it 
encouraged the sprouting of civil society to fill the void left by the state. This research will 
seek to outline the role of civil organisations in articulating the problems of 
constitutionalism as a necessity to the promotion of good governance and development in 
Zimbabwe through a case study of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). 
1.3 Research Aims and Objectives 
This study will aim to contribute to the existing body of literature related to the role of civil 
society organisations in promoting good governance and development especially in the 
developing countries of the south. This role also fits into the articulations of neoliberal 
theory and the World Bank (1998) that argues for democracy and good governance as key 
11 
 
tenets for development and for the provision of aid in developing countries. Mindful of the 
broad nature of the subject, the research will zero down and take the angle of a case study 
research of the NCA in Zimbabwe. 
Objective 1 
To situate the research within the current debates on state civil- civil society relations. To 
achieve this objective, the research will provide a critical review of literature and debates on 
the role of civil society organisations in promoting good governance and development. This 
will aim at creating a better understanding of the current debates in literature surrounding 
the existing normative frameworks in order to understand how these influence civil society 
organisations.  
Objective 2 
To explore the role and future of civil society organisations in promoting good governance 
and development in Zimbabwe. The purpose of this aim is to critique civil society 
organisations by looking at who they represent, whose interests do they pursue and if they 
broadly form part of the oppositional forces bent on the regime change agenda. 
Objective 3 
Describe the origins of the NCA, its structure and programmes in trying to deliver a people 
driven constitution to the people of Zimbabwe. The purpose of this aim is to be able to draw 
relevant recommendations through the knowledge of existing programmes as well as to 
gain an understanding of the operational challenges faced by the NCA and by extension civil 
society organisations. 
Objective 4 
Analyse and identify the perceptions of the NCA as an organisation, the government and 
ordinary citizens on the role of the NCA in promoting good governance and development. 
The objective of this aim is to situate what the people believe to be of critical importance in 
development. The level of understanding by the people is critical if citizens are to participate 
in developmental issues.  
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Objective 5 
To situate the current role of the NCA in view of the fact that the Inclusive Government of 
Zimbabwe adopted a new constitution for the country and the country has just had an 
election that has been won by ZANU PF party. This objective aims to assess the relevance of 
the NCA in the current dispensation. 
Objective 6 
To provide conclusions and recommendations based on the research findings. This objective 
aims to provide information especially against the argument that civil society organisations 
are necessary to the development of a nation as argued by multi-national financial 
institutions in their provision of aid. Thus this will highlight if indeed civil society is crucial as 
part of the democratic trajectory. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
1.4.1 Research Design 
In order to investigate the role of civil society organisations in promoting good governance 
and development in Zimbabwe through an examination of the role of the NCA, a qualitative 
methodology was employed, as detailed research planning was needed to produce precise 
and generalisable findings regarding the role of civil society organizations in promoting good 
governance and development. A qualitative methodology is a broad approach in social 
research aimed at understanding a particular social situation or event (Creswell 1994). This 
is a method of examining social research data without converting them to a numerical 
format. Babbie (2011) argues that qualitative analysis is the non-numerical examination and 
interpretation of observations for the purposes of discovering underlying meanings and 
patterns of relationships. It is therefore an investigative process entailing that the 
researcher makes sense of social phenomena by contrasting, comparing, replicating, 
cataloguing and classifying the object of study. Shank (2002) defines qualitative research as 
a form of systematic empirical inquiry into meaning. Systematic means planned, ordered, 
public and following the rules agreed upon. Empirical means that the type of enquiry is 
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grounded in the world of experience whilst the inquiry into meaning may mean that 
researchers try to understand how to make sense of their own experience. Denzin and 
Lincoln (2000) claim that qualitative research involves an interpretive and naturalistic 
approach. They argue that this means that qualitative researchers study things in their 
natural settings, attempting to make sense of or to interpret phenomena in terms of 
meanings people bring to them. 
Qualitative method is based upon the need to understand human and social integration 
from the perspectives of participants. It is aimed at gaining a deep understanding of a 
specific organisation or event rather than a surface description of a large sample of 
population. It provides explicit rendering of the structure, order and broad patterns found 
among a group of participants. Qualitative research does not introduce treatments or 
manipulative variables or impose the researcher’s operational definitions of variables on 
participants. Rather, it lets the meaning emerge from the participants. It is more flexible in 
that it can adjust to the settings. Concepts, data collections tools and data collection 
methods can be adjusted as the research progresses. 
Qualitative research aims to get a better understanding through first-hand experience, 
truthful reporting and quotations of actual conversations. It aims to understand how the 
participants derive meaning from their surroundings and how their meaning influences their 
behaviour. Qualitative research uses observation as a data collection method. Observation 
is the selection and recording of behaviours of people in their environment. It is useful for 
generating in-depth descriptions of organisations or events or in obtaining information that 
is otherwise inaccessible and for conducting research where other methods are inadequate. 
In this study, observation was used to see the responses of the interviewees to certain 
questions. It also proved a good technique when the researcher would try to be with the 
NCA people as they were carrying out their day to day duties.   
Another defining attribute of qualitative research is the open ended, inductive style of 
questioning and observation. Qualitative research methods answer the hows and whys of 
human behaviour, opinion and experience. Qualitative research also allows the collection 
and analysis of in-depth information on small groups. It entails that the researcher 
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immerses himself/herself in the everyday life of the setting chosen, entering the informants’ 
perspectives and meanings. This broad based approach will guide this study. 
1.4.2 Case Study 
A case study of the NCA was used to get detailed information on the role of civil society in 
promoting good governance and development. The method was employed due to its 
strength in being able to capture the context specific details. According to Yin (2003), the 
case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates contemporary phenomena within its real 
life context, addresses a situation in which the boundaries between the phenomena and 
context are not clearly evident and uses multiple sources of evidence. It can be defined in 
other words as a research method that allows for an in-depth examination of events, 
phenomena or other observations within real life context for the purposes of investigation, 
theory development and testing or simple as a tool for learning. The approach ensures that 
the issues are not explored through one’s lens, but rather a variety of lenses which allows 
for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood.  
Yin’s (2003) approach is based on a constructivist paradigm that claims that the truth is 
relative and that it is dependent on one’s perspective. This paradigm recognises the 
importance of the subjective human creation of meaning but does not reject outright some 
notion of objectivity. Constructivism is built upon the premise of a social construction of 
reality and one advantage of this approach is that there is a close collaboration between the 
researcher and the participant, while enabling the participants to tell their real stories. 
Through these stories, the participants are able to describe their views of reality and enable 
the researcher to better understand the participant’s actions. According to Yin (2003), a 
case study design should be considered when the focus of the study is to answer the ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ questions, when one cannot manipulate the behaviour of those involved in the 
study, one wants to cover the contextual conditions because they are relevant to the 
phenomenon under study or when the boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon 
and the context. 
The main advantage of a case study approach is a good method to challenge theoretical 
assumptions. The case study approach provides an insight in all stages of theory building 
process and probably the most valuable in testing new theories. Case studies also provide 
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raw material for advancing theoretical ideas. The limitation to this method however, is that 
its control is minimal. The extent to which the researcher can determine and influence 
activities in the field is very low. The method of using a case study also has a limit as a 
source of evidence for theory. However, this study was not aimed at generating theory but 
at aiding to the empirical evidence for generating theory.  
1.4.3 Sampling Techniques  
Sampling may be defined as the selection of some parts of an aggregate or totality on the 
basis of which a judgment or inference about the aggregate or totality is made. In other 
words it is the process of obtaining information about an entire population by examining 
only part of it. The approach is done so as to be able to make generalizations or to draw 
inferences based on samples about the parameters of the population from which the 
population is taken. A sample therefore can be defined as any number of people, units or 
objects selected to represent the population according to some rule or plan. This research 
had a randomly selected sample of 30 people.  
In quantitative research, sampling is the selection of a group of persons from a population 
with each person having an equal chance of being selected. The objective is to draw a 
representative sample and the results obtained from the sample can be generalised to the 
population. The two main reasons for conducting sampling are that the researcher may 
select people (sample) to investigate because of efficiency or convenience and may select a 
sample because of representativeness.  
In this research sampling was done on the persons interviewed in both the NCA as well as 
government employees in the Ministry of Public Service and Social Welfare which regulates 
the operations of NGOs and Civil Society. The advantage of sampling is that the magnitude 
of operations is small thus data collection and analysis can be carried out accurately and 
efficiently. It enables the researcher to make a precise estimate of the standard error which 
helps in obtaining information concerning some characteristic of the population. 
Furthermore it is economical.  
The researcher chose to use both probabilistic sampling and non-probabilistic sampling 
methods. In probabilistic sampling, the researcher used simple random sampling where 
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each element or persons in both the NCA and the Ministry of Public Service and Social 
Welfare had an equal probability of being selected. The use of probabilistic sampling 
method is bias free and an element cannot be sampled twice. Non-probability sampling is 
where items for the sample are selected deliberately by the researcher. In this research the 
main office bearers in both the NCA and the Ministry of Public Service and Social Welfare 
were interviewed. In non-probalistic sampling the researcher used purposive sampling 
where the researcher was arbitrarily selecting the sample considered important for the 
research.  
Snow ball sampling, a sociometric sampling technique generally used to study a small group 
was employed in the research. All persons in a group identify their colleagues or friends who 
in turn know their colleagues until the informal relationships converge into some type of a 
definite social pattern. This proved to be a useful tool in the research as one unit led to 
another. It was also important as the subject is highly subjective especially in a polarized 
environment like Zimbabwe and also in view of the fact that the research was done at a 
time when the NCA was in the process of transforming itself into a fully-fledged political 
party and therefore most of the former workers and members were no longer with the 
organisation. These individuals had to be traced for the interviews contacts that had already 
been made by the researcher made use of their social networks to refer the researcher to 
other people who participated or contributed to the study. 
1.5 Data Collection Methods 
Data gathering instruments are key and paramount factors in conducting a purposeful 
research. The researcher must employ data gathering instruments that effectively tackle the 
research problem. The researcher used questionnaires, interviews, secondary data and 
personal observations in this study. The researcher tried to employ data gathering 
instruments that tackled the research problem effectively. Borg and Gall (1996) underscores 
this by stating that the quality of data elicited from a representative sample relies on the 
quality and reliability of instruments used .Thus data collection techniques namely 
secondary data, questionnaires, interviews and personal observations were used in this 
study in an attempt to analyze the role played by civil society organisations (NCA) in 
promoting good governance and development in Zimbabwe.  
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In gathering data the researcher also made use of triangulation. Triangulation is the process 
of strengthening the findings obtained from a qualitative inquiry by cross-checking 
information. A researcher who argues that his or her findings are derived from many 
different kinds of people across many different situations will be more convincing than 
another researcher whose conclusions are based on observations of one person in one 
setting (Potter 1996). Triangulation is used in bringing together different sources of 
information to converge or conform to one interpretation. With the convergence of 
information from different sources (documents, interviews and observations), settings and 
investigators, the researcher can make a powerful argument that the interpretation is more 
credible.  
1.5.1 Questionnaires 
A questionnaire consists of a set of questions that are used by respondents selected from 
the population under study as well as self- administered questionnaires. Babbie (2011) 
defines a questionnaire as a document containing questions and other types of items 
designed to solicit information appropriate for analysis. These were used in this research 
study because the researcher wanted the participants to answer to the questions at their 
own time without any influence. Denzin (1990) notes that the questionnaire as an 
instrument in research has the advantage that it allows respondents in the study to answer 
to their questions at their own time with neither the pressure to respond to the questions 
quickly nor disturbing their daily activities. Such an advantage will prompt the researcher to 
make use questionnaires in this study. The use of questionnaires also fits into the objectivity 
of the study that aims to describe the objective reality independent of his subjective 
perceptions. Borg and Ball (1996) points out that such a stance is based on the assumption 
that objective reality exist such that if different researchers were to observe the same 
phenomenon using standardized measures, their findings will show agreement and 
convergence. 
Furthermore, the use of questionnaires in a study enables the researcher to have a wide 
coverage of respondents at a minimum expense and this also helps to iron out individual 
idiosyncrasies (Zhou 2012). Thus, the researcher made use of structured questionnaires with 
both closed and open questions to solicit information. Semi-structured questionnaires 
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consisted of a list of open-ended questions based on the topic areas the researcher was 
studying. The open-ended nature of the questions provided opportunities for both the 
interviewer and interviewee to discuss certain topics in more detail.  If the interviewee had 
difficulty answering a question or hesitates, the interviewer would probe.  
Through the use of the questionnaires a number of people received similar questions to 
answer and these questionnaires will serve as permanent records of study. According to 
Franklin and Wallen (2003), the use of questionnaires helps to speed up the data analysis 
process. Thus, the returned questionnaires were subjected to a thorough screening 
whereby the researcher was checking for inconsistencies and after that they were finally 
edited. The questionnaires were pre- coded in order to facilitate the easy entrance of data 
and statistical analysis.  
However, this method does not give the researcher any room for the interpretation of non-
verbal reactions of the respondents and it would be costly for the researcher to produce a 
large quantity of these questionnaires to cover the targeted population. It was as a result of 
such limitations that the researcher complemented the deficiencies with the use of other 
methods. 
1.5.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were generated from the use of the questionnaire. The use of 
interviews as a data collection method begins with the assumption that the participants’ 
perspectives are meaningful, knowledgeable and can be made explicit and that their 
perspectives can affect the success of the project. In-depth interviews were used to gather 
information on the role of civil society in promoting good governance and development. 
Borg and Gall (1996) defines an interview as a conversation which is strictly meant for the 
collection of information. Interviews involve direct verbal interaction between the 
researcher and the respondents. Babbie (2011) also defines interviews as a data collection 
encounter in which one person (an interviewer) asks questions of another (a respondent). In 
in-depth interviews, the interviewer seeks to encourage free and open responses and 
therefore may trade off between comprehensive coverage of topics and in-depth 
exploration of a more limited set of questions. 
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This research used face to face interviews. Face-to-face or personal interviews are labour 
intensive but can be the best way of collecting high quality data, especially when the subject 
matter is very sensitive, if the questions are very complex or if the interview is likely to be 
lengthy. In-depth interviews are important because they help the researcher to explore a 
few general topics to help uncover the participants’ views but respects how the participants 
frames and structures the responses. Thus the participants’ perspective on the phenomena 
of interest should unfold as the participants’ views it (the emic perspective) and not as the 
researcher views it (the etic perspective). The most important aspect of the interviewer’s 
approach is conveying the attitude that the participant’s views are valuable and useful. 
In-depth interviews also encourage capturing the respondents’ perceptions in their own 
words which is a very desirable strategy in qualitative data collection because this allows the 
evaluator to present the meaningfulness of the experience from the respondent’s 
perspective. These interviews were conducted face to face. The presence of an interviewer 
also generally decreases the number of ‘don’t knows’ and ‘no answers’. Interviews generally 
attain a higher response rate as respondents generally seem more reluctant to turn down 
an interviewer standing on their doorstep. The interviews were also used to guard against 
confusing questionnaire items because the interviewer can clarify some issues that the 
interviewee does not understand. In interviews, the interviewer can also observe the 
respondents as they answer questions. 
In-depth interviews were important for the purpose of this research because they allowed 
me to uncover the dynamics of the role played by civil society organisations in promoting 
good governance and development. I was able to ask for clarifications in areas where the 
answers are not clear enough for me as well as questions that required detailed 
information. The in-depth interviews were able to uncover to me the politics of the civil 
society in Zimbabwe as people were freely expressing themselves as well as how key 
decisions can sometimes be reached.  
One strength of in-depth interviews is that it can be conducted in private. In this way the 
respondents were able to air out some of their misgivings about the organisation without 
the fear of being overheard and victimized. Arrangements were made prior to the 
interviews to have one room made available for the interviews. Thus the research tried to 
20 
 
get the best private environment for the interviews by making appointments with the 
respondents in the Boardroom of the NCA and the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. In 
cases where the Boardroom was not available, an Office (room) was made available. 
Interviews were able to extract information about the operations of civil society 
organisations, government, programmes of the NCA and its role in the country’s 
development and other data that is important for analysis will be obtained. 
1.5.3 Secondary Data 
Secondary data is the data that has already been collected and recorded by someone else 
and readily available from other sources and as such then problems associated with the 
original collection of data do not arise. The secondary data can be collected directly either 
form published or unpublished sources. The use of secondary data has gained interest and 
momentum due to the recognition that many qualitative datasets offer narratives that 
discuss issues related to the primary research but which have never been analysed thus 
carrying out secondary research can lend new strength to the body of fundamental social 
knowledge as well as applying a new social perspective or conceptual focus to the original 
research issues. In general the purpose for which the data was originally collected differs 
from that to which the current researcher wishes to use.Secondary data analysis is the 
reworking of already analysed data over which the present researcher had no direct control 
or in which he had no direct involvement.  
Secondary data consists of relevant literature and policy documents, journals, newspapers, 
magazines, thesis and dissertations relevant to the area of study. Patton (2002) states that 
written material and other documents from organizations and programs records are 
essential in qualitative studies. This research carried out a comprehensive desk study of 
recent publications on the civil society organisations, good governance and development. 
Government documents and policies towards civil society organisations and the NCA in 
particular were also consulted. It should be noted that the subject under study falls within 
the broad study of the Zimbabwe crisis and a lot has been written. Furthermore with the 
neo-liberal ideologies that led to the rise of civil society as alternatives for development, 
there has been a large array of data on the subject. 
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It should be noted that for every qualitative study it is important to gather background data 
and to understand the historical context. The knowledge of the history and context 
surrounding a specific setting comes from the review of documents. In general documents 
are any preserved recording of a person’s thoughts, actions or creations (Potter 1996). 
Documents may be examined to investigate patterns and trends. The review of documents 
is an unobtrusive method rich in portraying the values and beliefs of participants setting. 
However, the use of documents should entail a specialized analytic approach called content 
analysis and this research benefited from the use of this approach.  
It is never safe to take published statistics at their face value without knowing their meaning 
and limitations and it is always necessary to criticize arguments that can be based on them. 
Thus the data collected by some other person should not be fully depended as they might 
have pitfalls. Thus it becomes necessary to find out the inconsistencies probable errors and 
omissions in the data. This necessitates the scrutiny of secondary data because it is just 
possible that the data might be inaccurate, inadequate or even unsuitable for the purposes 
of investigation. Hence the secondary data should possess the qualities of reliability, 
suitability and adequacy. 
1.5.4 Personal Observations 
Observation is a fundamental and highly important method in qualitative inquiry and is used 
to discover complex interactions in natural social settings. Observation entails the 
systematic noting and recording of events, behaviors and artifacts in the social setting 
chosen for the study. The observation record should be detailed, non-judgmental and 
should carry concrete descriptions of what has been observed. The researcher should not 
have a particular role in the setting and should enter the setting with broad areas of interest 
but without predetermined categories or strict observational check list. Observation is the 
technique of obtaining data through direct contact with a persons or group of persons. Since 
the main focus of qualitative research is naturalism, the researcher has to observe person or 
persons in their natural state as undisturbed as possible. 
By being in the field, interacting and socialising with the subjects proved very valuable to the 
researcher. The researcher had two weeks in the field collecting and gathering data. The 
period brought the researcher closer to the subjects and other respondents who might be 
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outside the sample and access to informal discussions and gossips that reflect on the 
community. Babbie (2011) argues that one of the key strengths of field research is that it 
gives researchers a very comprehensive perspective. By going directly to the social 
phenomenon under study and observing it as completely as possible, researchers develop a 
deeper and fuller understanding of it. Direct observation also reduces distortion between 
the observer and what is being observed that can be produced by an instrument e.g. a 
questionnaire. It occurs in a natural setting and not in a laboratory or controlled 
experiment. The context or background of behavior is included in observations of both 
people and their environment and this is important because society shapes human 
behaviour. Observation can also be used with inarticulate subjects or others unwilling to 
express themselves. 
1.6 Ethical Considerations 
Babbie and Mouton (2001) argues that ethical issues arise out of our interaction with other 
people, other beings and the environment especially where there is potential for, or where 
there can be a conflict of interest. Thus ethical issues are present in any kind of research. 
Babbie (2011) further contends that ethics is associated with morality. According to Creswell 
(1994), the researcher has first and foremost the obligation to respect the rights, needs, 
values and desires of the informants. Ethnographic research is always obtrusive, invading 
the personal spaces on informants and sensitive information is frequently revealed. The 
research process creates a tension between the aims of the research to make 
generalizations for the good of others and the rights of participants to maintain privacy. 
There are six broad ethical areas that need consideration in carrying out research. These are 
voluntary participation, informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity, potential for harm 
and communicating results. These are interdependent and interlinked to one another. 
Participation in research should be voluntary and there should be no coercion or deception. 
This participation is invited with a clear understanding that they are under no obligation to 
do so and that there will be no negative consequences for them if they do not assist. 
Another important issue is to ensure that the participants fully understand what they are 
being asked to do and that they are informed that if there are any negative consequences of 
such participation. Anonymity requires that the researcher should not know the names of 
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the participants as well as revealing them thus participants can be identified on the basis of 
the level of analysis. Ideally the research should have minimum harm because participants 
can suffer physical, psychological, emotional and embarrassment harm. Participants have a 
right to the research outcome having provided information and the researcher should make 
effort to avail the finished research product to them bearing in mind that the researcher 
should guard against misinterpreting results.    
Bearing in mind the above explanations and that this study was conducted at a time when 
the NCA membership had agreed that they could not continue as a civil society organisation 
but transform themselves into a political party, it was always going to be politically sensitive 
and thus there was need for the protection of informants’ rights and desires. The researcher 
assured the respondents that their identity would always remain confidential and would not 
be revealed in the research report. In my introductions, l made sure that l emphasized that 
the research was purely for academic purposes, for a fulfillment of a degree with the 
University of South Africa (UNISA) and would not be used for any other uses. I also had an 
introductory letter from the Department of Development Studies of UNISA to confirm my 
status as a student. The respondents were informed that participation in the research was 
voluntary and they could terminate it any time if they feel like. They were also free not to 
answer any questions that they deemed inappropriate. 
1.7 Challenges and Limitations of the Study 
The main principal subjects of this research study are the government and the NCA are very 
antagonistic in nature.  This is also partly due to the role played by the NCA in the formation 
of the opposition MDC. The NCA at its formation seem to have a two pronged approach to 
constitutional reform that is to lobby government and also to be part of the body politic that 
could spring up as the main opposition. This was due to the fact that the country had a very 
week opposition then and ZANU PF arrogance was partly blamed on the lack of a viable and 
strong opposition party. The government has always regarded the NCA as part of the 
opposition forces bent on regime change. Since the formation of the NCA, the government 
has always seen it as an appendage of the western countries that are not happy about the 
land reform exercise and is part of the broad oppositional forces funded by the west and 
former commercial farmers. This antagonistic nature has seen the NCA in some cases being 
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prevented from conducting meetings with the public and its members. This made it very 
difficult to get objective views on the NCA from the government or the other way round. In 
some instances, some government officials were just dismissive of the NCA’s role. However, 
because of the nature of the questionnaire, it made it very difficult for respondents to be 
clouded in the acrimonious relationship between the government and the NCA. As such 
some government officials would talk about the political side of the NCA without addressing 
the central theme of the research of the role of the NCA in promoting good governance and 
development.   
The fact that the study was also done during the period when the NCA was in the process of 
transforming itself into a political party also had its own challenges. This research was 
mooted when NCA was still a civil society organisation and the aim was to explore the role 
of civil society organisations in promoting good governance and development. So for the 
researcher to go into the field at a time when there was this transformation was a great 
challenge. However, the research had to be done in a historiographical manner looking at 
what NCA had done when it was still a civil society organisation.   
Interviewing high ranking officials from both the NCA and the government proved to be a 
problem as they were not always available. Securing a slot to interview and fitting in my 
schedule was a problem. In the extreme about three interviews had to be done over the 
weekend so as to accommodate some officials. At its formation the NCA used to write 
several publications which have since dwindled over the years and it was difficult to get 
some of their reports. Moreover with the transformation into a political party it seems the 
documentation of the past was not viewed important. All resources had to be put towards 
recruiting members. The lack of reports of programmes seems to have been a problem for a 
long time as a Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Royal 
Norwegian Embassy (RNE) & the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 
commissioned report in 2009 also alluded to it. It would also seem that the accord and 
unison that was part of the NCA at its formation is no longer there, it is not clear how many 
organisations still make up the body politic. The structures of the organisations seem at 
present nonexistent. 
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Despite these limitations, the researcher tried to explain to NCA officials that the research 
was not intended to carry out an audit but was purely for academic purposes. In any case, 
the researcher was only interested in the recent past when the NCA was still a civil society 
organisation. 
1.8 Chapter Outline 
Chapter 2 is the literature reviews section that focuses on the theoretical concept on which 
this research is based. The Chapter captures the theory of neo-liberalism on which this 
research is based explaining how the concept of civil society came into being. It notes that 
the concept of civil society is part of the neo-liberalism agenda that tried to help countries 
to improve their economic wellbeing against the background of massive state failure. It tries 
to position the research within the existing body of literature and also look at the historical 
background of the study. The Chapter first dwells on the terms good governance and 
development, defining them and develops further into the notion of civil society. Civil 
society is discussed from the global perspective, the African perspective and then zeroing 
down to the Zimbabwean perspective. 
Chapter 3 looks at the case study of the research, the National Constitutional Assembly 
(NCA). The Chapter outlines the history of constitutionalism in Zimbabwe in order to situate 
the history that led to the formation of the NCA. The Chapter also outlines how Zimbabwe 
got off to a false start after independence in 1980 in terms of laying the ground work of 
state development based on constitutional development. The Chapter is premised on the 
notion that when good governance and development failed, it was the role of civil society to 
come to the fore, raising the issues of constitutionalism as a prelude to good governance 
and development. The chapter also presents how the NCA was formed, its structure and 
programmes. 
Chapter 4 gives a presentation of the current state of affairs. It outlines the governance 
structure of the NCA in the internal democratic governance as well as leadership and 
accountability. The study looks at issues around membership, gender development and 
representation, the relationship with donors and how they influenced programming. The 
Chapter also looks at the role of the NCA is the oppositional politics in Zimbabwe and its 
relationship and role in the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and thus by extension the 
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inclusive government that was born out of the GPA. The GPA was instrumental in 
championing constitutional reform process under the auspices of the Constitution 
Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC) and the chapter looks at how the NCA had to deal 
with that. Civil society organisations are often criticised as elitist organisations and the 
chapter answers the question by looking at the NCA. The Chapter ends by discussing how 
the NCA transformed itself into a political party. 
Chapter 5 is a presentation of the analysis of the results in terms of theory by analysing the 
strategies that the NCA used in the quest for a new constitutional reform. The chapter 
provides an analysis of the people’s perceptions of the NCA, its effectiveness, its relevance 
and lessons that could be learnt from Zimbabwe’s constitutional reform process. The 
chapter concludes by providing recommendations on the role of civil society organisations 
in promoting good governance and development and suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
This thesis is premised on the theory of neo-liberalization (liberal democratic theory) that 
gave rise to the concept of civil society as one of the pillars in development and the 
promotion of the good governance agenda. Central to neo-liberalism is the abolition of 
government intervention in economic affairs. It is based on the principle of a free market 
system. Neo-liberalism has been defined as a theory of economic practices that proposes 
that human wellbeing can be advanced by liberating the individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within the institutional framework characterized by strong property 
rights, free markets and trade (DeMartino 2000). According to Haque (1999), 
neoliberalisation is an ideological position based on the strong beliefs in the promotion of 
the general good by following the principles of free market and open competition, limited 
state intervention and welfare individualistic self-interest, rational utility maximization and 
comparative advantage in free trade. The free market system is seen as the best possible 
way for economic development. The main features are the rule of the market, cutting of 
public expenditure, deregulation, privatization and the elimination of public goods 
(DeMartino 2000). Theoretically, the assumptions of neo-liberalism are in line with the 
principles of neo-classical economics.  
One of the most prominent common features of neo-liberalism is its emphasis on the role of 
the market and minimizing the interventionist role of the state. For the neoliberals, the 
market is the optimal space for the production and distribution of wealth and as the optimal 
vehicle for social mobility (Haque 1999). The neoliberal ideology requires the replacement 
of interventionist state by a non interventionist state and encourages the expansion of 
market forces by undertaking various market friendly policies. Policies such as deregulation 
and privatisation are encouraged. There is also belief in the principle of comparative 
advantage of free trade whilst opposing protectionist policies and the tying of economic 
growth to export expansion (Haque 1999). All this is achieved through economic 
deregulation, elimination of tariffs and a range of monetary and social policies favourable to 
business. Thus neo-liberalism can be seen as a development model that is very 
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comprehensive development strategy with economic, social and political implications. It is a 
model that involves a set of economic theories linking disparate policies together into a 
coherent recipe for growth with prescriptions for a proper role of key stakeholders such as 
labour unions, private enterprises and the state. Neo-liberalisation, therefore, is based on 
the belief that freely adopted market mechanisms is the optimal way of organizing all 
exchanges and goods. Free market and trade will set free the creative potential and the 
entrepreneurial spirit which is built into the spontaneous order of any human society and 
thus leading to more individual liberty and well being and a more efficient allocation of 
resources. 
The current interest on civil society came particularly as a result of a persistent push for 
growth for the formal sector to achieve a liberal economy. Although the role of civil society 
was not clearly articulated or emphasized in the initial packages of good governance, it was 
later endorsed in the reconceptualised definitions of the concept. Liberal democratic theory 
argues for civil society as a sure recipe for democracy and development. Development 
practitioners have come to the realization that it is not just state institutions that essentially 
ensure a high standard of democratic governance but also that the civil society has a big role 
to play (Al-Amin 2008). In the present era of globalization, the state and market economy is 
essentially important whilst the civil society is equally important in advocating for the state 
to promote national interests. 
The perceived failures of state led development approaches of the 1970s and 1980s fuelled 
an interest in Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the civil society as a 
development alternative, offering innovative and people centered approaches to service 
delivery, advocacy and empowerment. Their emergence have centered on their ability to 
offer a ‘development alternative’ and therefore seen to be making a lot of claims about 
more effective approaches necessary for addressing poverty and challenging unequal 
relationships thus justifying their role in filling the gaps caused by inefficient state provision 
of services (Banks and Hulme 2012). Their strength is seen in enabling to design services and 
programmes using innovative and experimental approaches centered on community 
participation and that through their programmes, they empower disadvantaged groups and 
help them to gain a voice in the governance space from which they have for a long time 
been excluded. The adoption of the term ‘empowerment’ as the bottom like to NGOs and 
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civil society is seen as their greatest assert because not only do they strive to meet the 
needs of the poor but they aim to assist them in articulating those needs themselves 
through participatory, people centered and rights based approaches (Banks and Hulme 
2012). Thus, the NGOs and civil society are no longer minor actors on the development 
stage as in some cases they receive more funding than the government.  
The period from the late 1970s to the early 1990s witnessed a major upsurge in neoliberal 
ideals in the contest of the development process and development strategies (Öniş and 
Şenses 2005). This neoliberal revolution presented a major assault on natural 
developmentalism in the context of which the state had played an active role in the process. 
The ideological ascendency of neo-liberalism at this time was accompanied by the rise of 
structural adjustment in aid policies, reductions in public expenditure and the withdrawal of 
state provided services. This radical reform led to the state being replaced by the market at 
the center of development strategies and poverty lost its position as an explicit concern. The 
continued donor distrust and frustrations with states generated and fuelled interest in 
NGOs and civil society as desirable alternatives viewing them favorably for their 
representation of beneficiaries and their role as innovators of new technologies and ways of 
working with the poor (Banks and Hulme 2012). 
The neoliberal approach and its accompanying structural adjustment programmes started to 
be drawn back from the mid-1990s and the development discourse shifted again. The poor 
performances of the structural adjustment programmes led to the emergence of a new 
focus on the role of the state to ensure conditions necessary for market economies to work 
efficiently. Thus the poor performances and the growing perception of persistent poverty in 
developing countries brought to the fore the requirement of pro-poor performance service 
delivery as a necessary capability for development. There was the emergence of the good 
governance agenda and the state took center stage again alongside the recognition of the 
explicit need to target poverty alleviation through a more interventionist, welfare oriented, 
state centered and scaled up approach (Banks and Hulme 2012). The impact of this was that 
on one hand there was the re-governmentalisation of aid increased state funding in an 
attempt to influence recipient governments, drawing attention away from NGOs. On the 
other hand the good governance agenda embraced the language of democracy, human 
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rights and public participation thus consolidating the centrality of NGOs and civil society in 
the development process.  
In the 2000s a new aid regime had evolved promising to move beyond growth focused neo-
liberalism towards greater consultation between donors and recipients and a greater focus 
on poverty and responsibility for the nation-state. The new focus became the strengthening 
of the civil society and the recognition that NGOs constitute part of the civil society. Donors 
started to promote their role in political reform thus they were democratizers of 
development (Banks and Hulme 2012). Most of the good governance conditions were also 
desirable on their own right for example low corruption, democratic accountability, rule of 
law and service delivery. Thus democracy building and transforming the state-societal 
relations became a major priority. In the development discourse, it was argued that civil 
society provides a third leg to the trinity model of development with the other legs being 
the state led public sector model and the second leg being the private sector model for 
economic development and profit enterprises (Tandon and Mohanty 2000). 
The idea of civil society and building a stronger wider participation to promote good 
governance has been a dominant component of global political and development forum for 
the last two decades. Bad governance is widely acknowledged to be one of the underlying 
causes of conflict, poverty and marginalization. Most theories on civil society grant an 
important role to civil society organisations (CSOs) in the governance process. CSOs 
generally have five key functions, approaches and roles in which they should fulfill in order 
to contribute to good governance. These are to plan strategically and adapt to the changing 
context, to put a Rights Based approach into practice, to develop capacities, to advocate for 
democratic good governance and to be examples of good internal governance. Therefore, 
governance is a negotiated process that is negotiated development through which the 
various interactions between the state and citizens result in the equitable fulfillment of the 
citizens’ political, economic, social and cultural rights. 
Therefore one can argue that much of the interest in civil society is linked to the global 
dominance of ne-liberal ideologies that envisaged a reduced role for the state and privatized 
forms of services delivery through the flexible combinations of governmental, non-
governmental and private institutional actors (Lewis 2002). Thus the good governance 
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agenda has deployed the concept of civil society within the wider initiatives of supporting 
the emergence of competitive market economies, building better managed states with the 
capacity to provide more responsive services and just laws, and imposing democratic 
institutions to deepen political participation. Good governance is therefore premised on the 
suggestions that a virtuous cycle can be built between the state, economy and civil society 
leading to a balanced growth, equity and stability. 
It must be noted that the idea of neo-liberalisation has found ardent critics in the 
development debate. It has been criticized for the subordinate role that it gives government 
in development. Its postulations have also not led to any meaningful social development in 
developing countries. Instead it has catapulted several countries into political crises. Much 
of the criticism has come from nationalists who argue that neo-liberalism is tantamount to 
neocolonialism. They have also noted that it aspires to intensify the abstractions inherent in 
capitalism, separating labour from its human context and replaces society with the market. 
Thus in the same way civil society has been criticized as alien to societies in the developing 
countries and thus are a ploy by the West to effect illegal regime change. Nationalists have 
argued that anything foreign should be treated or handled with care since the concerns may 
not be sincere. Thus some have argued that for example in Africa, there is no civil society 
but social movements (Moyo and Yeros 2005).  
Neo-liberalism shares many attributes as with other essentially contested concepts such as 
democracy whose multi-dimensional nature, strong normative connotations and openness 
to modifications over time tend to generate substantial debate over their meaning and 
application. Thus neo-liberalism should be seen as a development model that is a neoliberal 
model comprehensive development strategy with economic, social and political 
implications. It is a model that involves a set of economic theories linking disparate policies 
together into a coherent recipe for growth or modernisation with prescriptions for the 
proper role of key actors such as civil society, private enterprises and the state (Haque 
1999). The post 1989 dispensation of global good governance, conditionality had become an 
integral part of donor funding. Arguments for alternative economic models were drowned 
by the triumph of neo-liberalism. Thus the mobilisation for national democratisation offered 
new opportunities for a broader regional and international audience. Neo-liberalism 
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became the only opportunity for economic growth and good governance became the catch 
word and the highway to prosperity. 
Presenting on the case of the Zimbabwean crisis, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) has argued that 
Zimbabwe’s development conundrums need to be conceptualised within the broader 
debates on the African crisis in general and the deeper struggle between two ideologies of 
nationalism and neo-liberalisation which are both fundamentalist in their truth claims and 
annihilatory in their rejection of each other. Thus Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) argues against the 
Washington Consensus view that there is no alternative to neo-liberal orthodoxy and 
further argues that the neo-liberal ideology speaks of western domination and exploitation 
as opposed to co-evolution between the western world and the non-western world. Ndlovu-
Gatsheni (2013) argues for decoloniality as a new liberation ideology that can lead to 
development and sees the current problems bedevilling African states and Zimbabwe in 
particular in terms of development as emanating from the consequences of incomplete 
decolonisation, incomplete nation building and contested state making. 
2.2 Good governance and Development 
Good governance is the buzzword in this era and has swept public attention. It emerged as 
an off-shoot of the neo-liberalisation agenda. It has become a significant pillar in the 
consideration of a state’s ability to conform to the universally accepted democratic 
standards. It has also become an essential pre-condition for development. Countries with 
quite similar natural resources and social structures have shown different performances in 
improving the welfare of their people and this has been attributed to good governance. 
Poor governance stifles development. It has been noted that development inevitably suffers 
in countries that have high cases of corruption, poor control of public funds, lack of 
accountability and human right abuses. Good governance is now viewed as essential for 
promoting economic growth and alleviating poverty and it is assumed that without good 
governance the benefits of reform will not reach the poor and funds will not be used 
effectively (see World Bank 1992, 1998). 
Good governance has been defined in different ways by different people. The World Bank 
(WB) has been a prolific producer of documentation discussing good governance as a 
general tool in international development. According to the United Nations (UN), 
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governance is considered ‘good’ and ‘democratic’ to the degree in which a country’s 
institutions and processes are transparent. Its institutions refer to such bodies as parliament 
and its various ministries. Its processes include key activities as elections and legal 
procedures, which must be seen to be free of corruption and accountable to the people. A 
country’s success in achieving this standard has become a key measure of its credibility and 
respect in the world. Good governance promotes equity, participation, pluralism, 
transparency, accountability and rule of law in a manner that is effective, efficient and 
enduring. In translating these principles into practice, we see the holding of free and fair 
elections, representative legislatures that make laws and provide oversight and an 
independent judiciary to interpret those laws. According to the UN the greatest threat to 
good governance comes from corruption, violence and poverty, all of which undermine 
transparency, security, participation and fundamental freedoms. The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) defines good governance as referring to governing 
systems that are capable, responsive, inclusive and transparent. It entails meaningful and 
inclusive political participation and improving governance should include more people 
having a say in the decisions which shape their lives. The African Development Bank (AfDB) 
in its 2000 Bank Group Policy on Good Governance defines good governance as a process 
referring to the manner in which power is exercised in the management of the affairs of a 
nation and its relations with other nations. The policy identifies the key elements of good 
governance as accountability, transparency, participation, combating corruption and the 
promotion of an enabling legal and judicial framework. The World Bank defines it as the 
manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social 
resources for development (World Bank 1994). The Asian Development Bank (ADB) also 
defines it as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s 
economic and social resources for development (Asian Development Bank 1995).  
For the Asian Development Bank, the concept of good governance focuses essentially on the 
ingredients for effective management. Thus irrespective of the precise set of economic 
policies that finds favour with the government; good governance is required to ensure that 
those policies have their desired effect. In essence, it concerns norms of behaviour that 
helps to ensure that governments actually deliver to their citizens what they say they will 
deliver (Gisselquist 2012). The World Bank (1994) report concludes that development can 
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only take place if a predictable and transparent framework of rules and institutions that 
exists for the conduct of public and private business. The essence of good governance is 
described as predictable, open and enlightened policy together with a bureaucracy imbued 
with a professional ethos and an executive arm of government accountable for its actions. 
The concept of good governance came into prominence especially in Africa when donors 
decided that it was not enough to institute economic reforms in Africa but that it was 
necessary to reform the manner in which African governments were carrying out their 
business (Tandon 1996). Although it was necessary, the question is why governance was not 
linked to development before since development is clearly not simply an economic exercise. 
Nonetheless, the framework of development is essentially a post-World War 2 
phenomenon. The term good governance was introduced by the World Bank in 1989 in 
order to characterise the crisis in Sub –Saharan Africa. The big question that astounded 
donors by then was why Africa had remained stagnant or in some cases regressive in terms 
of development when large sums of money had been pumped through aid. The World Bank 
then diagnosed that the crisis in Africa was that of governance. The World Bank thus 
embarked on utilising the concept of governance as it grappled with the conundrum of why 
aid had failed in Africa. It focused on inwards to the institutions governing the economy and 
the implementation of structural reform. It found that the problem was in the management 
of countries’ economies and social resources. Good governance is understood by many 
especially in the creditor community as something that combines efficient (accomplishing 
tasks in the right things that citizens want done) and effective (doing the right things that 
citizens want done) service delivery while ensuring that political corruption is avoided and 
curbed in these processes (Goldsmith 2003). 
Thus the good governance agenda emerged after the cold war as a concern for the 
development practitioner. In aid circles, it also became the most prominent paradigm within 
which to direct all political reform efforts. The good governance agenda was premised on 
the suggestions that a virtuous cycle could be built between the state, economy and civil 
society leading to balanced growth equity and stability. Since the early 1990s, the good 
governance agenda has deployed the concept of civil society within the wider initiatives of 
supporting the emergence of more competitive market economies, building better managed 
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states with the capacity to provide more responsive services and just laws and improving 
democratic institutions to deepen political participation. 
Good governance implies a government that is democratically organised in a democratic 
political culture and with efficient administrative organisations with the right policies 
especially in the economic sphere (Anowar Uddin 2008). At the constitutional level good 
governance requires changes that will strengthen the accountability of political leaders to 
the people, ensure respect for human rights, strengthen the rule of law and decentralise 
political authority. At the political and organisational level, good governance requires the 
attributes of political pluralism, opportunities for extensive public participation in state 
matters and incorruptibility use of public powers or offices by the servants of the state. In 
administration, good governance requires accountability and transparent public 
administration and effective public management as well as the capacity to design and 
implement sound and good policies. 
Good governance has grown to be widely recognized as a basic condition for sustainable 
development. According to Masson (2005) there is a general and well documented 
agreement that good governance is a key factor in the success of economic and social 
development strategies. Individuals and groups in development derive their motivation 
from the ideological and spiritual commitment to social reform and change. The term good 
governance is thus an indeterminate term used in the development literature to describe 
how public institutions conduct public affairs and manage the public resources in order to 
guarantee the realization of the aspirations of the citizens. It can also be defined as the 
manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social 
resources for development. Former United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan once 
remarked that good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating 
poverty (Hyden, Court and Mease 2003). The UN and multilateral institutions’ reports are 
unanimous in noting that the inability of several countries to realize their potential 
especially in Africa is largely attributable to lack of good governance. There is a growing 
international consensus concerning the role of good, efficient and capable government 
plays in the economic and social development of a country. The UN general assembly has 
recognized that democracy, transparent and accountable governance in all sectors of the 
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society are indispensable foundations for the realization of social and people centered 
sustainable development. 
Donors now widely accept that the quality of governance does matter for development 
performance and aid effectiveness. They have since expanded their work on governance 
and political issues to include supporting the development of international agreements and 
initiatives on governance, substantial funding and technical assistance for governance 
reforms and capacity building in developing countries, promoting policy process that foster 
participation and supporting regional mechanisms for improving governance such as the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Many donors now consider governance issues in 
selecting focus countries or in information on their aid allocations. The World Bank uses the 
Country Policy and International governance assessment for ail allocations. Such policy 
briefs have put forward ideas on a set of core governance issues and considerations for aid 
allocations and country programming. Better orienting aid interventions to governance 
context would help make development assistance more effective and benefit the poor in 
developing countries and also reassure tax payers in donor countries (Anowar Uddin 2008). 
Good governance has many attributes. It is effective, participatory, transparent, 
accountable, and equitable and promotes the rule of law thereby creating a capable state. A 
capable state is one that exposes good governance and is characterized by transparency, 
accountability in the conduct of national affairs, the ability to enforce law and order 
throughout the country, respect for human rights, effective provision of infrastructure, 
limited role in the market economy, creation of favourable policy environment and seeking 
to walk in partnership with the private sector and civil society (Mdulo 2001). Other 
characteristics of a capable state are the acceptance of the opposition and competitive 
politics, predictable, open and enlightened policy making, a bureaucracy imbued with 
professional ethos acting to further the public good, maintenance of fair trade terms 
between the rural and urban sectors, recognition and respect for boundaries between itself 
and the private sector and civil society. These characteristics enable a state to effectively 
perform its role of developing a country and bringing about a better life for all its citizens. 
Good governance can result in governments that are more likely to adapt to economic 
policies that would resolve the constraints that hinder sustained economic growth. 
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Good governance is predicated upon mutually supportive and cooperative relationships 
between government, civil society and the private sector. The nature of relationships among 
these three groups of actors and the need to strengthen viable mechanisms to facilitate 
interactions thus assumes critical importance. It is also important to note that good 
governance is quite normative in conception. The values that provide the underpinning for 
governance are values postulated by international donor institutions. Since governance is 
the process of decision making and the process by which decisions are implemented, an 
analysis of governance focuses on the formal and informal actors involved in decision 
making and implementing decisions made and the formal and informal structures that have 
been put in place to arrive at and implement the decision.  
Proponents of the good governance agenda see it as a worthy goal and a means through 
which to impact a variety of other outcomes such as economic growth and development. It 
is further argued that good governance should be at the centre of development policy and 
that donors should not only provide positive support for governance reforms in aid recipient 
countries but should also incentivise better governance by taking into account the quality of 
governance in decisions about the distribution of foreign assistance. Opponents of good 
governance raise strong challenges. Critics especially in aid recipient countries argue that 
the use of governance criteria in the allocation of aid effectively introduces political 
conditionalities and imposes Western liberal models of democracy.  
The components of good governance lead to development or alternatively the interaction of 
the components of good governance causes development. Development is the most 
fashionable word for both developed and developing countries. Its importance can be seen 
in the fact that the United Nations adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 
order to try and improve the standards of living (to promote development). Defining 
development is highly contestable, with economists using two methodologies of the income 
per person and the economic growth criterion. However, it must be noted that the issues 
that determine development are broader than that. A simplified definition of development 
is the change, growth and improvement over a period of time that is the process of 
economic and social transformation. Thus for this process of economic and social 
transformation to occur, there is need to adhere to good governance. It is also important to 
note that all these elements/components of good governance are present in a strong civil 
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society participating in public affairs where all members of the society act under the rule of 
law. This research takes the critical issue of constitutionalism as articulated by civil society 
as of paramount importance to the attainment of good governance and therefore leading to 
development of Zimbabwe as a nation.   
2.3 Civil Society: Global Perspective 
Civil society is truly an international idea and has emerged as one of the key study in the 
study of comparative politics today. Recognition of the importance of civil society has risen 
on the international agenda in recent years. Increasingly civil society organisations have 
become an integral part in policy debates, norms and standard setting processes. They have 
also become part of the governance arrangements at both national and international level. 
It has become very difficult to imagine a global governance arrangement being negotiated 
multilaterally without the participation of civil society. The rise of civil society within the 
sphere of international development becomes very evident when comparing aid 
effectiveness. The growing interest in the public arena for global public goods has further 
deepened the primacy lent to global civil society (de Weijer and Kilnes 2012). 
According to most donor organisations, civil society is an instrument that will make 
developing countries especially African states more democratic, transparent and 
accountable. Over the past decade, attempts to provide a programme to secure democracy 
in Africa have come to depend substantially on civil society organisations as drivers to the 
democratic process. In the rapidly increasing literature on democratisation, much attention 
is paid to the public roles that civil associations undertake either to confront 
authoritarianism or to support newly democratic states (Kasfir 1998a). Such a concept of 
civil society has been shaped to serve the goal of better governance particularly democratic 
reform. Thus the existence of an active civil society is crucial to the vitality of political 
democracy and the nurturing of civil society is perceived as the most effective means of 
controlling repeated abusers of power, holding rulers accountable to their citizens and 
establishing the foundations for durable democratic government.  
Since the end of the cold war, there has been a global ubiquity to the concept of civil society 
among policy makers in different parts of the world of its relevance to strengthening 
democracy and development. Its roots can be found in both the liberal and Marxist 
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traditions of European political thought. For much of the latter part of the 20th century, the 
development debate has focused on the state or the economic forces underlying a country’s 
aspirations to make progress. The growing focuses on participatory development and the 
idea that institutions outside the state are also important contributors to social and 
economic advancement gave a new significance to civil society. Civil society is made up of 
associational life that reflects the extent to which citizens share their personal grievances 
and demands with others. It is an arena where the private becomes public and social 
becomes political (Hyden et al 2003). It is an arena where values are formed and expressed, 
the interests are articulated. The broad purpose of this research is to provide some 
reflections on whether or not the concept of civil society can be useful both in terms of 
analysis of social and political processes and in relation to policy interventions aimed at 
poverty reduction and development especially in non-western societies. 
The term civil society is used with different meanings by different authors in various 
contexts. It is also used by critics and activists as a reference to sources of resistance and to 
that domain of social life that needs to be protected especially against globalisation. Within 
the United Nations context, the term has been a source of controversy, as it is used to mean 
or include both business and private voluntary organisations. The working definition of the 
London School of Economics Centre for Civil Society is considered to capture the 
multifaceted nature of the concept whilst also being empirically and analytically useful. 
According to the London School of Economics Centre for Civil Society, civil society refers to 
an arena of un-coerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In 
theory its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though 
in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often 
complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces diversity of spaces, 
actors and institutional forms varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. 
Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, 
development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women’s organisations, 
faith based movements, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social 
movements, business associations and coalition and advocacy groups. 
According to Makumbe (1998) there are as many definitions of the concept of civil society 
as there are authorities on the subject. Makumbe (1998) has defined civil society as an 
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aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of non-state 
activities such as economic and cultural production, voluntary associations and household 
life and who in a way preserve and transform their identity by exercising all sorts of 
pressures or controls upon state institutions. From the definition two characteristics can be 
noted, that is the fact that civil society is a behavioural space between the state and the 
market where value norms of collective purposes are given precedence over those of the 
state and market and secondly that civil society is the organisational or associational action 
that oppose hegemony by a single social system such as state and the market or that seek to 
proffer alternatives in place of perceived weak institutions or process (Ncube 2010). Bratton 
(1994) has defined civil society as a sphere of social interaction between the household and 
the state which is manifest in norms of community cooperation, structures of voluntary 
association and networks of public communication. Alfred Stepans has derived his definition 
in the contemporary context of political liberalisation and democratization in Latin America 
arguing that civil society is an arena where manifold social movements and civil 
organisations from all classes attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of 
arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance their interests (Lewis 2002). 
CIVICUS (the World Alliance for Citizen Participation), an organisation that represents civil 
society organisation in the World defines civil society as an arena, outside of the family, the 
state, and the market where people associate to advance common interests. This definition 
focuses on citizen engagement and recognises citizens rather than organisations as the basic 
building block for civil society. It also covers a wide range of collective action initiatives and 
associational life. It deliberately avoids focusing on organisations, as this tends to lead 
towards an assessment of civil society according to the number and forms of existing 
organisations (de Weijer and Kilnes 2012). The CIVICUS definition also sees civil society as an 
arena that is the space where citizens associate to advance common interests as well as 
where debates and battles can take place over narratives and visions for the future. Thus 
such an arena can take many forms, depending on the type of institutionalised and informal 
space that exists in a given society. Civil society is therefore both a reflection of societal 
dynamics and the arena in which these dynamics play out.    
Lewis and Kanji (2009) have argued that during the last two decades, the political concept of 
civil society has come to form part of the language of development. Civil society is taken to 
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mean a realm or space in which there exists a set of organisational actors that are not part 
of the household, the state or the market (Lewis and Kanji 2009). These organisations form 
a wide ranging group that include associations, people’s movements, citizens’ groups, 
consumer associations, small producer associations, women’s’ organisations, indigenous 
people’s organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Since this array of 
organisations and associations is public without being official, civil society advocates argue 
that it enables citizens to debate and take action around public issues without the overt 
direction by the state (Lewis and Kanji 2009). There is no single concept of civil society that 
exists but instead there is a bundle of slightly different though at times frequently 
overlapping understanding of the term. The concept of civil society has also come to be 
increasingly used with reference to global and international processes, as civil society 
groups seeks to represent themselves across nation state boundaries by forming global 
institutions. 
Civil society is characterised by autonomy from both state and social interests, capacity for 
collective action promoting interests or positions, absence of intention to govern the polity 
and agreement to act within civil rules conveying mutual respect (Kasfir 1998a). Therefore, 
civil society incorporates organisations whose formal rules insulate them from demands 
from above and below. The organisations can act independently of the state actors as well 
as their constituencies. They are formed for specific, preferable narrow purposes that do 
not include seeking state power. They follow a code of conduct that contemplates listening 
to opponents, pursuing political compromise and engaging in a transparent behaviour. Thus 
in short, they accept the rules they attempt to enforce on the state. 
This concept of civil society is meant therefore to create a political system that will help 
sustain democracy after it had been conceded by a formerly reluctant authoritarian state. 
The ultimate objective is thus to adapt or create civil associations that are willing to work 
within the system rather than to shape organisations that intend to combat the state. The 
1996 USAID report insists for example, that sustaining newly emerging democracies will 
depend on building autonomous centres of social and economic power that promote 
accountable and participatory governance (USAID 1996). Civil society organisations inculcate 
democratic habits among their members, build a culture supporting democracy and through 
advocacy, they influence the government to adopt positions that their members support as 
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well as advocating to follow formal rules facilitating open, free and fair political debate or 
discussions (Kasfir 1998a). From the 1980s the ideas of civil society began to be increasingly 
invoked within development policy as part of wider debates about politics and 
democratisation, public participation and improved service delivery (Lewis and Kanji 2009). 
2.3.1 Origins of Civil Society 
Civil society can be traced back to the period when modern ideas of democracy were 
beginning to take root. It is historically connected to the rise of capitalism and the evolution 
of the modern state in the Hiberian sense of rational legal structures of governance. Hyden 
et al (2003) argues that it as much an integral part of development of the west as is either 
market or state. The source of its conceptual theory is more than one and early 
contributions varied along the principal parameters of the concerns as to whether civil 
society is primarily defined by economic or sociological factors focusing on the extent to 
which the economic activity is privately controlled or the role associations play as 
intermediaries between family and the state. The other conceptual theory concerns the 
relation between the state and civil society, for they are seen as autonomous of each other 
or as organically linked. 
Civil society has so many roots. This thesis will highlight briefly some of the key philosophical 
arguments developed historically behind our current view. One of the major differences is 
over whether the state and society should be intrinsically linked to form a civil society. For 
example, Aristotle saw civil society as a single entity comprising all social and economic and 
political aspects of life, a community of citizens who choose to live under an agreed system 
of law (Alqadhafi 2007). In contrast, Hobbes saw civil society as being constructed by the 
state, which imposes enough control on society to allow citizens to live together. In this 
argument, Hobbes opposed Aristotle who thought that society constructed civil society but 
both thought that society and the state were intrinsically linked.  
In opposition to Hobbes, Locke argued that the state arises from society and is needed to 
restrain conflict between individuals. According to Locke, individuals are part of a society 
that predates the existence of a state and therefore society is not constructed by the state 
(Alqadhafi 2007).  He saw people being able to live together in the state under natural law, 
irrespective of policies of the state. This self-sufficiency of society outside the control of the 
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state was given weight by the growing power of the economic sphere which was considered 
part of the civil society, not the state. The state is therefore constructed out of, and given 
legitimacy by the society which also retains the authority to dissolve the government if it 
acted unjustly (Alqadhafi 2007). The state cannot be given unlimited sovereignty because 
that would pose a threat to individual freedoms derived from natural law. Therefore there 
must be a social contract between the rulers and the ruled that not only guarantees these 
rights but also gives the state the authority to protect civil society from destructive conflict 
(Hyden et al 2003). A constitutional arrangement that both the state and civil society 
respects is the cornerstone of liberal democracy. Other writers continued with this 
distinction of civil society and government. The state kept its function of maintaining law 
and order that Hobbes had stressed, but was considered to be separate from society, and 
the relationship between the two of them was seen to be subject to laws that gained their 
legitimacy from society, not from the state. For example, Montesquieu saw the state as the 
governor and society as the governed with civil law acting as a regulator of the relationship 
(Alqadhafi 2007). The importance of the law in regulating the way the state and society 
interacted was obvious to many writers at the time who considered that a government that 
did not recognize the limitations of law could extend to become an over-reaching tyranny. 
However, it is important to note that all these earlier definitions of civil society had one 
common denominator, that civil society was defined in contrast to ‘uncivil society’ that is 
the state of nature out of which humans had managed to rise by accepting a system of law 
as enforced by the state. The two thus cannot exist without the other, the state controls 
society so that it may become a ‘civil society’. 
The concept of civil society as completely separate from and contrasted to the state was 
started by Hegel and Max. Hegel recognised this separation as the ‘achievement of the 
modern age’. However, the need for the state to regulate civil society in order to protect it 
from the less sociable instincts of people continued (Alqadhafi 2007). The German 
philosopher G.W.F Hegel argued that self-organised civil society needed to be balanced and 
ordered by the state otherwise it would become self-interested and would not contribute to 
the common good. Both approaches shaped the concept’s early evolution. In Hegel’s 
perspective, the state exists to protect common interests as it defines them by intervening 
in the activities of the civil society. Hegel saw civil society as largely comprising the 
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economic sphere of social life and that without the state to balance and order civil society it 
would become dominated by the pursuit of individual interests’ especially private 
acquisitiveness and this would harm the common good. 
Paine’s view is quite different. He draws on the traditions of the Scottish Enlightenment and 
especially the Scottish Enlightenment thinker Adam Ferguson who saw civil society as a 
socially desirable alternative to both the state of nature and the heightened individualism of 
emergent capitalism (Lewis 2002). His position was more anti-statist. According to Paine any 
expansion of the state power poses a threat to the liberties that keep civil society alive. In 
his Libertarian view, it is the market rather than the state that allows civil society to grow. 
The latter happens whenever individuals are free to exercise their natural rights. The state 
and civil society therefore cannot be viewed as reinforcing each other. Their relation is 
reflective of zero-sum game (Hyden et al 2003).  
Moving from the social and political sphere to narrower organisational focus, the work of 
Alexis de Tocqueville has been widely influential and has been used to support arguments in 
favour of civil society. De Tocqueville’s positive account of 19th century associationalism in 
the United States stressed volunteerism, community spirit and independent associational 
life as protection against domination by the state and indeed as counterbalance which 
helped to keep the state accountable and effective (Lewis 2002). De Tocqueville was 
alarmed not only by the prospect of a powerful state but also by the tyranny of the majority. 
Associations in his view, constituted the strongest bulwark against the unmediated popular 
will. Self-governing associations educate citizens and scrutinise state actions. They 
encourage distribution of power and provide opportunities for direct citizen participation in 
public affairs. Without taking a strong pro-market view as Paine, De Tocqueville still adopts 
a voluntarist view of civil society. It is capable of protecting and promoting the interests of 
individuals regardless of their socio-economic position. Hegel breaks with tradition of civil 
society as a natural phenomenon and instead regards it as a product of specific historical 
processes. Division of labour creates stratification within society and increases conflict 
between strata. Civil society in his account is made up of the various associations, 
corporations and estates that exist among the state. The form and nature of the state is a 
result of the way civil society is represented and organised. This according to those that 
preceded it tended to stress the role of civil society as one in which some kind of 
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equilibrium was created in relation to the state and the market (Lewis 2002). The neo-
Tocquevillian position can now be seen in current arguments in many Western countries 
that the level of associationalism within a society can be associated with positive values of 
trust and cooperation. 
There is a different strand of civil society thinking that has also been influential in some 
parts of the world. This strand is influenced by Antonio Gramsci. He was also influenced by 
the Marxist ideas, who argue that the economic dominance of the bourgeoisies gives it 
control of civil society via the state. Gramsci wrote much later than the earlier civil society 
theorists. He argued that civil society is the arena, separate from the state and market with 
which ideological hegemony is contested, thus implying that civil society contains a wide 
range of different organisations and ideologies both of which challenge and uphold the 
existing order (Lewis 2002). Antonio Gramsci, a foremost Marxist analyst of civil society 
bypasses the economic determinism of Marx by arguing that associations are the 
mechanisms for existing controls in society. By transferring focus from the state to civil 
society as the key arena for conflict, Gramsci concludes that civil society harbours the 
resources needed to develop counter hegemonic norms to those prevailing at the state 
level. Thus Gramsci’s emphasis is on the role of social institutions in either buttressing or 
challenging state power (Bratton 1994). Gramsci’s ideas were influential in the context of 
the analysis and enactment of the resistance to totalitarian regimes in the Eastern Europe 
and Latin American countries from the 1970s onwards. Gramscian ideas of civil society can 
also be linked to the research on social movements that seeks to challenge and transform 
structures and identities. Therefore, Gramsci was conceptualising civil society as the site 
into which state power was projected and consolidated in capitalist societies but also as a 
location where contestation and resistance to hegemonic power was possible (Lewis and 
Kanji (2009).   
Thus the origin of civil society has connections to the modernisation of western societies. As 
market and the state emerged in Western Europe and North America, so did civil society. In 
their approaches to civil society over the years, Europeans have followed in the footsteps of 
Locke and Hegels whilst the United States (US) has followed the path closer to Paine and 
Tocqueville. This is reflected in the way they approach support for democratisation in other 
parts of the world. The USAID focuses on privatisation and economic liberalisation to a 
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greater extent. Similarly in supporting civil society, they tend to act on the premise that 
associational life is dependent on the state. The Europeans stress the interconnectedness 
between the state, market and civil society e.g. in the way they see the role of governance 
in development. 
2.3.2 Civil Society in Contemporary times 
In the post-modern era or contemporary times, the concept of civil society is associated 
with the politics of democratisation (Ncube 2010). Contemporary conceptions of civil society 
identify the activist version, neoliberal version and the post-modern version of civil society. 
The activist version is informed by the struggles against military regimes in Latin America 
and against authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet bloc in the 1970s and 1980s. Most 
recently it has been imported into sub Saharan Africa (Ncube 2010). In Latin America, the 
theology of liberation and the Gramsci approach influenced the politics against military 
dictatorships and in Eastern Europe a Tocquevillian conception of a self-organising civil 
society autonomous from the state was summoned to oppose authoritarian communist 
states. The neoliberal version also draws from the Tocqueville and the idea of a minimalist 
state. Civil society refers to all forms of associational life that is not controlled by the state 
and is also free from the whims of the market but also exists to ensure that both the state 
and the market are accountable and responsive to the needs of the citizens (Ncube 2010). 
Thus it is the third sector after the state and the market. In contrast to the state, the sector 
is endowed with the comparative advantages of efficiency, flexibility, innovation, cost 
effectiveness in service delivery and in politics it is a vehicle of action and citizen 
participation. The post-modern conceptions of civil society today are understood as an 
arena where social movements and civic organisations from all classes attempt to constitute 
themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and 
advance their interests.  
Civil society organisations have today also acquired a new prominence as international 
actors. By virtue of their link to citizens and due to their increasingly global nature of their 
networks, civil society organisations can now claim to give a voice to international public 
opinion. Their unique positions make them indispensable partners in multilateral initiatives 
and are able to a certain limited extent, to contribute to overcome the democratic deficit of 
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global governance. Civil society plays a key role in democracy promotion through the 
affirmation of human rights and keeps the political system under pressure of accountability. 
Civil society organisations are contributing to the global dialogue on key issues and this 
dialogue is shaping a global public sphere in order to forge common answers to global 
problems (de Vasconcelos 2011). 
Civil society is conceived as a zone where citizens exercise their right to civil liberties free 
from state dominance (Steyn 2008). It is a vehicle for empowering citizens and a space for 
consensus seeking. Success in creating spaces for negotiated development requires capable 
and accountable governments as well as active citizens. Helliker (2012) argues that most of 
the literature focuses primarily on relations between civil society and the state such that the 
term civil society is deployed instrumentally in a state centric fashion as a force in 
democratizing the authoritarian and often neo patrimonial African state. The role of civil 
society in the context of state driven and sanctioned authoritarianism therefore is to build a 
modernizing democratic state. Accordingly in the later period of the democratic 
consolidation, there are said to be potential synergies between the state and civil society, 
with the later seeking to engage the state in a constructive manner and in doing so 
contributing to the building of national democratic institutions and organizational capacity 
for development (Helliker 2012). Therefore, civil society is considered crucial for the 
prevention of a return to authoritarian rule especially once the process of democratic 
consolidation is already underway. However, such claims tend to be normative and 
prescriptive in nature and thus the civil society is eulogized as the ultimate medicinal 
compound capable of curing all the ills. 
Through the civil society, the poor and vulnerable can be empowered by having their 
demands and knowledge represented, by increasing their capacity to comprehend their 
context and influence decisions that affect their lives and by challenging the status quo. A 
more egalitarian distribution of political power leads to more resources and opportunities 
for the poor. By being able to engage in decision making processes, define policies and 
improve services not only reduces poverty and improves social justice but also ensures that 
people live a life of dignity. Considering the lack of opportunities, skills and isolation in 
which many poor and vulnerable people live, civil society organisations should play an 
important role in defending their interest in the negotiated development process with other 
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often more powerful actors. Civil society has a role to promote good governance by limiting 
and controlling the power of the state. They also have a duty to protect citizens against 
excesses by the state by creating a buffer against possible state predatory behaviour as well 
as monitoring public performance, human rights abuses and corruption. One must also be 
quick to acknowledge that civil society is a theoretical concept rather than an empirical one 
in as much as the state and political society. It is a synthetic conceptual construct that is not 
necessarily embodied in a single, identifiable structure (Bratton 1994). 
Several scholars have questioned the universality of the application of the concept of civil 
society as an analytical construct to understand democratization and as a policy tool in non-
western contexts given its history and evolution. The most important question relates to the 
extent to which the concept can travel and still retain its utility free from distortions 
associated with conceptual stretching (Magure 2009). In respect as to whether the idea of 
civil society is relevant to Africa and other third world context, there are four possible 
answers according to Lewis (2002). The first is an emphatic yes and is based on the universal 
necessity for a political project geared towards building and strengthening democracy. The 
second is a clear no, primarily because the concept emerged from a western tradition 
characterized by different political and cultural settings thereby making it one of the many 
misguided policy transfers from the west. The third answer argues that civil society is 
relevant only if adapted to the unique local conditions hence the need to take the middle of 
the road approach to its use. Such an approach accepts the utility of civil society within 
reasonable and average limits and is not extreme in nature. The fourth and final argument is 
based on the premise that the question is irrelevant because civil society has been part of 
the third world countries’ colonial histories of both domination and resistance, thus the 
relevance of the concept is self-evident. 
In the light of the above, it is clear that the concept of civil society is of universal relevance 
and therefore cannot just be discarded altogether primarily because it originates from the 
west. It is worth noting that the many principles governing civil society as seen and 
understood in western eyes and terms are not yet fully evident and developed in the African 
settings (Magure 2009). To insist that civil society produce democratic transitions, optimists 
fail to distinguish conjectural and structural phenomena, thereby setting very high 
expectations for African civil society (Magure 2009). Instead one can argue that scholars 
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need to focus on collective activity and norms whether they are democratic or not that 
make up the actual existing civil society in Africa. Such an approach claims that African 
societies are inherently undemocratic and less likely to support liberal democracy. 
Therefore, regardless of the contested nature of the term, civil society is now part and 
parcel of the political and social discourse of a wide range of groups and individuals in 
African and beyond.  
It is also important to note that civil society today performs a critical role in delivering 
services to where there is a governance gap be it nationally or internationally. Civil society 
organisations owe their legitimacy to their activities. If their activities benefit the groups for 
whose good they work, they will be respected. Therefore their authority is derived from 
their actions. 
2.4 Civil Society in Africa 
Civil society has become a popular concept in both the analysis of the social bases of the 
recent political changes in Africa and in external policy support for processes of liberal 
democratic political reform. Civil society is portrayed as the driving force behind and 
guarantee of democratization and the containment of the state (Allen 1997). Civil society is 
also closely associated with the analysis of the African struggles for democratisation. Thus 
the current development paradigm in Africa predominantly concerns bringing to the fore 
civil society into a closer relationship with the states. Partnership between civil society and 
the state is now at the centre of the donor fronted new agenda for development assistance. 
Central to this agenda is the framework where civil society organisations are expected to 
work in partnership with participatory and accountable governments as the only means of 
ensuring and sustaining participatory, equitable and sustainable development (Hearn 2001). 
Manifestations of civil society in Africa can be traced back to the pre-colonial era. African 
traditional systems in pre-colonial times recognized the role of popular participation in 
decision making and governance. Some African societies can be argued to have had 
consensual political systems which required major decisions to be made only after 
widespread consultations among the people (Makumbe 1998). However, in most parts, 
traditional rulers were born rather than elected thus civil society then did not need to be as 
actively involved in the choice of leaders as the situation in the democratic governance 
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system as currently defined. Thus the pre-colonial African political system did not include or 
support civil society as currently defined in modern world. Bratton (1989) also argues that 
while many pre-colonial cultures in Africa may have lacked states, they certainly did not lack 
civil societies in the broad sense of the bevy of institutions for protecting collective 
interests. In most parts of Africa, the rural folk continue to grant allegiance to traditional 
institutions. It is upon such traditional institutions that Africans invented forms of voluntary 
associations during the colonial period as a response to the disruptive impacts of 
urbanisation and commercialisation. 
Sometimes some of these organisations were updated expressions of long standing informal 
solidarities such as ethnic welfare associations, prophetic movements, agricultural work 
parties and in some cases they gave collective shape to new occupational and class 
identities e.g. peasant movements, labour unions and professional associations. Many of 
these voluntary organisations became explicitly political by giving voice, first to protest at 
the indignities of colonial rule and later calling for independence (Bratton 1989). They were 
thus indeed the building blocks for the nationalist political parties that would arise later. 
One might have therefore expected a perpetuation of a trend towards institutional 
pluralism in the rash to modernisation in the early colonial period. However the new African 
political elite gave top priority to state sovereignty and national security. They chose to 
invest scarce power resources in the construction of one party or military regimes. Yet even 
centralised regimes were not universally successful at discouraging autonomous 
organisations from taking root within civil society. 
The colonial governments throughout Africa destroyed most of the civic groups that existed 
prior to the advent of colonization. Such groups were viewed suspiciously by the colonial 
governments who feared that they could become instrumental in mobilizing against colonial 
rule. Furthermore, colonial governments actively discouraged the formation of civil societies 
which could have participated in the political process in their countries (Makumbe 1998). 
The only civic groups that were allowed to operate and take part in the political processes 
during the colonial era were those whose membership comprised of the settlers or 
colonialists themselves. Africans were restricted into creating seemingly apolitical 
organisations such as burial societies. It was only through the passage of time that these 
burial societies became the fora for the expression for political demands. It is mostly 
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through such initiatives that the political parties that fought for independence were born. 
Civil society was instrumental in partnering with the liberation forces to liberate Africa into 
independence. 
The fact that the contemporary African state is not a product of indigenous society should 
not be taken to mean that African political is an institution-less arena. Forms of 
associational life have evolved in rural Africa that addresses the direct needs of peasant 
producers for survival, accumulation and reproduction under harsh and unpredictable 
conditions. Traditional social relations were rooted in the moral expectation that members 
will support one another in times of need. Thus the invisible organisations in this network of 
mutual obligation may be difficult to discern to the untrained eye because they are ad-hoc 
and informal rather than regular and formalised. Public morality in Africa is derived from 
particularistic values of the economy of affection rather than from the universalistic values 
embodied in constitutional law and rational bureaucracy (Bratton 1989). 
Post-independence Africa witnessed a widespread drive towards one party state as the new 
governments argued that the concept of multi-party democracy was alien and meant to 
divide the people. Most civil society organisations were ‘consumed’ by the governments and 
they lost relevance as they become part and parcel of the ruling parties. The disintegration 
of socialism seems to have triggered a widespread civil unrest in Africa. Both the civil society 
and opposition parties challenged the ruling elites in the mostly one party states and 
military regimes forcing them to accede to some form of democratization of the political 
systems (Makumbe 1998). Transitions away from one party state and military regimes 
started with political protests and evolved through liberal reforms and culminated in 
competitive elections and often ended up with the installation of new forms of regimes. 
Although all this was not unfolding uniformly in the continent, these movements and 
institutional arrangements appear to be evident in almost all African countries. Such major 
changes could not have been occurring without an active and dynamic civil society. 
According to Makumbe (1998), critics of civil society in Africa who claim that Africa has no 
meaningful civil society, fail to recognize and realize that unlike in developed countries, 
Africa has faced several obstacles to the development of its civil society since the advent of 
colonialism. The colonisers made efforts to ensure that no civil society groups could emerge 
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in their colonies and in post-independence, the new governments’ discouraged civil 
societies by practicing the one party state system of governance. Thus a lot of time has been 
lost to develop civil society. African civil society has existed in very difficult circumstances 
and just when one though they had found their foot, they remain mired in deep problems 
that affect their standing. 
The fact that there exists in Africa today some organized groups of citizens that undertake 
various non-state activities including exerting pressure on the state and the ruling elites for 
positive socio-economic and political changes is enough evidence to show that there exists 
civil society in African today. African civil society is however fairly weak and is beset by a 
plethora of constraints such as financial, organizational, operational and even 
environmental in nature (Makumbe 1998). These constraints make it difficult for civil society 
in Africa to effectively represent, promote and protect the interests of the people. Some of 
the constraints have been degenerated by Africa’s history while others are a direct result of 
the continent’s social, cultural and political condition. Although resolving these problems 
could take considerable time and resources, the task facing African civil society is not 
insurmountable. 
The attempt over the past decade to provide a programme to secure democracy particularly 
in Africa has of late come to depend quite substantially on civil society. Kasfir (1998b) has 
gone further to argue that the importance of civil society organisations in creating and 
sustaining democracy in Africa has been greatly overstated. Therefore, even after the 
initiation of democracy in Africa, there is much less confidence that African states are 
becoming democracies. With a few exceptions, those states that initiated transitions and 
even those that replaced their rulers with an election have entered an uncertain limbo in 
which their regimes reflect a contradictory combination of characteristics of democracy, 
authoritarianism and inherited practices of neo-patrimonialism (Kasfir 1998b). He argues 
that scholars have idealized the Western practices from which they borrow the notion and 
have overlooked the defects in the African context especially on its inequalities to access, 
difficulties in responding to problems of collective action and the general lack of finance 
(Kasfir 1998b). To him, a broader strategy of governance that takes into account both the 
building of civil society and assisting political institutions is more likely to contribute to 
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democracy and good governance. The nature and strength of Africa’s fledging civil societies 
will also help to determine the prospects for democratic consolidation.  
Proponents of the liberal ideology of civil society in Africa argue that the starting position in 
strengthening civil society is to increase participation in both the members active within 
them and the number of associations or organisations. The assumption is that because civil 
society plays an important role in enriching Western democracies, it would have the same 
effect on Africa. This is a much idealised view and facts on the ground shows that 
participation in the Western democracies has been decreasing. However, it should be taken 
that the concept of civil society needs an adaptive view. This suggests that while the 
concept is potentially relevant to non-western societies, it will take on local different 
meanings and should not therefore be applied too rigidly either at the level of analysis or in 
the implementation of policy and should not be deployed instrumentally in search of 
predictable policy outcomes (Lewis 2002). 
Furthermore, Makumbe (1998) has argued that the historic dynamic nature through which 
civil society in Africa developed and the neo-patrimonial political environment within which 
they operate combine to render civil society fairly weak and beset with constraints of a 
financial, organizational and operational nature. As a consequence, African civil society will 
continue to need material, financial and moral support from western donors. The question 
of civil society’s independence from donor influence is therefore crucial in analyzing the 
structural set up of civil society. African civil society tends to replicate the neo-patrimonial 
and authoritarian tendencies of the state in both its organizational structures and 
operations (Ncube 2010). 
Associational life in Africa took different forms in different countries. However, in almost 
everywhere, it provided ordinary people with an outlet for the political urge to combine in 
pursuit of shared goals. It must also be noted that the political space for civil society in 
Africa is shrinking. Okumu (2011) noted that in 2011 two thirds of the African states 
adopted or passed a legislation that reduces the space for civil society organisations 
especially those that are politically active or receive international support. Some African 
states are increasingly looking to the east for inspiration on how to jumpstart development 
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and economic growth. In such a development model the role of civil society is curtailed 
rather than promoted. 
2.5 Civil Society in Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe has a large, diverse and active civic community ranging from residents 
associations, student groups to think tanks and trade unions. Critical watchdog’s functions 
performed by civil society organisations in the democratic governance arena include 
election monitoring, political violence monitoring, corruption monitoring and tracking public 
opinion. To a large extent, Zimbabwe’s civil society is as much constructed by that discourse 
as it is self-invented, and its invention may have been by means and for ends rather than 
those implied in mainstream civil society discourse. Its intervention and construction has 
come through a history of struggles for and over politics, class struggle and the day to day 
material contingencies of survival as much as identity, freedom and verities of liberal and 
libertarian thought often associated with theories of civil society (Moore 2006). However, 
civil society in Zimbabwe suffers from the general weaknesses common in the sector across 
Africa as well as specific shortcomings that arise from the Zimbabwean crisis. 
Development of civil society in Zimbabwe mirrors that of other African countries. Moyo 
(1993) has argued that civil society in Zimbabwe is in a state of chronic underdevelopment 
that he approximates to social paralysis. This can be attributed to historical factors of pre-
independence and post-independence. However, it should be noted that in the late 1990s, 
Zimbabwe seem to have had a vibrant civil society. Civil society in Zimbabwe is struggling to 
define itself within the confines of the sense of the concept of civil society as universally 
accepted mainly because it has and is struggling to establish free associations that were not 
under the tutelage of the state and more recently from the opposition political parties and 
donors. 
During the pre-independence period, as has been noted on the civil society in Africa, the 
essence of the British colonial policies after the occupation of the country in 1890 and the 
days of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 were to criminalise the 
politics of the black community. Thus without political activity the prospects of civil society 
were diminished. For the black community, political activity became a clandestine affair as 
they were forced to organize and coordinate behind closed doors under life threatening 
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conditions (Moyo 1993). The British settlers’ attempts to monopolise politics resulted in an 
underdeveloped civil society in Zimbabwe. During this period, social movements such as 
trade unions, student groups, community organisations and political parties in the black 
community were trampled upon and viciously dealt with in an attempt to relegate them to 
permanent irrelevance. Colonial authorities frustrated the development of civil society in 
Zimbabwe by seeking to remove the black community from mainstream politics and 
confining them to the realm of tribal existence where they would be natives and define 
themselves in ethnic terms as opposed to national identities (Moyo 1993). There was a 
belief among the colonisers that blacks were better governed as tribal entities and this 
belief dominated the settler government thinking during the colonial period. The result was 
that the development of civil society among the black majority was severely undermined. 
According to Raftopoulos (2000), the growth of nationalist political party organizations 
between the early 1950s and the end of the colonial period in 1980 provided Africans with a 
broad civic forum in which to organize, to develop some form of political accountability, and 
to engage in the protracted, uneven and still unfinished process of constituting a national 
identity. The experience of nationalist organizations was both inclusive and subordinating in 
that, although the nationalist movement provided a broad framework for political 
organisation, it constrained the autonomous growth of various organizational structures in 
the name of a unified, more centrally controlled national structure (Raftopoulos 2000). 
Moyo’s (1993) views on how the colonial governments criminalised the politics in African 
communities and the mode of colonial rule which restricted blacks to the realm of tribal 
existence where they would define themselves ethnically as opposed to national identity 
has been strengthened by the work of Mamdani (1996). Mamdani (1996) has explained the 
weakness of African civil society through the bifurcated nature of the colonial state that 
developed two forms of power under a single hegemonic authority. Thus while urban power 
spoke the language of civil society and civil rights, the rural power under customary 
authority was concerned with enforcing traditions on the community. 
The post-independence period was characterised by a government which, although it had a 
fairly broad basis for legitimacy founded on the legacy of the liberation struggle and a 
general developmentalist socialist programme faced the task of establishing its dominion in 
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the state and in parts of the country where its support was weak (Raftopoulos 2000). 
Therefore its rule was characterised by popular consent and a distinctive coercion to 
enforce unity and compliance. This therefore meant the establishment of political structures 
that marginalised dissenting voices.  
The attainment of independence in 1980 after a protracted war gave hope to Zimbabweans 
that there would be a complete turnaround from the colonial and UDI attitudes towards 
politics. They hoped to regain all the lost liberties that they had been deprived of for close 
to a hundred years of colonial rule. This proved not to be, instead the ruling Zimbabwe 
African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) took maximum advantage of an 
underdeveloped civil society by claiming that ZANU PF was the sole representative of the 
people. The party declared itself to be the umbrella organisation of all social movements 
and went about destroying civil society organisations in the name of the revolution (Moyo 
1993). Organisations were challenged to join the ruling party as a way to prove their 
revolutionary and patriotic commitment. 
In 1981 ZANU PF declared the year as the year of the consolidation of the people’s power 
which according to President Mugabe impelled the ruling party to adopt a more 
comprehensive and a more generous view of government embracing all these forces. The 
need for such a comprehensive view of government was interpreted by the ruling party to 
mean a one party state. The nation was told that the new country demanded people either 
as individuals or groups, a single loyalty that is proper and a manifestation of the national 
unity and spirit of reconciliation. The single loyalty meant loyalty to the ruling party. Social 
groups that tried to resist the tactic of exclusion by inclusion under the guise of one state, 
one society, one nation and one leader were branded sell outs and enemies of the 
state/nation (Moyo 1993). 
Civil society organisations that had operated clandestinely and underground during the 
colonial period and had hoped to gain legitimacy after independence were left decimated 
by the ruling party tactics. Some bled to death as they failed to find any political space for 
independent policies and opinions arising from self-management and self-organisation 
without the watchful eye of the state. Those that survived found themselves having to join 
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and toe the ruling party line. As a result civil society remained weak in lobbying for strategic 
policy changes. 
Kagoro (2003) argued that the public arena in Zimbabwe during the 1980s was dominated 
by state security concerns. At the time the country was faced with real threats from the 
apartheid regime in South Africa, insurgency groups in Matabeleland and Midlands 
provinces and the Renamo bandits along the border with Mozambique. The exigencies of 
state security were used as a guise for liquidating all forms of dissent and keeping a tight 
rein on the emergence of independent associational life. Moore (2006) has also argued that 
the 1980s can be viewed as an era in which the post-independence civil society began to 
emerge amidst the ZANU PF government’s countervailing efforts to create a one party state 
along the lines of nationalism and Marxist-Leninism. In spite of the fact that ‘nationalism’ 
had won the state, a civil society would emerge that was almost inseparable from the state 
just as it was during the struggle. Thus civil and political societies were barely 
distinguishable during this period although much of civil society did indeed end up battling 
politically for a state which in allowing for more political plurality would also create the 
space for autonomous organisations that would not be seen by the state as an autonomous 
threat to its power (Moore 2006). 
However, it is equally important to note that during this period there was an equally 
organized women’s movement. The women’s movement was engaged in very successful 
advocacy especially around inheritance laws and the issues of women’s human rights. The 
women’s movement questioned the extensive exclusion of women from structures and 
processes of governance. Thus the women’s movement’s unique contribution to the politics 
of nascent civil society in the post-colonial state was the notion of social exclusion as an 
expression of limited citizenship, misrecognition and dehumanization (Kagoro 2003). 
In 1990 the state responded to the global events by abandoning the majoritarian, 
developmentalist rhetoric and adopted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank (WB) prescriptions for the economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP). This 
prescribed among other things the downsizing of the state, removal of subsidies in social 
services, deregulation of financial services and the privatisation of state owned enterprises. 
Aid became tied to questions of governance and political liberalisation. Therefore the 
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emergence of pro-democracy movements in the post 1990s was linked in part to the 
contextual changes in the global political economy as well as explicit donor interventions. 
On one hand ESAP had authored the very conditions of impoverishment and social exclusion 
that have made governance a topical issue in Zimbabwe today whilst on the other hand it 
brought in the political and economic liberalisation around which the post 1990 civil 
struggles have and continue to be waged. The civil society critique of the economic 
conditions authored by ESAP was linked to the greater democratisation in the form and 
discourse of constitutionalism (Kagoro 2003). The popularity of the constitutional discourse 
was demonstrated by the emergence of the NCA, a discourse that has for most part been 
conducted within the terrain of liberal human and civic rights. The NCA succeeded in forging 
a broad alliance to advocate for a new home grown constitution. 
The 1990s saw the proliferation of civil society organisations in Zimbabwe and this is mainly 
due to the deregulation of the economy. The deregulation of the economy saw the 
introduction of the structural economic adjustment programmes in which a lot of social 
services that the people had been accustomed to were removed. Civil societies appear to fill 
the gap that had been left by the state’s removal of the social services. There was a rise of 
discontent by the populace in the country on the economic direction the country was taking 
and civil society seems to capture the moment especially the trade unions. 
However, civil society in Zimbabwe seems to be facing a quagmire with the problems of 
financing and agenda setting. Civil society organisations in Zimbabwe are creatures of the 
international community which provides much of the funding. This problem exists on two 
fronts, domestically and internationally (Sachikonye 2011). Domestically, civil society 
organisations needs to free itself from the opposition politics and internationally, they 
needs to be less dependent on international donors if they are to enjoy meaningful 
autonomy in crafting its own agenda (Sachikonye 2011).  
The other problem with civil society organisations in Zimbabwe is that it is not anchored in 
its domestic constituencies. Therefore the struggle for democratization should be conceived 
on two levels, within the civil society organisations and the struggle to democratize the state 
and national politics. Carrying out the later task presents another challenge of organizing 
and participating as a collective.  Civil society in Zimbabwe has a high oversensitivity to 
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organizational tuff and the need to protect the autonomy. Such an organizational 
psychology militates against effective and sustained collaboration among civil society 
organisations. 
Civil society organisations in Zimbabwe have also suffered as a result of the Zimbabwean 
crisis with the exodus of skilled personnel. Civil society played a crucial part in the formation 
of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in the late 1990s and this has 
created problem for them. This proved to be a moral quandary on whether civic leaders 
should assume a political role by holding political office (Kagoro 2003). The state had to use 
this to discredit the entire civil society as partisan and politically biased and actuated by self-
interest.  
The sector finds itself highly politicized today and rather than playing a non-partisan 
mediating role, some strategically located civil society organisations find it necessary to 
pronounce on whether the various contesting political parties deserve the sector support. 
Because of its perceived association with the opposition parties in the last decade, civil 
society organisations have attracted undue attention from the state. The state has enacted 
the Private Voluntary Organisations Act that governs the sector and gives the state 
considerable discretion over their registration, finances and operations. The relationship 
between the state and civil society organisations has been a terrain of political struggle, 
with the state stepping up surveillance and threats especially against organisations engaged 
in governance and human rights work.  
The relationship between the state and civil society has metamorphosed and oscillated over 
time. Civil society organisations were embedded in the ZANU PF one party state mantra in 
the 1980s, played midwife to the birth of opposition politics of the MDC in the late 1990s, 
sought an influential autonomous role in the transitional government of 2008 and have 
retreated shell shocked on the outcome of the 2013 general elections without a clear 
agenda on how to move forward. The installation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) 
after the 2008 elections created serious divisions within the civil society. Emblematic in the 
rift was the constitutional making process with key organisations such as the NCA, 
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the Zimbabwe National Students Union 
(ZINASU) vehemently opposed to the leading role of parliament where they argued that the 
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process was not people driven. Other organisations recognized that constitutional reform 
requires political power and technical expertise and participated in the process. 
Zimbabwean civil society in the late 1990s became so robust that in 2000 together with the 
fledging opposition MDC successfully campaigned for a no vote in the government authored 
daft constitution referendum. This was probably their highest water mark and maybe the 
most resounding victory in its history. Soon after the referendum in which the ZANU PF 
party and government was hugely embarrassed, the party-state which had been in a 
reactive mood woke up, sharpened and displayed its fangs (Sachikonye 2011) and used 
them in a multi-frontal attack on the opposition, media and civil society.  
State-civil society relations degenerated into deep polarization and conflict and a protracted 
struggle for space (Sachikonye 2011). The state reengaged its hegemonic gear and with 
vengeance. The state became an angry state in defense of an angry regime and an angry 
ruling party and governing by anger became the modus operandi and a form of governance. 
The 2008 election were held under this set up and this laid the contextual frame work for 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) initiated inter-party dialogue that 
culminated in the power sharing transitional deal. 
The Zimbabwean civil society blossomed during the crisis ridden decade with a number of 
governance and human rights organisations flourishing. However, Sachikonye notes with 
regret that a distinctive feature of civil society organisations at the turn of the millennium 
was that in the aftermath of the triumphant defeat of the government’s draft constitution, 
virtually all the organisations harbored visions of short, sharp and decisive victory over the 
state and the ushering of a new post authoritarian era. As history now records, this turned 
out to be an illusion and more critically the civil society organisations were slow to adjust 
and reorient to the new reality of a vicious but insecure state determined to secure and 
prolong its hold at the apex of power. Civic society thus clearly underestimated the regime’s 
quest and appetite for retaining power. Therefore the civil society failed to read the 
situation and adjust their programmes and strategies appropriately. 
One of the salutary contributions of the Zimbabwean civil society in the Zimbabwe imbroglio 
was the ability to keep the flame of democracy burning. They were able to keep the 
Zimbabwean crisis and the issue of democratization alive domestically, regionally and 
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internationally even in the face of hardened authoritarian and dictatorial regime. It must be 
noted that the enactment of the GPA and the establishment of the coalition government 
meant a new phase in the struggle for democracy had downed upon the country and this 
demanded a new radical adjustment. Regrettably several civil society organisations did not 
recognize that the new realities offered a new structure of opportunities under changed 
circumstances.  
Critically, most civil organisations partnered the opposition MDC and in terms of the 
coalition government of 2008, the MDC Formations went into government. Thus, whatever 
the justification, civil society was not supposed to continue being cosy with the MDC given 
the watchdog role civil society has to play. The elections in March to end the coalition 
government this year saw the MDC being trounced by ZANU PF and this has complicated the 
matter for the civil society organisation as some openly campaigned for the MDC and thus 
ZANU PF does not hold them as legitimate representatives of the people who plays a 
watchdog role but an appendage of the opposition. 
It is important to note that by the standards of other African countries except South Africa, 
Zimbabwe has a robust civil society. Its development, however, has been shaped by the 
state policies of cooptation in the early years of independence to being vocal during the 
height of the Zimbabwean crisis. It is a heterogeneous community spread across a spectrum 
of humanitarian charities, community based organisations, to development non-
governmental organisations and governance oriented civil society organisations. Despite 
operating under a lot of duress, they have of late been speaking candidly and have been 
boldly vocal in speaking the truth to the powers that be by challenging the monolithic and 
hardening authoritarian order of the government regime. 
2.6 Conclusion: Civil society in Zimbabwe post 2005 
Civil society gained international reputation due to the escalation of the Zimbabwean crisis. 
They became the ears and eyes of the international community and were regarded as more 
objective. They also brought new perspectives with so much experience in matters affecting 
the country for example grassroots development and human rights. They seem to have a 
strong knowledge base and a strong commitment to issues affecting the country as well as 
issues relevant to the emancipation of the country. They have also shown more sensitivity 
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and understanding of Africa’s severe economic and political crisis than their respective 
governments. NGOs and civil society have recommended an action oriented compact for 
Africa’s development which must be translated into coordinated programmes for short term 
solution thus keeping in mind that the people at the grassroots level must take lead in their 
needs and formulating development strategies. 
NGOs and civil societies have demonstrated an awareness of the fact that convectional 
development models have not changed the situation of the poor and have been quick to 
recognise that people are poor because they have no power. Political environment fraught 
with repressive legislation, violence and replete with intimidation and polarisation has made 
it very difficult for civil society to operate. Due to their strong interest in local development 
processes and their ability to connect local processes in national and global processes, NGOS 
and civil society if incorporated in policy making processes, they can contribute to the 
internalisation and localisation of international development goals. They have the capacity 
to contextualise international goals and develop them more so as to make them appropriate 
on the national and local levels. They connect the global with the local. 
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CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDY: THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY (NCA) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the case study of the research, the NCA by looking into the history of 
constitutionalism in Zimbabwe and fitting into history how the NCA came into existence. As 
mentioned earlier, in Zimbabwe, state driven development had failed hence the emergence 
of other non-state actors as part of the salvation. There is also the problematic issue of what 
is the prerequisite for development. It has been argued that an essential prerequisite is 
constitutionalism and the rule of law and that once a country can attain those two then 
there will be economic development as well as the deep entrenchment of democracy and 
good governance. Zimbabwe’s political development or regression since 1980 has been 
centred on attempts or lack of to resolve the unfinished business of the Lancaster House 
constitution. The governance crisis is largely due to the Lancaster House constitution 
(Kagoro 2004). 
Constitutions are now seen as tools for bridge-building amongst and between civil society 
and the state (Sachikonye 2011). Thus in order to develop African political cultures 
grounded in human rights and social justice, an organic link is needed between the 
constitution as a rule of law instrument primarily concerned with restraining government 
excesses and protecting ordinary citizens and the constitution as a legitimation of power 
structures and relations based on a broad social consensus with a diverse society. The task is 
to move away from old constitutionality that overemphasised law and state power towards 
new constitutionalism that has more relevance to the needs of citizens and ultimately 
owned by them. Constitutionalism is therefore the mirror reflecting the national soul, the 
ideals and aspirations of a nation, the articulation of values bonding its people and 
disciplining its government. Thus a thorough and inclusive process of constitutional reform 
has the potential to remedy Zimbabwe’s governance crisis.  
The most important legal instrument in the scheme of good governance is the national 
constitution. A major part of the answer to economic development and good governance 
lies in the development of constitutions that can stand the test of time and that deliberately 
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structure national institutions engaged in the management of the country in such a way as 
to ensure that a capable state is ensured. The future of democracy is predicated on the 
development of viable constitutional arrangements that set up viable institutions within 
which to conduct the business of good governance and which foster an environment where 
peace and development can flourish. Such an arrangement will ensure that the exercise of 
government authority is exercised in a predictable, responsible and legally regulated way to 
the satisfaction of civil society. It should however be noted that it is not for outsiders to 
meddle in the constitutional development process or tell what should be in the constitution. 
The people must decide their own constitution because there is a well-founded suspicion 
especially with the history of colonialism of anything smacking of superior wisdom from 
outside. 
Economic recovery and development must begin with a recuperation of those values that 
are acknowledged as the foundations for human society (Mdulo 2001). These values are in 
turn the foundation of social creativity and democratic governance. Thus there is need to 
establish stable political and constitutional orders that promote development and aid in the 
conquest of poverty, hunger, disease and ignorance while also guaranteeing citizens rule of 
law and equal protection regardless of sex, colour or ethnic origin. The aim should be to 
achieve a constitutional order that is legitimate, credible and enduring and which is 
structurally accessible to the people without compromising the integrity and effectiveness 
of the process of governance. Constitutional democracy will inevitably involve multiple or 
concurrent constitutional orders than a single centre of authority and power. A constitution 
is thus not an act of government but of a people constituting a government and a 
government without a constitution is power without a right (Mdulo 2001). A constitution is 
a thing antecedent to a government and a government is only the creature of a constitution. 
It is a basic structure of any organised society. 
Some scholars have criticised the move towards written constitutions and the current 
constitutional arrangements on the grounds that they are based on western models of 
governance rather than on African ideals of governance. They have gone further to question 
the relevance of western models to the African conditions. However, while transplanting 
western models into Africa might be problematic, the motives of some of those who 
advocate for African solutions to Africa’s problems may sometimes be suspect. Indeed most 
65 
 
dictators and advocates of one party state system of governance justified themselves on the 
grounds that they were a variant of democracy best suited to the peculiar African 
circumstances and a natural facilitator of economic growth and promoter of national unity. 
It only became clear later that these justifications had little to do with the African concepts 
of governance but more to do with consolidation of power through the elimination of 
political opposition. 
A serious search for viable constitutional arrangements must begin with a frank 
identification and examination of the specific social, political and economic conditions of the 
present (Mdulo 2001). It must be noted that a constitution affects the lives of all citizens 
and therefore must address the concerns of all citizens regardless of ethnicism, gender or 
station in life. A constitution of a nation is therefore not just a statute that mechanically 
defines the structures of government between the governors and the governed but should 
be a mirror reflecting the national soul, the identification of the ideals and aspirations of a 
nation and an articulation of the values binding its people and disciplining its government. It 
is an autobiography of a nation. It should reflect the lives of all the people. The people must 
have a sense of ownership of the document and must be able to see themselves and their 
history before they can respect and obey it. Thus constitutions that do not address the real 
issues or causes of discontent are sure to generate legitimate crisis. 
Beyond the essential ingredients of a democracy, good governance and development, 
constitutions should be seen as a liberating document that not only limits the powers of the 
state and its institutions but also guarantees the kinds of liberties and freedoms that will be 
able to make the pursuant of happiness and self-fulfilment a reality for the people. It should 
guarantee an equal opportunity for all citizens irrespective of gender, race, religion or 
ethnicity. Equal opportunity for all is a mark for true liberation because it ensures that the 
benefits of economic development accrue to many people and not just a few and that all 
citizens have a chance to live up to their potential and achieve self-fulfilment. 
3.2 History of Constitutionalism in Zimbabwe  
According to Sachikonye (2011), Zimbabwe has a chequered history in constitution making. 
The Lancaster House constitution was negotiated under duress. Presided over by Britain, the 
constitution reflected the balance of forces involved in the independence negotiations as 
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well as the power balance within the southern African region at that particular juncture 
(Sachikonye 2011). As a compromise document, the Lancaster House constitution pervaded 
the process and structures through which the new state sought to consolidate national 
independence and provide the basis for economic and social development. Mandaza (1986) 
has noted that the conduct of the Lancaster House conference itself, the various 
concessions made by the liberation forces leaders all tended to reflect a result less than that 
which might have been expected of a national liberation movement had it won an outright 
victory in the battlefield. 
Zimbabwe’s political and constitutional history is largely textured by the form which 
nationalism and the liberation struggle took from the 1960s to the 1970s. The convectional 
nationalist movement that arose in the 1950s and early 1960s was confronted by an 
obdurate white minority regime that refused to concede independence to the majority. The 
settler regime as argued earlier used repressive means to contain African nationalism. The 
nationalist movement then mutated into a liberation movement that grew in strength and 
spread its tentacles, subsequently forcing the minority regime to the negotiating table 
(Sachikonye 2004). Post-independence analyses on the political developments in Zimbabwe 
should never underestimate the role in which violence and coercion played in the colonial 
regime strategies to block independence as well as in the nationalist movement politics 
themselves. The use of detention, torture and killings was perpetrated by the colonial 
regime and the nationalist movements also utilised violence and intimidation in mobilising 
supporters for support.  
Zimbabwe adopted a constitution in 1979 that was a product of negotiations to end the 
liberation struggle. The nationalist movement that ‘supposedly’ represented the people was 
not elected by the people. Their legitimacy was drawn from their active prosecution of the 
armed liberation struggle. The 1979 constitution bore resemblance to most independent 
constitutions that were the outcome of an agreement between the colonial power and the 
representatives of the colonised people. Nevertheless, the Lancaster House constitution was 
premised on the recognition of the liberal norms of constitutionalism (Sachikonye 2004). It 
incorporated the concepts of separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, and 
supremacy of the legislature over the executive, public service neutrality and government 
accountability. The constitution thus sought to place extensive limitations on the powers of 
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the government. A provision in the constitution stipulated that the constitution should not 
be changed substantially for the next ten years so as to ensure that the transition after 
independence would not entail a substantial shift in social and property relations. The 
clause would only later have far reaching consequences on the realm of land rights. 
The Lancaster House constitution was no more than a compromise between competing 
interests. There was a terrible absence of wider and popular participation in its making and 
this robbed it of a broader legitimacy among the generality of Zimbabweans. Mdulo (2010) 
has noted that the Lancaster house constitution failed to create potential for the necessary 
institutional change not only on the institutions in the political realm but also in the 
institutions that govern the way the economy functions. It therefore failed to serve as a 
framework for local political and economic actors to negotiate the transformation from a 
colonial state with great economic disparities to a more equitable Zimbabwe. 
The Lancaster House agreement was also a compromise between the transfer of political 
power to blacks and the entrenchment of the economic privileges of the white settlers and 
international capital (Kagoro 2003). Thus the agreement toned down most of the more 
radical preferences of the socialist oriented liberation movements of an independent 
Zimbabwe. Raftopoulos (2004) argues that the Lancaster house constitution gave the settler 
capital a decade long period of consolidation during which issues around radical 
restructuring of the legacy of economic inequality were effectively put on hold. During the 
negotiations the land issue proved to be a contentious point. One of the nationalist leaders, 
Joshua Nkomo stated that, “we knew that vast acreage were lying idle and therefore 
without market price in areas formerly reserved for white ownership. To buy areas 
adequate for resettling the many land hungry African farmers who had been confined to the 
former tribal trust lands, would be beyond the financial ability of the new state” (Nkomo 
1984). Thus the new constitution constrained the capacity of those who had been disposed 
of their land to claim it. The Lancaster House constitution was therefore determined by a 
series of national, regional and international economic forces that established the contours 
of the compromise that necessitated the policy of reconciliation announced by president 
Robert Mugabe in 1980 (Raftopoulos 2004). 
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The Lancaster House constitution was expected not to have its significant provisions 
amended for 10 years. According to Sachikonye (2011), it was therefore surprising that from 
1990 (the date of expiry of the stricture) to 1998 there was no urgent attempt to review the 
constitution and institute reform despite many burning issues relating to democracy, land 
reform and social rights. Instead the executive introduced some constitutional amendments 
that premised on centralisation and consolidation of power and authority. Thus the absence 
of urgency in constitutional reform can be partly explained in that the president was a major 
beneficiary of the amendments especially the one made in 1987. The 1987 amendments 
created the position of an executive president which vested near absolute powers in the 
president especially in critical areas of the constitutional and political process thereby 
creating a presidential monarch. 
According to Sachikonye (2004), while the Lancaster House constitution served an important 
purpose of transferring power from the minority settler regime to a majority government, it 
was not necessarily a good foundation for good governance. It would only later be described 
as outdated, imposed and transitional instrument that does not represent the wishes and 
aspirations of the people for good governance and development (Hlatshwayo 1998, in 
Sachikonye 2004). To compound the problem, the post-independence government did not 
prove to be an ardent reformer in terms of democratisation. It has been argued that while 
majority rule was for the first time extended voting rights and participation in the electoral 
process to all people, democratic values of tolerance and respect for the rule of law was not 
strictly observed by the government (Sachikonye 2004). The emphasis of the post 
independent Zimbabwe became that of consolidation of power over every layer of society 
and decent was crushed ruthlessly. 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) has argued that any serious analysis of the roots of the crisis of the 
national democratic revolution in Zimbabwe must be traced back to the Lancaster house 
settlement because the settlement was directly responsible for compromising a 
‘revolutionary transition’ under which the racially biased inequalities in land and assert 
distribution could have been resolved. Zimbabwe was thus born with what Amanda 
Hammar and Brian Raftopoulos has termed the “unfinished business” (Hammar, 
Raftopoulos and Jensen 2003). 
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In 1987 the government introduced the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act No 7. 
This introduced an executive president with an unlimited term of office and President 
Mugabe became the first incumbent with omnipotent powers typically given to executive 
presidents in a one party state (Kagoro 2004). This constitutional amendment shifted power 
significantly towards the executive marginalising the legislature and the judiciary. 
Furthermore in 1992 the government under pressure from the labour unions that were 
calling for strikes passed a Labour Relations Amendment Bill that was meant to pre-empt 
mass protests by labour at the imposition of the economic structural adjustment 
programme. Labour was incensed and called for street demonstrations that were heavily 
suppressed by the police. It was in this context of severely proscribed civic and political 
space that a blistering critique of the government and ruling party emerged. 
Matinenga (2013) also notes that Zimbabwe like many other countries in the region soon 
amended the independence constitution and unfortunately not for the better but for the 
worse. There was a general shift to monolithic executive government chaired by an equally 
all powerful president. Thus the emphasis of governance shifted from the people to nation 
or sovereign rights. The people were told that western constitutions do not work in Africa 
and there was need to search for an African democracy. All this was synonymous with 
dictatorship and tyranny. The constitution was amended ostensible for it to be relevant to 
the country’s peculiar situation but in reality the amendments were concentrated on vesting 
more power to the executive. By the 1990s, the constitution was now bearing very little 
resemblance to the original document of 1980 (Mdulo 2010). The document was now 
shaped by sixteen separate amendments all of which made multiple changes to the 
constitution. The amendments reduced the country to a party-state and converting the 
nation into a party-nation. ZANU PF leader became elevated to national symbols. 
Opposition to ZANU PF was seen as unpatriotic and an enemy of the country. Membership 
and loyalty to ZANU PF came with great rewards and often immunity from prosecution. 
As protests mounted regarding government corruption in the 1990s as well as the general 
failure to improve the quality of life for all the citizens, the government became 
undemocratic and authoritarian by centralising power in an attempt to hold on power. Thus 
the attributes of the state became a highly centralised system of governance, excessive 
control of all aspects of human endeavour, limited capacity to govern, excessive regulation 
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of the civil society, weak institutions of the state and civil society, few countervailing forces 
to the power of the executive, limited participation in governance by the general populace, 
preferential access to power and resources often determined by ethnical and geographical 
considerations (Mdulo 2010). 
The result of the attributes to the state was an unprecedented economic decline and 
increasing poverty among the general populace. There was clearly a crisis of governance and 
as a result there was stagnation in development. Clearly the Lancaster House constitution 
had failed to gain legitimacy or to provide a framework for the democratic governance. The 
challenge was how to achieve a stable political and constitutional order that would promote 
development and good governance. The aspirations became that of achieving a 
constitutional order that is legitimate, credible, enduring and structurally accessible to the 
people without compromising the integrity and effectiveness of the process. This is the 
situation that was prevailing in the country by the time the NCA was formed. 
Sachikonye (2011) noted that with the benefit of hindsight, the period between 1990 and 
1998 would most probably have provided a more conducive environment and conjecture for 
constitutional reform. This was because this was a period in which political positions had not 
hardened to become too adversarial. Sachikonye calls it a lost decade as far as 
constitutional reform was concerned.  
Ncube (2010) argues that one of the consequences of the Zimbabwean regime’s deliberate 
promotion of institutional paralysis in the post 2000 Zimbabwe was the patronisation of 
policy space within the state and in particular around the person-head of president Mugabe. 
It became hard for non-state actors that were perceived to be anti-government to easily 
access policy spaces. Street demonstrates were ruthlessly quashed further straining the 
state and civil society relations and even dividing the civil society over their appropriateness 
as strategies of engaging the state. 
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3.2.1 Constitutional Amendments 1981 – 2000 
Amendment Year Description of Change 
1 1981 Reduced qualification period of lawyers to the judiciary 
and Senate Legal Committee so as make these various 
offices accessible to black lawyers 
2 1981 Created a separate Supreme Court from the High Court. 
Also specified qualification period for judges, making this 
more attainable by blacks 
3 1983 Afforded Parliament the power to abolish dual 
citizenship 
4 1984 Introduced Office of Ombudsman and reconstituted the 
Judicial Services Commission to give the President more 
control over it 
5 1985 Allowed for appointment of Provincial Governors by the 
President 
6 1987 Ended the separate roll for whites 
7 1987 Created the Executive Presidency and abolished office of 
Prime Minister 
8 1989 Provided for the AG becoming a member of Cabinet thus 
bringing the judiciary under Executive influence 
9 1989 Abolished the Senate making way for a one chamber 
Parliament 
10 1990 Created a second vice-Presidency 
11 1990 Terminated land provision for ‘willing buyer, willing 
seller’ in favour of ‘fair compensation’ 
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12 1993 Reorganized the prison and public services and armed 
services, reducing their independence 
13 1993 Reversed a Supreme Court judgement on the death 
sentence, stated that delayed execution did not amount 
to a human rights abuse 
14 1996 Reversed a Supreme Court judgement on women 
marrying foreign men – such spouses no longer became 
automatic citizens 
15 1998 Changed government financial year from 1st July start 
date to 1st January start date 
16 2000 Land provision transferred responsibility for 
compensation from Zimbabwe Government 
Table 1: Constitutional Amendments from 1980 to 2000 
 
3.3 THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBY (NCA) 
3.3.1 Formation of the NCA  
Magure (2009) argues that the introduction of Economic and Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP) reforms witnessed an increase in industrial unrest as workers tried to 
make up for the loses in wages stemming from inflation. Trade unions began to broaden 
their jurisdiction beyond the shop floor and this ultimately led to the flowering of social 
movements in Zimbabwe. In light of the fact that workers were no longer earning a living 
wage coupled with poor working conditions, the only option left was to bring those issues 
into the national stage by politicising these issues. On the other hand the government’s 
decision to ignore genuine demands from labour in order to ensure the success of the 
economic reforms predisposed the working class to use the political route in order to 
protect themselves from the vagaries of the market forces. The increasing economic 
problems contributed to the erosion of the government legitimacy, providing a fertile 
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ground for civil society to link constitutional issues to the broader problems of the economy 
and lobby the state into playing a facilitative but not deterministic role in establishing a 
process for constitutional reform. 
Dorman (2001) argues that the popularity of the NCA soared because they capitalised on 
both the latent critique of the government and the newly expanded independent media. 
Despite the sense of crisis rapidly emerging in 1997, public criticism of the government 
policies had remained until then in the domain of a few activists and academics. One of the 
NCA’s main submissions to the government was that there was a compelling need for the 
constitutional making process to be free from state control and domination. In 1999 the 
government high jacked the constitutional making process by setting up the Constitutional 
Commission (CC) ostensibly to accommodate NCA demands but without necessarily 
addressing questions of representation, composition and ownership of the process. For the 
NCA, the government process was fundamentally flawed because it negated the ethos of 
good governance. According to one of the founders of the NCA, Tendai Biti, “it is not the 
democratic content that makes a constitution democratic but rather it is the democratic 
process that makes it democratic, otherwise we should have borrowed a democratic 
constitution from the library” (Sithole 2000). 
The arbitrary amendments to the Lancaster House constitution without any proper 
consultation spurred the debate about the need for a new constitution. The amendments 
were seen to be all about vesting power in the executive and even parliament never 
debated the amendments. The main question raised was whether the idea of 
constitutionalism as a means of regulating and limiting the exercise of political power had 
found root in the country’s system of governance (Ncube 1991 in Sachikonye 2004). The 
realisation then was that there could be no significant political and social change that could 
occur without the re-writing of the constitution. More generally then, the regional 
conjecture was one in which progressive constitutions were being made in South Africa and 
Botswana. 
The popularity of the constitutional discourse was demonstrated by the emergence of the 
NCA. This discourse was for the most part conducted under the terrain of liberal human and 
civic rights (Kagoro 2004). The framers of the initiative that would become the NCA were 
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driven by their experiences in pursuing social objectives for labour, marginalised groups, 
victims of human rights abuses, students and women (DuPree 2012). The vision to form NCA 
was inspired by the community and everyday work of the various participating 
organisations. In this work they variously realised that without good governance founded on 
firm foundation of a democratic constitution, the multi-pronged, well-meant efforts to fight 
poverty, hunger and disease in Zimbabwe would remain a pipe dream. The founders wanted 
to prepare Zimbabweans through education, discussion and debate to give them a taste 
that constitutions are made for and by the people. 
The NCA was founded on the 14th of May 1997 with a membership drawn from religious 
organisations, professional associations, grassroots structures, trade unions, academic 
institutions, student organisations, media bodies, business groups, women’s groups, 
political parties and human rights groups. The initial conception was for it to be a one year 
project to carry out public education on the constitution of the country and its shortcomings 
as well as organising debates on possible constitutional reform. The NCA mandate was to 
establish a new tolerant, transparent and democratic legal, political, social and economic 
order and a new constitutional framework upon which good governance and development 
could be founded. The aim of the NCA was to subject the constitution making process to 
popular scrutiny in order to entrench the principle that constitution are made by and for the 
people. 
On the 31st of January 1998, the NCA was officially launched intending to make the 
constitutional making process address the historical and contemporary socio-economic and 
political challenges confronting the society. It was launched as an open access civil 
organisation to work with similar minded organisations and individuals in order to establish 
a new tolerant, transparent, democratic, legal, political, social and economic order as well as 
a constitutional framework upon which good governance could be founded. At the launch 
there were about 135 organisations as indicated by the Table 2 below. The delegates at the 
launch recommended that an independent and impartial body should lead the 
constitutional reform process, that people through a constitutional referendum should 
ratify the new constitution written by the people of Zimbabwe and that the process and its 
structure should be non-partisan (Kagoro 2004).  
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Churches 9 
Interest Groups 8 
Women’s Organisations 7 
Human Rights Groups 4 
NGOs 20 
Trade Unions 10 
Academic Organisations 5 
Cultural Organisations 8 
Student Groups 5 
Resident Associations 4 
Political Parties 14 
Youth Groups 6 
Pressure Groups 7 
Other 28 
Total 135 
Table 2: Membership Organisations of the NCA 
The NCA believed that the people should be the key players in the process of building a new 
constitution. For the first time in the history of the country, the NCA effectively mobilised 
the population to chart a democratic political process that was independent of the state 
effectively pressuring the state to accede to the demands of the new people driven 
constitution. According to Kagoro (2004) the popularity and credence to the agenda of the 
NCA among the ordinary people was boosted by the events between 1997 and 2000. The 
government paid unbudgeted gratuities as compensation to war veterans for participating 
in the liberation struggle and also ventured into the Congo war leading to an economic free-
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fall. This resulted in a growing frustration by the ordinary people leading to a series of 
strikes and stay-aways. The ruthless manner in which the strikes were dealt with by the 
state added weight to NCA claims that the country was faced with both a constitutional and 
governance crisis. The increased repression and economic degeneration served to illustrate 
for the majority of the citizens the disregard for the rule of law and criticism by the 
executive. 
The NCA submitted a statement to the government setting out that it was the duty of the 
incumbent government to facilitate the constitution making process without seeking to 
control or dominate the exercise. It also called for the setting up of the appropriate legal 
framework that would ensure participation by all the citizens in the crafting of the new 
constitution. The framework would include a law providing for the selection of a broadly 
representative Constituent Assembly which would carry out consultations to the people and 
thereafter prepare a report in constitutional form for debate and adoption. The draft 
approved by the Constituent Assembly would then be put to a national referendum. 
The government reacted with scorn and scepticism to the formational and demand of the 
NCA. The government and ZANU PF argued that the NCA was neither national nor an 
assembly. In any case they wanted a process driven by the party. The government expressed 
doubt at the prudence of electing a Constituent Assembly arguing that there was little time 
before the year 2000 general election. Instead the government suggested the appointment 
of a commission consisting of all Members of Parliament (MPs) and representatives of 
various civil society organisations with equal representation. True to what the government 
had stated to the NCA, on the 26th of April 1999 the state president, Robert Mugabe 
gazetted a Statutory Instrument 138A setting up a Constitutional Commission (CC) of Inquiry 
(Kagoro 2004). The commission was charged with initiating the process of constitutional 
review and presenting a new constitution to the president by the 30th of November 1999. 
The commission consisted of 400 members drawn largely from the ruling party and a few 
from the private sector and state friendly non-governmental organisations. The commission 
was directed by the president to afford the people the chance to air their views and an 
opportunity to author and found their constitution enshrining freedom, democracy, 
transparency and good governance. The commission gathered evidence by holding public 
outreach meetings throughout the country as well as by receiving oral and written 
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submissions and its draft would be put to the people in a referendum and if accepted would 
become law. The state had managed to highjack the constitutional agenda from the civil 
society by pretending to accommodate the NCA demands. However, the questions of 
representation, composition and ownership of the process were not adequately addressed 
and this became the bone of contention with the NCA. 
In the midst of all this and having been rebuffed by the government, the NCA held an extra 
ordinary meeting in April 1999 and resolved to convene an all stakeholders constitutional 
convention. The convention was held in June of the same year and was attended by more 
than 7000 people from across the political and geographical spectrum. The People’s 
Constitutional Convention (PCC)’s agenda was to define more succinctly the process to be 
followed in evolving Zimbabwe’s next constitution, define the mechanisms that would 
guarantee genuine national consultation, debate and discussion regarding constitutional 
principles and the actual content of the new constitution and finally to demand that a 
national referendum be held (Kagoro 2004). The PCC also resolved not to participate in the 
government appointed commission and register that the process was defective and gave 
the executive too much control. The PCC further mandated the NCA to run their own 
parallel programme of writing their own constitution and mobilising society through civic 
education. The NCA was to mobilise and educate people on the modalities and reasons for 
rejecting the government process. The NCA boycotted the government process arguing that 
it violated the principles it had submitted earlier. The government resolved to continue 
without the NCA setting the stage for a protracted clash between the two processes, one 
led by the government and the other by civil society. 
True to the arguments of the NCA, the government Constitutional Commission (CC) 
produced a first draft that was questioned by president Mugabe in an address to the ZANU 
PF congress. He was critical of the fact that the draft had included a land and property 
clause that provided for a more generous compensation than the Lancaster House 
constitution. In response to the president query, the CC produced what it termed 40 
clarifications to the draft constitution. Included was the amendment to the land and 
property clause stating that the government would be absolved from paying compensation 
of expropriated land if the British did not make funds available. Also included was an 
amendment that provided for increased executive powers especially in respect to outside 
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military interventions, compulsory national service for youths and the fact that the 
limitations of the terms of office of the president did not apply to the incumbent. The draft 
thus failed to truthfully and faithfully record the views that had been gathered. Workers too 
were agitating for the right to strike and the draft did not give such rights. The final draft 
was therefore a deviation from the expressions of the people and this in turn vindicated the 
NCA which had argued all along that the process was flawed and was meant to hoodwink 
the general populace into believing that their views would be considered when in fact the 
executive had their own personal agendas. 
3.3.1.1 The Constitutional Commission (CC) Constitutional Making Process 
In 1999, the government of Zimbabwe set up a Constitutional Commission (CC) as a direct 
response to public pressure led by civil society on the need of a new democratic constitution 
to replace the Lancaster House constitution. Before then there had been suggestions that 
the NCA process would feed into the government’s proposed commission and whilst talks 
had been held between the two groups, an agreement over the issue of guaranteeing the 
commission’s freedom from presidential interference could not be reached. The 
government appointed 400 individuals of which 150 were members of parliament as 
commissioners who would spear-head the process. The commissioners were appointed by 
the president and were more or less inclined to the ruling ZANU PF party. The commission 
was headed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe. The CC was tasked with 
gathering, analysing and evaluating data from the people on the constitution and to 
produce a final draft constitution for the presentation to the government for a referendum 
before adoption.  
The CC consulted the people through thematic committees outreach programmes that were 
established for that purpose. Unlike the NCA, the CC did not emphasise on the amendments 
to the Lancaster House constitution in its outreach programme but on the problematic 
nature of the Lancaster House constitution having been written by a small elite in the 
United Kingdom. The CC’s goal was often described as home grown with the government 
stating that they were not amending the Lancaster house constitution but moulding it in 
their own image because you cannot have a nation that breathes the historical experiences 
of another nation (Dorman 2001). Aware of the transparency issues, the CC went far beyond 
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what any other commission had ever done in the history of the country. They used paid 
adverts and press releases to outline exactly how the CC would function emphasising that 
the whole world was watching and thus there was no room for not being transparent. 
The mix of the ZANU PF, some opposition figures and non-aligned commissioners was 
unprecedented, although critics still interpreted it as overly ZANU PF. The CC appealed for 
donor funding in order for them to carry out the process. The formation of the CC led to 
some serious divisions within the NCA and civil society as some groups chose to be 
incorporated into the process while others insisted on being autonomous. Some 
organisations saw this as a chance to work within the system especially as it was against the 
background of the government’s implicit corporatist approach to civil society organisations 
and nongovernmental organisations. Some NCA members became more assured in their 
determination not to cooperate with the CC as this would legitimise the process. However, 
the formation of the CC created a situation for a much more conflict prone and combative 
discussion of the constitution (Dorman 2001). 
In August 1999, the CC began a programme of 5 000 meetings that were organised by 8 
provincial teams to solicit for the people’s views. Dorman (2001) recons that while the 
independent press took great pleasure in detailing the CC meetings that were characterised 
by the low turn outs, many people did address the Commissioners and with great 
forthrightness. The CC claimed to have organised 4 321 public meetings which were 
attended by 556 276 people as well as 700 special ad hoc meetings that were attended by 
150 000 people. In addition they received 4 000 written submissions. They also had radio 
and television programmes as a way of reaching out to the people. In October 1999, the CC 
held an open 3-day plenary session in which the views from the provinces, interest groups 
and political parties were presented. After the session everybody became aware of the 
dominant views from the people’s submissions. When the CC prepared the draft, it was 
noted that the draft had deviations from the people’s submissions and that what had been 
presented by ZANU PF during the 3 day plenary session was now dominant in the draft. 
There was a public outcry with at least 24 Commissioners resigning in protest and others 
taking the Commission’s chairperson to court.  
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The outreach for the CC was heavily decampaigned, rejected and boycotted by the NCA who 
were not happy with the composition and terms of reference of the CC. The CC went ahead 
with its government driven constitutional making process and produced a draft constitution 
that was presented to the government for consideration. The government adopted the draft 
constitution before organising a referendum where the draft was offered to the people to 
accept or reject through a vote. In February 2000 the people rejected the draft constitution 
with a 54% ‘no’ vote. The very public failure of the draft constitution to reflect on the 
content of the people’s submissions to the commission during the course of the public 
hearings led to the dramatic rejection of the draft. Unsurprisingly it was criticised by those 
outside the process who emphasised on the issues that the CC had negated but had 
featured prominently from the people’s submissions during outreach. 
3.3.1.2 The NCA and the CC 
By the time the government appointed the CC in 1999, the NCA had already done a lot of 
work in conscientising the people on the need for a new democratic constitution written 
through an inclusive people driven process as a way of solving the country’s socio-economic 
development as well as promoting good governance. The NCA rejected the manner in which 
the government’s CC had been established as well as the way the commissioners had been 
appointed arguing that they were partisan and the government’s control of the 
constitutional making process. The NCA argued that the commission’s constitutional making 
process was not people driven since the process was owned, managed and controlled by the 
ruling party and its government. In rejecting participation in the CC process, the NCA thus 
undermined the legitimacy of the government commission. After rejecting the government 
driven constitutional making process, the NCA began a parallel process of consulting the 
people on the constitutional issue as an alternative to the people of Zimbabwe. During the 
consultation process, the NCA would gather the views of the people and in this way they 
maintained a national presence that would also overlook the initiatives of the government 
sponsored commission. Such strategies were meant to draw support for the NCA as well as 
providing legitimacy and authoritative presence in the constitutional debate. It is possible 
that the transparency and greater openness to which the CC conducted its business was in 
part due to the presence of the NCA. After collecting the data, the NCA analysed and 
evaluated it before producing its own draft. During these outreaches, the NCA encouraged 
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its membership to vote against the government CC draft. They also vigorously campaigned 
against the CC process and urged the people to reject the draft. 
3.3.2 Structure of the NCA 
The NCA’s had a vision of a prosperous, peaceful, democratic and united Zimbabwe founded 
on the principles of human dignity and social justice. Its goal is for Zimbabwe to have a new, 
democratic and people driven constitution. A new democratic constitution according to the 
NCA is the only basis of good governance in Zimbabwe that will in turn lead to social and 
economic development. 
The aims and objectives as set out in its constitution are: 
 To strive to promote, deepen and broaden the concepts and practice of 
democracy, transparency, good governance, justice and tolerance in the 
republic of Zimbabwe. 
 To strive for the initiation of a constitutional making process in Zimbabwe 
by engaging in the process of enlightening the general public on the 
deficiencies and weaknesses of the current constitution and advocate for 
a new one, participating in any fora organized to discuss the constitution 
and preparing a draft for a new constitutional order. 
 To strive to protect, deepen and foster a human rights culture and rule of 
law in Zimbabwe 
 To implement, incorporate and protect in the country international 
human rights norms as contained in conventions such as Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination against Women, the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. 
 To work with other similarly minded organisations or individuals in 
establishing or striving to establish in Zimbabwe a new tolerant, 
transparent and democratic, legal, political, social and economic order 
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and a new constitutional framework upon which governance can be 
founded. 
The core business of the NCA centred on; 
 Arranging meetings, seminars, debates and training workshops consistent with its 
objectives. 
 Issuing public statements on important national issues. 
 Monitoring social, political and legal developments in Zimbabwe and submitting 
position papers to relevant bodies and authorities. 
 Organising and participating in public campaigns including peaceful demonstrations, 
protests, boycotts or stay-aways or any other such activities. 
 Organising and authoring publications including leaflets, newspapers, journals or 
petitions. 
 Creating regional and local subcommittees or working groups with an interest in or 
concern with the aims and objectives of the NCA constitution. 
 Engaging in local and international networking. 
 Creating archives, data bases and resources for its activities or any other related 
activities or developments in Zimbabwe. 
 Assisting litigants or participating in any litigation including representative actions in 
which important human and constitutional issues are raised 
 Doing all such things as are necessary to achieve the aims and objectives of the NCA. 
3.3.2.1 Institutional Structure 
The NCA had five main organs that is; the Congress, the Annual Consultative Assembly, the 
National Taskforce, the Region and the Constituency. They also had structures at national, 
regional (provincial), constituency and ward levels. The organisational structure had two 
main components that is the political structure consisting of the various elected bodies at 
the various levels and the secretariat consisting of the employees of the organisation.  
The Congress met every five years and comprised of representatives from the various 
constituencies of the NCA, chairpersons, secretaries, youth representatives, women 
representatives and committee members. The Annual Consultative Assembly was converted 
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from the Annual General Assembly following the 2006 amendment of the NCA constitution. 
The Annual Consultative Assembly was the supreme governing organ of the NCA comprising 
the Taskforce, Standing Committees and the Regional Committees. It would meet annually 
to formulate policies and principles for the NCA, review and supervise the work of the 
National Taskforce, approve audited financial statements and elect members of the national 
Taskforce. It also had powers to repeal and amend the constitution. 
Below the Annual Consultative Assembly was the National Taskforce consisting of 33 
members elected in accordance with the procedures to the constitution and serve for five 
years. The taskforce was responsible for managing the affairs of the NCA. It was akin to an 
executive board and dealt with the decision making in between congresses. It had a broad 
range of powers which include promoting and implementing the aims, objectives and 
policies of the NCA. It could also employ any person to manage or assist in the management 
of the objectives of the NCA and remunerate such an employee from the funds 
administered by the Taskforce and to create subcommittees of its members as well as 
controlling the financial affairs. 
The NCA constitution also provided for 8 standing committees of the Taskforce to assist in 
carrying out its functions. These were the Local Regional Committee, Management 
Committee, the Media and Information Committee, Gender Committee, Advocacy and 
Action Committee, Disciplinary Committee, the Legal Committee and the Youth Committee. 
Three additional committees were created pursuant to the power of the Taskforce under 
the constitution to create sub committees of its members and to prescribe terms of 
reference for these subcommittees. The additional committees were the Political Liaison 
Committee, Human Rights Committee and the Editorial Committee. Each of these 
committees was chaired by a member of the Taskforce.  
The functions of all the other committees were provided for by the NCA constitution except 
for the Political and Liaison Committee, Human Rights Committee and the Editorial 
Committee. It was notable however that the constitution contained contradictory provisions 
concerning the composition of some committees for example the Management Committee 
(Lumina 2009). One provision noted that the Management Committee consisted of the 
Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, Chairpersons of the Standing Committees and four other 
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members of the Taskforce (making a total of 14 members) whilst another provision stated 
that it shall be chaired by the Chairperson and shall consist of not more than five members 
of the Taskforce, making it a total of 6 members (Lumina 2009). The Taskforce was also 
responsible for the day to day supervision of the secretariat, recruitment of staff, 
fundraising and financial management.  
The secretariat was comprised of all employees of the organisation and headed by a 
National Director and assisted by some senior staff below who were either administrative or 
support staff. The constitution of the NCA was not clear on the role of the secretariat save 
for some rather vague and ambiguous reference to the secretariat supposed to hold regular 
meetings of its own to discuss, set goals and targets as well as any other office matters 
(Lumina 2009). 
3.3.2.2. Membership 
The NCA membership comprised of two categories that is individual and institutional. The 
institutional members are composed of other organisations such as political parties, labour 
organisations, women organisations, youth groups and student organisations. Both 
individual members and institutional members paid a membership fee and this was also a 
way of raising money for the operations of the organisation. 
At its inception the NCA managed to put up structures across the breath of the country in 
both urban and rural areas. However, after the violence that erupted in 2000 with the land 
invasions and the failure to wean itself from the MDC, they too suffered as the rural areas 
became no go areas for people perceived to be anti-ZANU PF. This failure to separate the 
civil duties from the oppositional politics of the MDC would become an albatross neck on 
the operations and the structures of the NCA. 
The NCA recruited new members through public meetings and door to door campaigns. The 
responsibility for maintaining the membership records at Regional level lay with the Field 
Officer whilst at national level it was the responsibility of the Advocacy and Youth Officer. 
According to a 2003 NCA National Evaluation Report, the NCA membership stood at 500 000 
individual members and 150 institutional members (Lumina 2009). In 2006, the NCA 
reported that it had managed to recruit 3526 new members. However the NCA did not have 
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proper records of its membership and most numbers were based on estimates. The 2009 
Evaluation of the NCA determined that from presented documents, the NCA had 1648 
members as indicated by the Table 3 below; 
Region Male Female Total 
Bulawayo 45 15 60 
Harare 127 141 268 
Mashonaland Central 64 15 79 
Mashonaland East 120 82 202 
Mashonaland West 282 199 481 
Masvingo 44 85 129 
Midlands 159 34 193 
Manicaland 93 18 111 
Matebeleland South 42 8 50 
Matebeleland North 63 12 75 
Total 1039 609 1648 
Percentage 63% 37% 100% 
Table 3: NCA Individual Membership (Lumina 2009) 
3.3.3 Programmes of the NCA 
From its inception, the NCA sought to build a broad alliance of civic organisations around 
the issues of constitutional reform and the language of constitutionalism. In order to fulfil 
this objective, the NCA carried out a series of meetings and seminars at different levels. At 
provincial level, it organised meetings to broaden its appeal at a national level so as to move 
away from the idea that it was a Harare based organisation. In organising these provincial 
meetings, the NCA started a process of establishing national structures and conducted a 
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series of sectoral meetings on a range of issues that included media, land, economy, 
churches, women, youth and Parliament. Such meeting were intended to relate discussions 
on the constitution to broad societal issues as well as to inject the discourse of 
constitutionalism into as many areas of discussion as possible (Raftopoulos 2000). 
The NCA employed a multi-prolonged strategy involving education, consientisation and 
politicisation of the populace. They used rallies, marches, conventional workshops and 
seminars targeted at specific interests groups such as women, youth, traditional leaders and 
minority groups. This also included community outreach programmes using specially trained 
facilitators to discuss the constitution with the rural communities as well as collecting their 
views on reform. Remote areas in rural areas were reached by touring drama groups that 
had been trained in interactive community drama and equipped with vernacular print and 
graphic material so as to reinforce their message. 
The informational and educational strategies of the NCA also extended to newspaper 
television and radio advertisements as well as organising a series of demonstrations in 
various parts of the country to publicise its objectives. Local broadcast service for the 
indigenous languages was extensively used to penetrate the rural areas that had access to 
electronic media. Urban audiences were targeted using billboards, newspaper adverts, radio 
and television adverts. Holding public workshops was one of the main activities of the NCA. 
It created public education material to explain how the challenge of the constitution related 
directly to the social and economic objectives of Zimbabweans.  
For example Figure 1 below is a cartoon from an NCA brochure illustrating citizens failing to 
comprehend the rampant corruption, governance issues and the need for less executive 
power so as to enhance political participation. Such messages were carried to the people by 
the 600 trained trainers who were at first trained by the NCA to carry the messages to the 
people. It is also worth pointing out that in the NCA’s intensive awareness campaigns, they 
benefited a lot from the organisational structures of the labour movement, the churches 
and other grassroots organisations. These organisations ignited and sustained the 
momentum for the organised campaign for a popular constitutional reform. The messaging 
from the NCA to the people was that there is an authoritarian constitution that rendered 
economic and political power in the hands of the few thus benefiting the minority. All the 
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misery the people were suffering from was blamed on the constitution. People were under 
the control of the few leaders where power was used in a dominating way and politics was 
based on personality cults and empty promises resulting in a weak society characterised by 
apathy, dependency and corruption. 
 
Figure 1: NCA Citizenship Illustration (Du Pree 2012) 
It was against this massive publicity campaign that the government constitutional 
referendum was held on the 13 and 14th of February 2000. The referendum was held in a 
much polarised atmosphere with the government controlled media refusing to give space to 
those who were opposed to the draft constitution. A total of 1 300 000 people voted and 
88 
 
54% voted against whilst 46% voted for the adoption of the draft. The result of the 
referendum was a shocker to the government and ruling party were shell shocked. The 
people had done the unthinkable by defying the state and had won (Kagoro 2004). The 
success of the ‘no’ vote provided the electorate with a sense of hope and presented a major 
step towards imagining alternative futures (Kagoro 2004). The referendum rejection was 
significant in that it was the first time a major rejection of a political position put forward by 
ZANU PF. Although it can be interpreted as a protest vote against the state’s management 
of the economy, credit should also be given to the NCA for vigorously campaigning against 
it. In rejecting the draft, the people thus asserted their power and resisted the state 
domination and attempt to deny them their right to name their world and thereby 
reconstitute it (Kagoro 2004). 
The NCA’s broad objective of creating a discourse around the exercise and practice of 
political power in Zimbabwe had been achieved. However, according to Kagoro (2004) the 
referendum result was a pyrrhic one because the vision of a new constitution had not been 
achieved and also the government‘s response caught the NCA off guard. The government 
stated that they respect the wishes of the people to reject the draft constitution and that 
this meant the people were happy with the amended Lancaster house constitution. This 
distortion was immediately followed by the farm invasions and the violent 2000 general 
elections. The violence that occurred was unparalleled in the history of Zimbabwean 
elections. In the middle of violence, there was so much political polarisation and the NCA 
was labelled as the same with the opposition MDC. The violence decimated the structures 
that NCA had managed to build. 
As mentioned above, NCA programmes were limited in the post 2000 era. However they 
remained resolute in their fight to educate Zimbabweans that the struggle for a new 
constitution remained the only alternative out of the political abyss the country was in. The 
fact that the constitutional reform agenda remained on the spotlight till the days of the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) highlights the positive influence of the NCA. The post 
2008 elections when there was persistent violence against the opposition, the NCA was able 
to raise the issues of constitutionalism and under the banner of the Save Zimbabwe 
Campaign they were able to put the country on the spotlight such that eventually SADC 
intervened culminating in the talks that led to the establishment of the GNU. One of the 
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conditions of the GNU was that the country should rewrite the constitution and it is this 
period that led to the dormancy of the NCA. The parties in the GNU were able to write the 
constitution and NCA refused to participate claiming the process was flawed and was led by 
politicians and therefore could not produce a perfect document but one similar to the 
Lancaster one in which the views of the parties will carry the day. To a big extent they were 
vindicated. However, the new constitution was approved and the country went into 
elections in March 2013 where ZANU PF won convincingly. The NCA disappointed by their 
former partners, the MDC announced on the 29th of September 2013 that they were 
transforming into a political party as they had realised that it was futile to continue to fight 
for the re-writing of a new democratic constitution. Their strategy now is to fight for the 
political space, win elections and re-write a new people driven constitution. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The constitutional discourse that culminated with the constitutional referendum in 2000 
raged on during the course of the Zimbabwean crisis, was still at the centre of the political 
reform process under the coalition government (2009-2013) and is still a burning issue 
today even after the adoption of the new constitution authored by the coalition 
government in 2012. According to Ncube (2010) the discourse on a ‘people driven’ 
constitution is/was informed by the classical debate on whether the law left at the whims of 
the state (ruling elites) is promotive or inhibitive of a democratic society. The struggle over 
law aimed to make subordinate classes to become legislators by achieving authoritative, 
norm creating capacity (Ncube 2010). The term ‘people driven’ constitution in the civil 
society became a differentiating principle between those on one hand, who seek to 
legitimate the continuation of the hegemonic status quo and those who seek to 
democratically transform the status quo. Thus the quest for a new constitution should be 
seen as a way to seek to create new institutions that are responsive and conducive for 
economic development and a well-grounded constitutional discourse was to be the 
prerequisite for this newly found impetus for democratisation and development.  
Constitution making is largely about building the political community as well as structures. 
In the Zimbabwean context, there is need for a more democratic system as well as the need 
to build political institutions that has been distorted by political manipulation. The future of 
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democracy in the country rests upon the development of constitutional arrangements that 
can guarantee viable institutions in which to conduct the business for good governance. This 
means developing a constitutional order that channels conflict into non-violent settlement 
of differences, preserves the ability of groups to participate in a continuing dialogue about 
policy, generate governments that are accountable and focuses attention on shared 
aspirations. In order to ensure that the citizens feel a sense of ownership in the constitution, 
the process must ensure extensive consultations with the people and all principal 
stakeholders before any constitution can be drawn up and adopted. Therefore the process 
ought to be inclusive, transparent, accessible, accountable and empowering to civil society 
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CHAPTER 4: CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Underpinning the conflicting beliefs around the nature and suitable role of civil society are 
two conflicting conceptions. The Anglo-American liberal tradition that posits that civil 
society is an autonomous realm of associational life above the individual and family and 
below the state. According to this view, civil society demarcates social space against the 
state and market to uphold a sphere of political life for citizens. It has a precautionary role 
against the state and an advocating role to protect the individual rights and liberties from 
incursions by the state and to promote and expand them (McCandless 2011). The Marxist 
tradition on the other hand identifies civil society as the site of economic relations upon 
which a legal and political super-structure is elevated to become the socio-economic base of 
the state. Thus the state and civil society for Marxists are executive arms of the bourgeoisie 
and therefore the state can never be a neutral arbiter or serve societal interests as a whole. 
Zimbabwean scholars on civil society have therefore chartered on the Gramscian middle 
ground that argues that civil society is neither entirely captive of the state nor autonomous 
but rather is a site for problem solving where society might be defended from the incursions 
of both the state and the market.  
However, Gramsci also argued that it can be a battleground where the state, ruling elites 
and other powerful actors intervene with hegemonic projects to influence and spread the 
agendas of organised groups. As such the nature and role of civil society in Zimbabwe is 
deeply questioned. Accusations about political and self-serving agendas and motives of 
different actors and their alliances and relationships with political parties, the government 
and the donors are at the heart of conflict and polarisation (McCandless 2011). This flies in 
the face of liberal conceptualisations that suggest that civil society is autonomous from the 
state, often in a watch dog role with more collaborative, partnership oriented relationships 
with international organisations and even donors. Such a role could have been the role 
played by the NCA in its quest for democratic constitution as a vehicle for good governance 
and development. However some left leaning nationalists analysts view the liberal 
conceptualisations as imposed and in conflict with the redistributive concerns especially 
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considering the fact that the NCA was opposed to the land reform program because it was 
against the ‘rights’ framework that they were fighting for in a new constitution. The NCA 
struggle for the rights to civil liberties could have been the bone of contention here because 
the left leaning nationalists saw the violence that characterised the land reform programme 
as a necessary evil to achieve entitlement. 
The NCA was born with the aim of facilitating a popular view of Zimbabwe’s constitution 
and building capacity for popular participation in decision making around constitutional 
issues. From the start, the NCA’s central grievance focused on a critique of the Lancaster 
house constitution on both its content and the process by which the several amendments 
were being made. The years before had been characterised by a systematic dislocation of 
the majority of Zimbabweans from participating in political activities. As the discontent over 
the economic situation grew, the NCA increasingly focused its grievances on what was seen 
as the root problem, that of government accountability and the extended powers and term 
limits of the executive. The NCA wanted to rationalise constitutional power among the 
organs of the state. The NCA launch resolutions called for the development of an 
independent, impartial body to lead to an accessible constitutional making process that 
would ensure a broad based and inclusive participation of all citizens. It also resolved that 
the process should be non-partisan and the people should ratify the new constitution 
through a referendum.  
This chapter presents the current state of affairs based on the samples of interviews that 
were carried out in this research. The chapter presents data on the perceptions of the 
respondents on the role played by the NCA in promoting good governance and 
development in Zimbabwe over the years. The chapter will look at NCA governance 
structure, its relationship with the government, the opposition and donors. It is only 
through such a presentation that one can truly analyse if the idea of liberal civil society is 
alien to developing countries of the south especially against the back ground of critics that 
do not see any value in civil society because they are just importing a western idea to a 
different environment, culture and system. 
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4.2 The Governance structure of the NCA 
The governance structure of the NCA has expanded and metamorphosed numerous times 
over the years. As noted in the previous chapter, at its inception the NCA was a circle of 
NGOs, civic bodies, trade unions and concerned individuals. Its second meeting was 
attended by about 50 people and a seven member Task force was elected to lead the 
organisation, themselves being representatives from the civic organisations. This small 
national structure eventually grew into one of the largest structurally decentralised 
organisations in the country. Its management was crystallised into four levels that is the 
Annual General Assembly, the Task force, the secretariat and the structure. The Task force 
consisted of 28 members elected by the assembly. The Taskforce was further fragmented 
into different committees. The secretariat comprised of all employees of the organisation 
covering all the 10 provinces of Zimbabwe. However by 2012 the secretariat was now only 
based at the Head office in Harare and was much reduced in terms of numbers because of 
the withdrawals of most of NCA’s major donors. The Task force comprised of mainly 
‘politicians’ and activists directly elected at the general assembly and would in turn form 
various subcommittees. Two positions in the Taskforce were reserved for women under the 
women quota gender representation. There were also two seats reserved for youth. 
Women representation was also guaranteed in the lower levels with seats reserved in the 
structures from the provinces right until the constituency and ward/district level. The least 
level of structure were the ‘structures’, them being the member bodies at all levels in both 
the rural and urban areas. 
4.2.1 Internal Democratic Governance of the NCA 
Effective internal democratic governance is generally assumed to include issues like 
transparency and broad based participation in the organisation’s decision making process 
and implementation around the selection of leaders, accountability and responsiveness of 
leaders to their members and the degree to which the women, youth and minorities are 
integrated into the structure and function of the organisation in meaningful ways 
(McCandless 2011). The NCA constitution had the Annual General Assembly (AGA) as the 
supreme governing organ of the organisation followed by the Taskforce and the various 
thematic committees made up of the Taskforce members. The AGA had a role to formulate 
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the broad policies of the organisation as well as supervising the work of the Taskforce. The 
AGA met twice a year and in the interim period the Taskforce would be enforcing or making 
decisions based on wide consultations, gathering and reporting on the output of the 
structures from the ward level to the provincial level. 
However, it would seem from the several responses from interviews that by 2013 the 
structures of the NCA had virtually collapsed and it was just individuals in the Taskforce 
purporting to represent the ‘people’ who would sit down and make decisions. Most 
decisions were said to be emanating from the chairperson of the organisation who wielded 
so much power that no one could voice against him. The evaluations of the NCA by Lumina 
(2009) also seem to have confirmed this. Some respondents said it had become impossible 
to separate the Taskforce and the Secretariat. Some decisions reportedly made by the 
Secretariat were said to have been an extension of the Taskforce. However in interviews 
with former Taskforce members, they categorically denied this, insisting that the NCA 
structures were still intact and most of the decisions emanated from the grassroots. In fact 
they claimed the NCA constitution had no room for anyone to make unilateral decisions. 
One former Taskforce member argued that their detractors especially their erstwhile former 
allies in the MDC had been instrumental in the withdrawal of most of their donors in order 
to incapacitate them and peddle stories that the NCA was a dead organisation. In response 
to the fact that the congress had not met since 2006, the former Taskforce members added 
that this was due to financial constraints faced by the organisation and not that the leaders 
were clinging to power. Either way for an organisation to spend so much time without 
holding a congress where the general membership participates and crucial decisions should 
be made and leaders are elected does not sound well for good governance.  
Because the Taskforce had direct links to the constituencies, some respondents noted that 
the Taskforce could easily manipulate the electoral person in the election of leaders. 
Although this might not have been, the elections of the NCA post 2000 have been marred by 
allegations of rigging and voter irregularities. Indeed a resolution by the Taskforce to change 
the NCA constitution from a two term limit for the chairperson of the organisation for him 
to be at the helm until the struggle for a new constitution is achieved was heavily criticised. 
Furthermore, the decision by the Taskforce to delay the AGA was also interpreted as a way 
to cling to power. One government official quipped in the interview that there was nothing 
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democratic in the NCA about the governance of the NCA since it had become a personal 
property of the chairperson. Such conceptions whether they are true or false does not augur 
well for the transparency of an organisation. McCandless (2011) noted that the tension that 
surrounded the move from institutional membership to individual ones created an 
unnecessary tension, rifts and mistrust between the grassroots and the academics from the 
institutions thereby curtailing the sustained involvement and participation. 
The 2009 evaluation found lack of comprehensive records and poor quality of data for 
example outdated membership cards and poorly prepared annual reports that made it 
difficult to obtain accurate information (Lumina 2009). The report notes for example that 
large proportions of the 2006 annual report was substantially similar to the 2005 one while 
the 2007 annual report ostensibly covering the period from the 1st of January to 31st 
December 2007 mentioned 2008 events (Lumina 2009). The report also noted gaps in terms 
of information including incomplete statistical information concerning attendances to 
workshops which made it very difficult to assess NCA programme offerings and key 
organisational development activities. For example the 2005 annual report contained 
statistics on attendances at grassroots workshops for the period January to December 2005 
but only the attendance figures concerning gender and youth workshops and public 
meetings for the period January to June 2005 were recorded without any explanation on the 
lack of other relevant statistics. This could make it debatable if such activities took place at 
all. It also makes it difficult to compare attendances for the preceding and succeeding years 
for any assessment on whether the activities reached more beneficiaries during the periods 
under review.  
The NCA management and administration systems and procedures were set out in the 
Management System Manual which was initially adopted in 1998 by the Finance and 
Management Committee of the NCA Taskforce. The manual covered guidelines on issues of 
employment, records keeping, hours of work and remuneration, administration of finances 
and allowances. The 2009 evaluation found that the Management Systems Manual was 
repetitive in some parts and contained some provisions that are unclear and could cause 
confusion for example workers were supposed to take instructions from the director or a 
member authorised by the Taskforce a situation that could lead to confusion especially in 
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circumstances where the director and national Taskforce member gives contradictory 
instructions concerning the same matter (Lumina 2009).  
The NCA constitution mandated the vice chairperson to chair the Finance management 
committee responsible for fundraising and allocating resources to the secretariat and for 
the supervision of the secretariat. However the evaluation of the NCA in 2009 (Lumina 
2009) noted that the chairperson controlled all the funds and how they were allocated. The 
report noted that such practices borders around bad governance and there were always 
allegations of misappropriation of funds. The interviews of former workers carried out 
during this research also noted that the there was no transparency on the manner in which 
the organisation’s funds were held. They noted that ultimately everything went down to the 
chairperson and even noted that when some workers went for a period of time without 
receiving their salaries, they had to talk to the chairperson because he was the ultimate 
accounting officer. 
The management system manual provided for a centralised financial administration system 
with bank accounts being administered by the national office. Financial controls included 
the requirement that a cheque must be signed by two signatories and that all expenditures 
should be supported by documentary proof. The signatories were the national 
director/coordinator and the Taskforce members appointed by the Taskforce on the 
recommendations of the Finance and Management Committee. The management system 
manual also contained provisions regulating the use of the NCA assets especially vehicles. 
Acquisition of vehicles and assets were supposed to be authorised by the Taskforce on the 
recommendations of the Director. No member of the NCA could use the organisational 
vehicles for personal purposes save for the Programmes Coordinator, Director, 
Administrator and Finance Manger. Despite what was contained in the manual, the 
evaluators found that the chairperson was using the NCA vehicle as a personal one and even 
those entitled to use the organisation’s vehicles no longer had them (Lumina 2009). It was 
noted however during this research, that the NCA no longer had vehicles as they had been 
attached by the sheriff of the court owing to a labour dispute. 
Based on the findings of the NCA evaluation and interviews carried out during this research, 
the issue of good governance seem to have been problematic for the NCA. Most of those 
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interviewed alluded to the fact that the NCA had become more of the property of the 
chairperson. Workers were going for months without remuneration, although this could 
also be due to the fact that there was over reliance on donor funding and when the donors 
decided to with draw their funding the NCA was found wanting. They failed to plan for a self 
sustaining measure to fund their activities. 
4.2.2 Leadership and Accountability in the NCA 
The NCA has had three chairpersons of the Taskforce since its inception, the chairperson 
being the most powerful position in the organisation. The first chairperson was Morgan 
Tsvangirai who was chosen because of his position as the secretary general of the labour 
union organisation, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). The ZCTU was the 
largest or biggest civic organisation in the NCA and in the country. When a number of civic 
leaders in the NCA began to note that the constitution alone was not going to achieve the 
crisis of governance and moved to form a new political party, the MDC in 1999, Tsvangirai 
left his position together with other leaders to head the newly formed MDC in September 
1999. The decision to form the political party on the basis that constitutional reform alone 
could not solve the crisis of governance was itself a problem especially coming from people 
who three years earlier had raised the issue of constitutionalism as the drawback to good 
governance and development in the country. This decision would go on to haunt the NCA, 
as it played into the sustained views of its detractors including the government as they 
would discredit the NCA as a political organisation whose leadership was interested in 
political office. Morgan Tsvangirai led the NCA through its early development phases, 
cultivated the use of radical strategies in opposition to the government and was able to built 
its social movement base in preparation of its ‘No’ vote campaign against the government 
sponsored draft constitution in 2000. 
The next NCA chairperson was Thoko Matshe who was Morgan Tsvangirai’ deputy and took 
over when Tsvangirai resigned to take up leadership of the MDC. McCandless (2011) credits 
Matshe for uplifting women representation in the NCA. She also presided over the NCA’s 
greatest achievement, the ‘No’ vote against the government draft constitution in March 
2000. A highly controversial NCA AGA in 2001 saw the election of Lovemore Madhuku as the 
third chairperson of the NCA. Madhuku remained at the helm of the NCA until 2013 when 
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the decision to transform the NCA from a civil society organisation to a political party was 
made. He remains the interim leader of the NCA party. Madhuku transformed the NCA from 
being an institutional membership body to individual membership. Madhuku also managed 
to have the NCA constitution amended in 2005 when his leadership term was coming to an 
end having served two terms and not eligible for re-election to allow himself a third term. 
Madhuku oversaw the development and production of the NCA draft constitution and drove 
the body towards a more grassroots oriented structure. His tenure has been the most 
controversial. To his credit, he has been a leader who led from the front. He also presided 
over the radicalisation of the NCA adopting more and more confrontational methods with 
the government. Madhuku continued to be at the forefront of radical resistance oriented 
mass action (McCandless 2011).  
Madhuku presided over the most controversial terms of the NCA. In 2006 the NCA held its 
congress that approved some controversial amendments to the NCA constitution. It 
extended the term of office of its leadership from two to five years. Previously the NCA 
constitution provided a maximum of two terms of two years for the leadership. The 
incumbent leadership then had served two terms and were supposed to step down. The 
incumbent chairperson was re-elected unopposed in a situation that courted a lot of 
controversy. Supporters of the amendments and the re-election of Madhuku as chairperson 
argued that the continuation of the leadership was necessary to prevent the infiltration of 
the NCA by ZANU PF. Critics however argued that the amendments and elections went 
against the good governance principles for which the NCA stood for. They also argued that 
the election had set a very embarrassing precedent for civil society because civil society was 
urging politicians to overstay. Other civil society organisations criticised the re-election of 
Madhuku arguing that there was need to build democracy from within civic organisations 
and that what had happened in the NCA was incompatible with good governance and 
democratic constitutionalism.  
The events of the 2006 congress seem to have undermined the credibility of the NCA as a 
good governance advocacy organisation and may have led to the reduced involvement of 
some of the NCA’s institutional members in the organisation’s activities. Other notable 
changes brought by the amendments to the constitution included the conversion of the 
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AGM of all members into an Annual Consultative Assembly comprising the Taskforce, 
Standing Committee and Regional Committees and the establishment of the congress to be 
held every five years. The establishment of the congress for all NCA members after every 
five years had the unfortunate consequence of limiting participation of ordinary members in 
decision making to once every five years. 
Some of the respondents in this research confirmed widespread perception that the NCA 
was dominated by its chairperson therefore undermining the credibility of the organisation. 
In September 2013, Madhuku presided over the NCA congress, the first since 2006 that 
called for the transformation of the NCA from a civil society organisation to a political party 
arguing that lobbying for a people driven constitution had failed to yield positive results and 
that the inclusive government formed in 2009 had forced a new constitution onto the 
people of Zimbabwe. Some people said they had expected Madhuku to relinquish his hold 
on the NCA especially when it was announced that a congress would take place in 
September 2013. According to the NCA, the best option was seen as to fight for political 
office and rewrite the constitution after the attainment of political office. Several 
respondents to the interview of this study argued that the passage of a new constitution in 
2013 was the NCA’s waterloo. Donors had fled them when they decided not to participate in 
the inclusive government process and therefore there was nothing more to fight for. It was 
generally accepted that the new constitution adopted in 2013 was generally a good 
document compared to the Lancaster house constitution and thus the NCA was beginning to 
lose relevance. Almost all the respondents were of the view that the NCA could have done a 
better job as a watch dog organisation. 
4.3 The NCA membership 
At the inception of the NCA and probably until after the March 2000 referendum, the NCA 
membership was institutional. The institutional organisations members automatically 
contributed their members to the NCA. Although the NCA was still open to individual 
membership, the majority came from the institutional member organisations. In this way it 
was possible by then to estimate membership. The members of the institutional body 
members of the NCA thus cross-fertilised and a common membership grew (McCandless 
2011). There was debate around the issue of individual membership but they were 
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eventually allowed because the NCA constitution clearly stated that membership was open 
to “individuals and institutions who share the objectives of the organisation.” 
In the early formative years of the NCA it would seem, however, that the NCA was founded 
upon the principles of and directed by its institutional members through the Taskforce. By 
then the structure of the NCA strictly resembled that of a civic network. The political 
orientation of the NCA began to change during the campaign against the government 
sponsored draft constitution in 2000 and in the aftermath of the people’s rejection of the 
draft. The referendum no vote highlighted that the NCA had grown and had a lot of non-
aligned members. These had to be accommodated too and the organisation had to 
transform itself with a focus on individual members than the institutional ones. According to 
McCandless (2011), the NCA saw this as a clear and better way to develop a genuine mass 
base that was unaffiliated as well as broadening the membership and reaching out to the 
rural areas. By reaching to the rural areas, this would demystify concerns that the NCA was 
an urban civil society organisation catering for the urban people. 
However, this shift was problematic to the NCA because is became difficult for them to 
account for their membership. A membership database is said to have been created but it 
was never utilised. One way of keeping records of proper membership was to check with 
the subscriptions, however as the economy began to take a knock people were no longer 
subscribing as members and paying the annual membership fee. NCA was also relying on 
donor support for its operations rather than member’s subscriptions. Membership was 
estimated based on attendances at workshops, meetings and marches. For example the 
number who voted against the government draft constitution in 2000 was taken to be 
members of the NCA even if the turnout was generally poor. Equally so the people who 
voted against the Inclusive government draft constitution in a referendum in 2012 were 
interpreted as members of the NCA. Thus some respondents boldly proclaimed that the 
NCA had 70 000 members based on the referendum results. Again the turnout was very 
poor. Another respondent argued that the 2013 referendum was best to estimate 
membership because both ZANU PF and the MDC formations supported the draft 
constitution and therefore if their members voted for the draft, and only the NCA 
campaigned against the draft, then we can safely assume that the no vote membership 
belonged to the NCA. Obviously this line of reasoning is not scientific because it reduces the 
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people of Zimbabwe into belonging to ZANU PF, the MDC formations (MDC, MDC-T) and the 
NCA. Furthermore it does not follow that because the three main political parties in the 
inclusive government supported the draft then their entire supporters followed suit. 
The NCA membership which was obviously strong at the time of the first referendum in 
2000 dwindled in the following years owing to the massive state sponsored violence that 
was waged against prodemocracy forces between 2000 and 2008. During this period, the 
NCA structures were decimated and efforts to revive them after the Inclusive Government 
of 2009 when violence had decreased proved to be an uphill task as the organisation had 
began to be deserted by its donors and had become financially crippled to undertake 
activities and boost its membership. Most of its secretariat offices in the provinces had to be 
closed and NCA had to work with a dwindled staff. 
Despite these challenges, former members interviewed in this study said the organisation 
had a healthy membership. They were pointing to the 2013 referendum but as noted above 
this line of reasoning is unscientific. The membership of the NCA participated in the 
activities of the organisation as well as a role in influencing policy direction. Members 
participated in elections as voters or candidates for the Taskforce for any position. Members 
could also ask any questions to the Taskforce verbally or in writing. Members were also 
supposed to spread the message of the NCA to the general populace as well as attending 
workshops and meetings at national, provincial, district and ward level. Members were also 
supposed to mobilise for NCA activities. 
This structure of the NCA meant that is had shifted from the earlier days when institutional 
membership held sway. Most of the institutional organisations that had been at the 
forefront in the beginning left as they no longer had voice. In a way the NCA lost access to 
the constituencies of those organisations. McCandless (2011) also notes that this also led to 
a diminished capacity for strategic thinking and programming. In a way the structure of the 
NCA metamorphosed to reflect that of a political party with political structures from 
national, provincial, constituency, district and ward level with no consideration to technical 
skills and competencies (McCandless 2011). Such a structure led the NCA to be at the mercy 
of the government who refused to accommodate the NCA as a civic organisation but saw it 
as a political organisation interested in oppositional politics and regime change. The close 
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association to the opposition formations of the MDC was also problematic as most 
members of the NCA were members of the MDC making a distinction difficult. It was 
common to see MDC members of the wearing their party regalia at NCA meetings. In the 
political violence that engulfed the country from 2000 to 2008, this cosiness exposed the 
NCA members to violence and as the structures of the MDC were destroyed in most rural 
areas so were the NCA structures by extension. 
4.4 NCA and Gender Development 
The NCA operated in a country that is highly patriarchal and although the constitution of the 
country had guarantees for women’s rights, several women’s organisations have always 
lamented the fact that not enough is being done to improve women’s rights. The NCA 
constitution had guarantee provisions for gender emancipation for example the Taskforce 
had a gender committee led by women who were automatically elected. In fact in the 
structures of the NCA, there were provisions for a gender quota. McCandless (2011) also 
notes that while it is clear that the NCA had made pragmatic and staffing efforts to 
empower women and ensure full participation, this was not sufficient in helping address the 
patriarchal relations within the organisation given their rootedness in society at large. The 
NCA draft constitution substantially addressed the ways of empowering women whilst its 
own constitution allowed for special processes in the election of women. One respondent 
stated that women representation in the NCA was about 35%. McCandless (2011) notes that 
the NCA strategy of mass action in the context of violence tended to attract young men and 
deter women from participating in NCA activities. 
Although the NCA constitution provided for a gender committee of the Taskforce and had 
officials responsible for gender issues at the national and regional levels as well as within its 
secretariat, the organisation had no gender policy that could inform gender mainstreaming 
on its structures, processes and programmes. The NCA quarterly report for 2006 also stated 
that it continued to operate a quota system designed to ensure that women actively 
participate in the organisation’s decision making structures (Lumina 2009). The 2009 NCA 
evaluation found out that women constituted 25% of the organisation’s leadership at all 
levels and concluded that the under representation of women results in limited space for 
women in the decision making within the NCA (Lumina 2009). 
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The NCA has endeavoured to enhance equal representation of women and to that end thy 
held a number of workshops specifically focused on gender mainstreaming and youth 
issues. In interviews with NCA members and staff, the 2009 evaluation found out that the 
concept of gender was not well understood by the various structures (Lumina 2009). It 
appeared to be understood as the promotion of women rather than as referring to how 
socially constructed roles affect the expectations, rights, power and opportunities of men 
and women. Furthermore gender mainstreaming appears to be understood as equivalent to 
assigning the gender function within an organisation to women as opposed to a process of 
creating knowledge about impacts and awareness of and responsibility for gender. Thus all 
gender chairpersons of regional and national levels were all women. The evaluation found 
that none of the gender chairpersons appeared to understand the concept of gender and 
that a number of women assigned with the responsibilities of gender chairpersons had little 
formal education with little capacity to understand this complex concept (Lumina 2009). 
The situation does not seem to have changed by 2013, with some respondents to this study 
alluding to the fact that they were gender committees positions held by the women at all 
levels of the NCA structure. Former workers in the secretariat said the subsidising of the 
levels of violence from 2009 had encouraged more and more women to become actively 
involved in NCA activities. Despite the financial problems that seem to have dogged the 
NCA, some respondents said some of the NCA demonstrations were now beginning to 
attract female activists attributing it to the success of the NCA gender workshops that were 
held across the country. 
4.5 The NCA and the donors 
Over the last years, scholars have begun to increasingly question about the structure and 
interests of alliances in the civil society as part of a wider political critique of liberalism and 
the nature, and purpose and efficiency of international interventions. It is often asked 
whether the associations are private or public, whether they are principled progressive and 
altruistically driven or represents simply another sphere of the neoliberal project. Such 
debates reflect the unresolved ideological tensions about the nature of civil society between 
the liberal, Marxist and Gramscian traditions and the increasingly critical African 
perspectives (McCandless 2011). Despite the contestations, the liberal perspectives of civil 
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society are widely hegemonic in international practice and are promoted by 
humanitarianism, development and democratisation. The western donor consensus that 
civil society is the autonomous force that can hold the governments accountable and the 
base upon which a truly democratic culture can be built has led to massive over-flow of 
funding for civil society. However this consensus narrowly interprets civil society as 
professionalised NGOs dedicated to the welfare advocacy and civil education work on public 
interests issues directly relating to democratisation rather than older established voluntary 
organisations.  
This donor tendency has occurred in Zimbabwe and underlies the debated about the nature 
and role of civil society. Critical scholars have argued that civil societies developing in this 
liberal form reproduce material hierarchies and class inequalities. The now highly prominent 
neoliberal version of civil society is argued to facilitates the operation of both the state and 
the market, benefiting and marginalising actors differentially and giving rise to new social 
groups and forms of organisation as prompted by changing economic incentives 
(McCandless 2011).  
In Zimbabwe, civil society has served to cushion the shocks of structural adjustment 
programmes and in the context of international financial institutions and donor promoted 
poverty reduction programmes, civil society organisations are becoming a means for 
stabilising rather than challenging the socio political status quo. In recent years scholars 
have begun to argue that civil society is much more complex and conceptualised 
phenomena. Civil societies that have developed in post-colonial Africa are thus not shaped 
by or a response to indigenous challenges and opportunities inherent in societies but rather 
reflect hybrid interests of both local and alien forces exacerbated by globalisation.  
One of the criticisms that the NCA faced since its inception was that it was not home grown, 
that it was a front for the western governments to effect regime change in Zimbabwe. This 
criticism is very common amongst the civil society organisations in most countries in the 
south. McCandless (2011) notes that it is not fair and logical to assume that because donors 
are interested in the democratisation and development then civil society organisations 
cannot be genuinely interested in the same or that they cannot build strong constituencies 
around such concerns. The NCA’s major donors have been mostly European donors. The 
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NCA relied exclusively on donor funding for its activities over the years. However there is no 
evidence to suggest that the NCA changed its programming to suit the donors and the NCA 
never diverted attention from its strategies in favour of international donors. According to 
some respondents the donors tried to influence the NCA to participate in the inclusive 
government’s efforts to write a new constitution but NCA took a principled position and 
refused based on what its membership had said leading to some donors pulling out of the 
organisation. In fact on former member of the NCA Taskforce told this researcher that as 
early as during the CC, the NCA was pressurised by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) to participate in the government process but refused 
leading to the loss of funding.  
The government has been adamant over the years that the NCA was donor funded to effect 
regime change. The NCA activities during the period 2002 – 2008 fuelled this speculation 
because it is the period when NCA could engage in violent clashes with the police in 
demonstrations. It is also alleged that the NCA was again pressurised by donors to 
participate in the 2009-2013 Constitution Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC) 
constitutional reform process and when they refused, donors started to pull out leading to 
the near bankruptcy of the organisation. 
4.6 The NCA and Oppositional politics in Zimbabwe 
Perhaps one of the most problematic areas in the history of the NCA was when it facilitated 
the formation of the MDC in 1999 together with other civil society organisations. Because of 
this relationship in the 2000 general elections, the NCA publicly encouraged its members to 
support and vote for the MDC. By doing this, the NCA failed to become an impartial civic 
body as required of a civil society organisation. When the government would continuously 
label it part of the oppositional forces bent on regime change, there was some truth to it. 
This had negative impacts in the relationship between the NCA and the government and 
such frosty relations persisted until the decision to transform the body into a political party 
in 2013. The decision to transform into a political party would also affirm the notion that 
civil society is political. 
The cosy relationship between the NCA and the MDC would thaw later when the MDC 
joined the inclusive government. Furthermore the decision by the inclusive government to 
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let parliament take lead in the constitutional reform process riled the NCA and there was a 
bitter fall out with the MDC. The NCA accused the MDC of negating on the fundamentals 
agreed to for the re-writing the country’s constitution that is should be people driven and 
led by civil society rather than by politicians. The NCA would later go on to campaign against 
the draft constitution and it is such mistrust of the MDC that led them to transform into a 
political party. 
Almost all the respondents from the Ministry of Public Service and Social Welfare 
interviewed during this research agreed that one of the biggest undoing to the work of the 
NCA was its decision not to work in tandem with the government opting to work with the 
opposition. Thus in the eyes of government officials, the NCA was just an appendage of the 
opposition. One respondent argued that this could have been as a result of the 
organisation’s fight for the rights and liberties of the people which fits into the western roles 
of civil society. One senior official stated that at various times the NCA would snub some 
meeting with the government or decide to go for a confrontational approach. Such a 
confrontational approach according to the government was not meant to achieve desired 
results but to please their western donors. The decision by the NCA to oppose every 
initiative to write the constitution was mentioned by two of my respondents as evidence 
enough that the organisation was not genuinely concerned with the agenda of the new 
constitution. Officials pointed to the refusal by the NCA to participate in the parliamentary 
constitutional reform process in 2011 when other civil society organisations participated as 
evidence enough that the NCA wanted the country to be in perpetual constitutional crisis. 
Former members of the NCA however differed saying the organisation was the most 
principled organisation in the country and always ready to defend the general populace. 
These members mentioned the fall out with the MDC formations as evidence enough of 
their principled nature. According to these members it was only the NCA which was able to 
highlight the deficiencies of the constitutional process that was brought about by the 
political parties and that the results of the process where a highly defective constitution was 
forced onto the people by the political parties in 2013 was evidence enough to show that 
the NCA was not political but had a principled stance. Either way, the fact that the NCA 
decided later to abandon its civil society nature to form a political party gives credence that 
the organisation was very political from the beginning.  
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Supporters of the NCA have always viewed it as an organisation that represented the views 
and aspirations of the majority of Zimbabweans who wanted good governance and 
development in their country through a constitutional means that is driven and authored by 
Zimbabweans. Critics however, mostly represented by the government saw the NCA as a 
political front and puppet of the western countries formed with a specific agenda of 
effecting an illegal and unconstitutional regime change in Zimbabwe. To the government, 
the NCA was neither constitutional nor an assembly and the president once stated that the 
NCA was a one man organisation created to receive donor funds and without support of the 
majority of the people in the country. 
4.7 NCA programmes 
The sustained push for a new constitution reform process by the NCA contributed to an 
enhanced political commitment to constitutional reform process as reflected by Article XI of 
the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and the inclusive government’s adoption of a 
timetable for constitutional reform. The main activities that the NCA undertook included 
embarking on massive civic education to raise popular awareness on the need for a new 
constitution and how that would help to resolve the country’s socio economic development 
problems. Campaigns were undertaken through a range of constituency workshops focusing 
on gender and youths. A number of peaceful demonstrations and stay- aways were held in 
urban centres in order to exert pressure on the Zimbabwean government to accede to 
demands for a democratic constitutional order. The NCA also embarked on a publicity 
campaign through the issuing of press statements, holding press conferences, media 
interviews, newspaper advertisement and the distribution of fliers, placards, posters and 
banners.  
The NCA also conducted training of facilitators to conduct grassroots workshops on the 
organisation’s vision and mission. Some of the activities included grassroots civil education 
focused on the link between good governance and human rights, the NCA draft constitution, 
gender and youth issues, mobilisation for mass pressure, publicity and media campaign. 
Grassroots civic education was conducted through workshops, theatre and public meetings. 
Discussions centred around three issues of what is the constitution, what is good 
governance and how does the constitution contribute to it and what are human rights and 
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how are they protected and to what extent a new constitution will improve the human 
rights in Zimbabwe. The objective of these workshops was to mobilise the grassroots 
support for constitutional reform. Participants were drawn from the NCA wards and 
identified on the basis of interest, proximity to venue, demand and gender balance. A 
typical guideline for the facilitators to NCA meeting discussions was based on Table 4 below.   
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1. What is NCA? 
 Stress its non-partisanship 
 Say when the NCA was formed. 
 Membership of the NCA: individual and institutional. 
2. What is the vision and mission of the NCA? 
 To understand the vision and mission of the NCA, you must understand the essence of a 
constitution. At this stage explain what a constitution is. 
 What is the link between a democratic constitution and good governance and social progress 
and development? 
 Emphasize the “people driven aspect” of constitution making: here refer to the 2000 
referendum and why the NCA campaigned for a NO vote. 
 Defend the NO Vote and criticize the government stance of: 
(i) Claiming that in voting NO, Zimbabweans rejected an opportunity to get a new constitution. 
(ii) Attributing the NO vote to the land cause. 
3. What are the weaknesses of the current constitution? 
 Refer to, among other things: 
(i) 17 amendments to serve the interests of the governing elite. 
(ii) Presidential Powers. 
(iii) Lack of accountability of the government. 
(iv) Electoral framework. 
(v) Narrow Bill of Rights. 
 Under this section, refer to some of the provisions of the NCA Draft as comparisons. 
 Where relevant, refer to constitutions of other countries in Southern Africa e.g. South Africa 
 Illustrate how the weaknesses of the current constitution have had effects in practice e.g.: 
(i) Referring to the 2000, 2002 and 2005 elections. 
(ii) Abuses by the President. 
(iii)Human Rights abuses showing lack of accountability by government. 
4. What is the way forward? 
a) Zimbabweans must continue to educate each other on the importance of a new constitution. 
b) Zimbabweans must prioritize the issue of a new constitution. 
c) Indicate the role of the NCA and its two main programmes: 
(i) Civic education 
(ii) Putting pressure on government. 
 Explain and defend the NCA programmes of peaceful demonstrations. 
 Explain the structure of the NCA and how ordinary people may participate in it. 
 Say something about unjust laws like POSA. 
d) Link the NCA initiatives with other initiatives. 
e) Indicate the risks involved in the struggle for a new constitution. 
f) Invite people to join NCA. 
Table 4: Standard Presentation by the NCA for a Grassroots Workshop/Public Meeting 
(Lumina 2009) 
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The gender and youth workshops that were held were aimed at ensuring the propagation of 
a gender sensitive constitutional reform agenda and utilising issues affecting gender and 
youth as a gate way to reach out to the broader mass of people with the constitutional 
reform agenda. The workshops were also focused on issues affecting gender relations and 
the youth in relations to the need for a new and democratic constitution for Zimbabwe. 
Other issues discussed included unemployment and the need for a constitutional framework 
that would guarantee the rights to health including access to treatment for those infected 
and affected by HIV/AIDS.  
The main objectives for the NCA activities were to raise awareness about virtues and values 
of democracy, promoting civic responsibility and popularising the constitutional reform 
agenda. Around 2007, discussions also centred on the SADC initiated dialogue between 
ZANU PF and the MDC formations. The NCA organised a number of public meetings to 
afford the grassroots communities an opportunity to discuss the political, social and 
economic challenges that were afflicting the country so that the people can propose their 
own remedies to the crisis and in a way promoting participatory development. Such 
discussions and activities helped in maintaining the constitutional reform issue as a key 
agenda item in public opinion, forging a united front in the push for constitutional reform 
and upholding the critical role of civil society in ensuring public accountability and laying the 
basis for constructive engagement with the government and political parties.  
Although the NCA embarked on a publicity campaign, government restrictions on the 
independent media negatively impacted on their campaigns. The country was also facing a 
general deteriorating socio-economic environment characterise by hyperinflation, high 
incidence of HIV/AIDS and this negatively impacted on the NCA activities. The existence of 
Public Order and Security Act (POSA) made it difficult to hold public meetings and 
demonstrations because the law gave the police powers to ban any meetings or any 
associations that they deemed to cause alarm and despondency. AIPPA also paralysed the 
operations of the media to a point of diminishing the media’s role in the promotion and 
sustenance of democracy and development. By 2013, the NCA civic education was more 
focused on the Inclusive government constitutional making process which the NCA was 
opposed to, educating their members why the process was a deliberate ploy by politicians 
to hoodwink the general populace into believing that the process was above board. 
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Although the NCA was perceived to be an important actor in the constitutional reform 
process, there were some concerns relating to its governance and advocacy strategy. In 
particular concerns were raised on its failure to revise its advocacy strategies to enable it to 
engage more constructively with the inclusive government and other civil society partners in 
the context of the constitution making process provided for under Article XI of the GPA. 
4.7.1 The NCA and the post 2000 constitutional amendments 
The post 2000 period saw the country’s constitution being amended four times. According 
to Ncube (2010) these changes were in one way or the other in favour of the policy 
positions of ZANU PF than the opposition or civil society. The NCA criticised these arbitrary 
changes to the country as elite and politician driven rather than people driven. 
Constitutional amendment No 16 was passed in April 2000 in the aftermath of the ‘No vote’ 
referendum victory against the government sponsored draft constitution. The amendment 
allowed the state to compulsorily acquire land from the white commercial farmers and 
legalised the land invasions by the war veterans and landless masses. The amendment 
removed guarantees for the compensation of white commercial farmers whose land had 
been compulsorily acquired by the state for resettlement. 
Constitutional amendment No 17 came into effect in September 2005. It vested the 
ownership of the land acquired through the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) into 
the hands of the state. It also barred the courts from presiding over any litigation cases 
against the acquired farms. This was in response to the former white commercial farmers 
who were contested against their evictions from their farms as well as the improvements 
that they had made on the farms. The amendment also created the Senate as an upper 
chamber of parliament.  
Constitutional amendments No 16 and 17 were roundly criticised by the civil society as well 
as by the international community. Ncube (2010) also notes that the amendments were 
criticised for violating international law obligations including that of the African Union (AU). 
The civil society including the NCA also criticised the reintroduction of the senate as a ploy 
to waste meagre resources and reward politicians that had been rejected by the electorate 
in the general elections held earlier in the year. It was the disagreements over the 
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participation in the Senate elections that led to the split of the MDC and would have severe 
repercussions on the credibility of the MDCs as an alternative to the ZANU PF government. 
Constitutional amendment No 18 was passes in September 2007 with the support of both 
the ZANU PF and MDC formations in parliament. It formalised the holding of harmonised 
elections for both members of parliament, senate and presidential elections in Zimbabwe. It 
also made provisions that for anyone to be declared a winner in a presidential election, the 
candidate must get at least 51% of the vote. The amendment also provided for some 
loosening of some of the repressive laws that had been passed earlier. In general the 
amendments in repressive laws were compatible with the generally accepted norms in a 
democracy. To the chagrin of the NCA, the amendment called for the re-writing of a new 
people driven constitution only after the harmonised March 2008 general elections. The 
NCA criticised more especially the MDC formations for abandoning what they had been 
fighting for all along since the formation of the NCA by supporting the amendments in 
parliament. The NCA further accused the MDC formations of betraying the struggle for 
social change as well as for failing to address the issues of democratising structures and 
institutions needed for effective and good governance. This amendment opened fissures 
between the former allies in the NCA and the MDC formations with the NCA announcing 
that they were severing ties with the MDC formations. The MDC formations defended the 
amendment as a confidence building measure in the context of the inter-party political 
dialogue that was taking place between the two MDC formations and ZANU PF that were 
being mediated by former president Thabo Mbeki. 
Constitutional amendment No 19 was passed in September 2008 in order to create for the 
provision of the inclusive government following the signing of the GPA on the problems 
facing Zimbabwe on the 15th of September. It provided for a power sharing inclusive 
government between ZANU PF and the MDC formations. The amendments were in the 
following respects; to pave way for the creation of the prime minister and deputy prime 
ministers office, to substitute the chapter on citizenship, to make specific provision for the 
appointment and functions of the committee of parliament known as the Committee on 
Standing Rules and Orders, to provide for the appointment for the chairperson of Zimbabwe 
Electoral Commission, and of the members of the Anti-Corruption Commission and the 
Zimbabwe Media Commission. The NCA again criticised this amendment arguing that the 
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September 15 2008 GPA reached by the country’s political parties was a deal reached 
through trickery and forgery aimed at throwing away the people’s victory in reference to 
the March 2008 general elections. The agreement was meant to sanitize the ZANU PF 
regime whilst reducing to a fool, the MDC victors of the elections.  
4.7.2 The NCA and the Global Political Agreement (GPA) 
On the 29th of March 2008, Zimbabwe held its harmonised elections using the Lancaster 
house constitution as amended. The results of the elections were withheld for close to two 
months before they were eventually released. The overwhelming public perception in the 
country was that the election results were heavily manipulated in order to prevent the 
announcement of the outright winners (Zembe and Sanjeevaiah 2013). Because of the 
constitutional requirement that in the event that the results of the presidential election 
were less than the 51% threshold of the total votes cast, then a presidential runoff between 
the two candidates who secured the highest number of votes would be conducted within 
ninety days of the announcement of the results. A rerun or presidential election runoff was 
held on the 27th of June 2008. It was during the period in the run up to the June 27 election 
that the country experienced a bloody and violent campaign. The period animated state 
sponsored political violence unprecedented in the history of the country.  
In general it can be noted that the post 2000 referendum on the draft CC constitutional 
reform spawned a multi layered and deep seated crisis that later prompted SADC to actively 
intervene in search of a viable but elusive solution to the protracted and worsening crisis. 
The SADC negotiating team headed by former South African president Thabo Mbeki forced 
the contending parties to a compromise and following rocky negotiations the three 
principals (leaders) of the political parties with seats in parliament (ZANU PF, MDC and 
MDC-T) signed the GPA which mandated the formation of an inclusive 
government/government of national unity. The GPA was signed on the 15th of September 
2008. The inclusive government was put into effect by the constitutional amendment No 19 
in February 2009, just in time for the formation of the inclusive government. 
The GPA was a political treaty that sought to define the strategic direction of the country. 
The signatories agreed to create a genuine, viable, permanent, sustainable and nationally 
acceptable solution to the Zimbabwean crisis. It also sought to resolve once and for all the 
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prevailing political and economic situation as well as aiming to chart a new political direction 
for the country. One of the flagship provisions of the GPA was Article XI which 
acknowledged the fundamental right and duty of the Zimbabwean people to make a 
constitution for themselves in a process that is inclusive and democratic. 
The GPA was born out of pressure from mostly civil society under the banner of the Save 
our Zimbabwe campaign as well as the stalemate caused by the results of March 2008 
harmonised elections and the inconclusive presidential elections. The campaign raised 
pressure about the situation in Zimbabwe internationally. It was partly through the pressure 
that the AU and SADC decided to get actively involved in the Zimbabwean crisis by 
mediating for a political solution that would bring all the contesting political parties into 
forming the inclusive government. The campaign was premised on the delay in announcing 
the March 29 elections result as well as the state sponsored and organised violence and 
intimidation against the opposition and civil society. The civil society came up with a broad 
frame work for collaboration between themselves, mass civic education campaign, 
increased information dissemination to remote areas through existing structures as well as a 
non violent social action (Ncube 2010).  
The campaign aimed at affirming the election of March 29 as the only legitimate expression 
of the people of Zimbabwe, to promote peace and tolerance amongst Zimbabweans, 
demanding the demilitarisation of the political and electoral process and expressed civil 
society’s willingness to mobilise citizens to defend their vote and human dignity. The 
campaign managed to increase the regionalisation and internationalisation of the 
Zimbabwean crisis. The international community was called upon to assume leadership, 
responsibility and obligations to promote peace and human dignity and alleviate the gross 
suffering of innocent citizens. The campaign catalysed and amplified regional and 
international condemnation of the Zimbabwean regime (Ncube 2010). 
Having fought very hard for the internationalisation of the Zimbabwean crisis at a critical 
point in history, the NCA felt let down when the AU and SADC initiated talks left them out of 
the picture. The SADC facilitated talked only brought to the table ZANU PF and the two MDC 
formations. The NCA together with other civil society organisations had agreed with the 
MDC formations that the basis for any inter party talks to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis 
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should be premised on a new constitution before the 2008 harmonised elections. The NCA 
was riled especially by Article XI (see Table 5) of the agreement that dealt with the need for 
a new constitution. In as much as the NCA agreed on the need of a new constitution they 
felt the process agreed to by the political parties was self serving and was not people driven. 
The NCA condemned their former allies, the MDC formations for agreeing to a process that 
was contrary to the principles of the NCA. As a result the NCA rejected the COPAC process 
arguing that it was not people driven but was more of a political settlement between ZANU 
PF and the MDC formations. The fact that the process was led by politicians was a very 
worrisome development since politicians are concerned about power. The NCA argued that 
the supposedly outreach consultations with the people were a mere waste of resources 
since ultimately the politicians would determine what to do with the document. The 
bickering over the COPAC draft later would act to vindicate the position of the NCA as in the 
end the voices of the people were discarded in favour of a negotiated constitution between 
the parties in the inclusive government. 
4.7.3 The Constitution Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC) Constitution Making 
Process  
At the heart of the GPA was Article XI that mandated a commitment by the three parties to 
the agreement (ZANU PF, MDC-T and MDC) to develop a process in which a new 
constitution should be agreed upon and to be followed by new elections. The successful 
conclusion of the constitutional reform process was going to complete the country’s return 
to a new democratic dispensation premised on good governance and development. Article 
X1 of the GPA had provisions for the drafting of a new constitution and the establishment of 
COPAC (See Table 5). The political parties involved, that is ZANU PF and the MDC formations 
agreed to appoint a Select committee of parliament comprised of representatives of the 
political parties bounded by the GPA. The terms of reference for the select committee 
included holding public hearings and consultations as it deemed fit in the process of public 
consultation over the making of the new constitution.  
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ARTICLE VI OF THE GPA 
6. Constitution 
Acknowledging that it is the fundamental right and duty of the Zimbabwean people to make 
a constitution by themselves and for themselves; Aware that the process of making this 
constitution must be owned and driven by the people and must be inclusive and 
democratic; Recognising that the current Constitution of Zimbabwe made at the Lancaster 
House Conference, London (1979) was primarily to transfer power from the colonial 
authority to the people of Zimbabwe; Acknowledging the draft Constitution that the Parties 
signed and agreed to in Kariba on the 30th of September 2007, annexed hereto as Annexure 
"B"; Determined to create conditions for our people to write a constitution for themselves; 
and Mindful of the need to ensure that the new Constitution deepens our democratic values 
and principles and the protection of the equality of all citizens, particularly the 
enhancement of full citizenship and equality of women. 
6.1 The Parties hereby agree: 
(a) that they shall set up a Select Committee of Parliament composed of representatives of 
the Parties whose terms of reference shall be as follows: 
(i) to set up such subcommittees chaired by a member of Parliament and composed of 
members of Parliament and representatives of Civil Society as may be necessary to assist 
the Select Committee in performing its mandate herein; 
(ii) to hold such public hearings and such consultations as it may deem necessary in the 
process of public consultation over the making of a new constitution for Zimbabwe; 
(iii) to convene an All Stakeholders Conference to consult stakeholders on their 
representation in the sub-committees referred to above and such related matters as may 
assist the committee in its work; 
(iv) to table its draft Constitution to a 2nd All Stakeholders Conference; and 
(v) to report to Parliament on its recommendations over the content of a New Constitution 
for Zimbabwe 
(b) That the draft Constitution recommended by the Select Committee shall be submitted to 
a referendum; 
(c) that, in implementing the above, the following time frames shall apply: 
(i) the Select Committee shall be set up within two months of inception of a new 
government; 
(ii) the convening of the first All Stakeholders Conference shall be within 3 months of the 
date of the appointment of the Select Committee; 
(iii) the public consultation process shall be completed no later than 4 months of the date of 
the first All Stakeholders Conference; 
(iv) the draft Constitution shall be tabled within 3 months of completion of the public 
consultation process to a second All Stakeholders Conference; 
(v) the draft Constitution and the accompanying Report shall be tabled before Parliament 
within 1 month of the second All Stakeholders Conference; 
(vi) the draft Constitution and the accompanying Report shall be debated in Parliament and 
the debate concluded within one month; 
(vii) the draft Constitution emerging from Parliament shall be gazetted before the holding of 
a referendum; 
(viii) a referendum on the new draft Constitution shall be held within 3 months of the 
conclusion of the debate; 
(ix) in the event of the draft Constitution being approved in the referendum it shall be 
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gazetted within 1 month of the date of the referendum; and 
(x) The draft Constitution shall be introduced in Parliament no later than 1 month after the 
expiration of the period of 30 days from the date of its gazetting. 
 
Table 5: Article X1 of the Global Political Agreement 
The COPAC draft was a product of two processes that is the outreach process in which the 
people were asked their views on what they wanted on the draft as well as the second 
process of negotiations among the three political parties in the inclusive government. The 
national objectives of the constitution were defined as good governance, national unity, 
peace and stability, fostering fundamental rights and freedoms, good and sound foreign 
policies, national development, empowerment and employment creation, food security, 
culture, gender balance, rights of children, youths and the elderly. According to the parties 
in the inclusive government, a new constitution was ideal to entrench democracy, good 
governance and upholding the rule of law. Unlike the CC in 1999 that led the constitutional 
reform process, the process now was led by COPAC comprising 25 members from each of 
the political parties in the inclusive government. The COPAC outreach process managed to 
hold a total of 4 943 meetings in each of the country’s 1 957 wards. Although the COPAC 
teams leading the consultative process tried to ensure credibility, inclusiveness, 
transparency and accessibility there were reports of incidents of violence and intimidation 
that could have created an environment of fear thus preventing the full participation of 
citizens in the process. There were also reports that the political parties in the inclusive 
government coached their supporters on what to say during the outreach sessions. 
Critics of the COPAC process led by the NCA argued that the process had taken too long (36 
months) amid severe bickering between the parties thereby failing to dispel the growing 
public perception that it was a largely wasteful exercise. Despite calls for a non partisan 
process, the three political parties in the inclusive government were central to the process 
with the political parties deciding on the secretariat in order to guard against their interests. 
COPAC appealed to donors and just as during the ill-fated 1999 constitutional reform 
process, civil society was again divided over the process. Some saw an opportunity after 
almost a decade of violence to participate and try to change things. The NCA argued that it 
was against their principles and decided to boycott the process. The problems with the 
COPAC draft were due to the historical and political circumstances within and around which 
118 
 
it was conceived. It got its mandate from Article XI of the GPA therefore suffering from the 
problem of political partisanship. At one time the COPAC lead drafters could not start work 
on the final version of the draft constitution because issues had to be agreed by a plethora 
of structures borne out of the said tri-partisanship for example there were 3 Co-Chairs of 
COPAC, COPAC Select committee of parliament, COPAC Management committee and the 
GPA principals. 
The COPAC constitutional making process managed to produce its heavily compromised 
draft constitution that was negotiated in secret by the political parties in the GPA. The 
negotiated compromised partisan draft constitution caused irreconcilable sharp 
disagreements between the three political parties that led to one of the parties to produce 
its own draft constitution based on 200 amendments that it proposed should be included 
into the COPAC draft. On the 21st – 23rd of October 2012, the COPAC held its 2nd All 
Stakeholder’s Conference where the proposed amendments were submitted, considered 
and adopted (Zembe and Sanjeevaiah 2013). The principals to the GPA further instructed 
their subordinate members of parliament attending the 2nd All Stakeholders Conference to 
surrender the amended COPAC draft constitution to them so that the principals could 
scrutinise it for further amendments before a referendum on the document could be 
organised. A referendum to the COPAC draft constitution was conducted on the 16th of 
March 2013 and 3 079 966 people voted for the draft while 179 489 voted against it. The 
COPAC draft constitution was enacted by the GPA parliament replacing the colonial 
Lancaster house colonial constitution as the new constitution of Zimbabwe of the 22nd of 
May 2013. 
The COPAC draft constitution introduced a fundamental departure from the Lancaster 
House constitution by way of providing a wider bill of rights with mechanisms to ensure the 
enforcements of these rights. There were additional limits to the presidential authority with 
the legislature and the judiciary empowered to check and review the decisions made by the 
president. Overally, the COPAC draft seemed to substantially attempt to address the 
pertinent constitutional issues that have been at the epicentre of the Zimbabwean crisis. 
The draft is hoped to fundamentally positively influence the quality of governance in 
Zimbabwe.  
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4.7.4 NCA and the 2013 Referendum 
The four year constitutional making process that culminated in the draft constitution was 
characterised by bitter and at times violent inter party struggles with each party seeking 
supremacy of its own preferences. However the sharp contestations suddenly and 
surprisingly evaporated when the party principals agreed on the contents of the draft on the 
17th of January 2013. This was against all wind of public expectation. The happy consensus 
and cooperation had the perverse effect on robbing the referendum process and its 
campaign the popular dynamism and enthusiasm (ZESN 2013). Most people questioned the 
need for a referendum especially against the backdrop of severe shortages afflicting the 
country. More so the fact that the process that was supposed to take only 6 months had go 
on to take 3 years with so much spending infuriated the people. Even the principals seem to 
have taken it for granted and gave the referendum campaign one month only before the 
referendum.  
This prompted the NCA to take the government to court challenging the short period of 
campaigning and seeking a two month extension. The clearly unjustified decision for a short 
campaign period pumped some wind into the NCA ‘no’ vote campaign. This was part of NCA 
strategy despite their ongoing vote ‘no’ campaign. The court dismissed the case but 
acknowledged some points the NCA had argued for example the issue of time frame. 
 According to one of the senior NCA official during the March 2013 referendum, Takura 
Zhangazha, the 2013 vote ‘no’ campaign vote count was to demonstrate both a national 
presence as well as an indication that despite all the politics of the MDCs and ZANU PF, 
there were at least a quartet of million Zimbabweans who are amenable to a third way in 
the country’s national politics (Zhangazha 2014). The court challenge by the NCA and the 
‘no’ vote campaign actually had an effect in raising awareness which persuaded more 
people to go and vote for their respective preferences (ZESN 2013). 
After the referendum results were announced, the NCA rejected them arguing that the 
notice period given to people to go through the draft had been inadequate and that the 
government only provided about 80 000 copies which was clearly inadequate. NCA also 
argued that 95% of the voters had not seen or read the draft and knew nothing about its 
contents but simply voted because they were following orders from their political leaders. 
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The poor turnout was taken by the NCA to mean an endorsement by the people that they 
did not care about the draft. To that effect, NCA argued that the draft was undemocratic 
and that a constitution does not become people driven merely on account of people being 
driven to meetings and being told what to say as was the situation during COPAC outreach 
meetings. As a democratic principle, the NCA thought it better to stay the path of a people 
driven constitution even against the backdrop of literally being financially resource-less 
against the donor driven COPAC constitutional making process. 
4.8 Was the NCA an elitist organisation? 
It has been argued that civil societies are elitist organisations that claim to represent the 
people when in fact they are representing themselves. Part of the critique has been the fact 
that the majority of the people reside in rural areas and are mostly excluded as most civil 
society organisations are urban based. The NCA was an urban based organisation and 
Kagoro (2001) notes that at its formation, the NCA leaders and activists took to the 
communities pre-determined packages. In this way their operations were top down 
approach. The NCA made efforts to target Zimbabwe’s rural population especially during the 
‘no’ vote campaign. They managed to set up structures in the rural areas and although these 
structures were destroyed during the near decade long of violence (2000 – 2008), some of 
the respondents to this study attested that they were still visible and even some structures 
existed in the rural areas.  
In fact the decision to turn the civic body into a political party came from mostly those 
structures. However despite efforts to reach out the people in the rural areas, it must be 
noted that the operating environment in rural areas continued to narrow and the 
government continued to brand the NCA as an elitist, business, white and imperialistic. 
Although in the early days the NCA meetings were held in towns and hotels, as time went 
on the meetings expanded to rural areas and growth points. As explained earlier, with time 
the NCA transformed itself into a grassroots membership organisation populated with more 
activists than academics. However critics led by the government continued to label the 
organisation elitist. Probably this was because of its chairperson who was a robust 
intellectual. Somehow people thought the chairperson held all the sway because 
intellectually no one could challenge him since he was surrounded by mostly activists. 
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4.9 NCA transformation into a political party 
The NCA held its congress of the general assembly from the 26th to the 28th of September 
2013. This general assembly resolved to transform the civic body into a political party. In an 
interview the NCA chairperson and interim chair of the political party, Dr Lovemore 
Madhuku stated that the reason for their transformation is that the membership was 
convinced that at this point and time it was the best way for the NCA to contribute to the 
development of the country. He added that for the past 16 years the NCA had made 
contributions to the political discourse as a civic organisation and that the decision to 
transform into a political party was guided by the goal of contributing to the development 
and prosperity of the country. The party was to pursue social democratic ideals with a pan 
Africanist thrust. The special congress resolved to continue the constitutional journey by 
expanding the mandate of the organisation into one that will seek political power. 
However before the NCA ship could begin to navigate the tumultus waters of the 
Zimbabwean politics, it has been hit by desertions by some key members. Those who have 
resigned have sighted ideological differences, stating that the NCA being born out of 
frustrations in both ZANU PF and the MDC formations should have been different in how 
they operate. This misunderstandings grew from the fact that the NCA has since its 
transformation been participating in by-elections without first organising their structures 
and holding an elective congress. One deserter noted that the NCA needed a leadership that 
understands what it stands for, and that the country needs a much more conscientious 
leadership than the one being demonstrated by the ruling party.  
From the interviews carried out during this research, the decision to form a political party 
does not seem to have had support. Most respondents said the country had too many 
political parties and for the NCA to join the fray would give ZANU PF victory in future 
elections. They argued that the oppositional forces were busy fragmenting instead of 
coming together to form an alliance to topple the ruling party. It would seem personal 
differences are affecting the oppositional forces from coming together. Respondents were 
of the opinion that the NCA should have continued as a civil society organisation and 
become a constitutional watchdog. In that way they would continue to educate the masses 
about the newly adopted constitution rather than to leave the work to the government. 
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Respondents from the government said there was nothing peculiar about NCA’S 
transformation as they had always held the view that the NCA was dabbling in politics. 
Either way the transformation of the NCA into a political party destroyed the gains that civil 
society had made in Zimbabwe’s socio-economic transformation and casts doubts on the 
role of civil society organisations in developing countries. 
4.10 Conclusion  
The post 2000 NCA emerges together with others to try to transform the hegemonic social 
order of the state by re-articulating it in accordance to its vision of a new social order 
(Ncube 2010). This resistance to state hegemony and its view of a ZANU PF monolithic social 
order took many forms for example there was a creation of a counter block around the 
opposition MDC and the governance and human rights civil society that sought to compel 
society to consent to the common sense of the liberal ideology rooted in a people driven 
constitution, respect for property rights and the rule of law. There was also the strategy of 
delegitimizing the state through the campaigning and supporting sanctions against the 
ruling regime. 
Although the NCA tried to subvert the repressive laws that had been passed by the 
government prohibiting gatherings and demonstration by continuing to hold street 
demonstrations, these were ruthlessly quashed by the police further straining the state-civil 
society relations and even dividing the civil society over the appropriateness of such 
strategies in engaging the state. 
The constitutional discourse that culminated in the referendum in 2000 raged on during the 
course of the Zimbabwe crisis and became the centre of the political reform process under 
the coalition or inclusive government that came into effect in 2009. According to Ncube 
(2010) the discourse of a people driven constitution was informed by the classical debate on 
whether the law left at the whims of the state is promotive or inhibitive of a democratic 
society. The NCA was founded on a non partisan principle although its top leadership 
believed that a mutation of the movement into an alternative opposition political party to 
wrestle power from ZANU PF would realistically pave way for a fuller address of the 
governance conundrum (Kagoro 2004). It is clear therefore that the birth of the 
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constitutional movement as a counter hegemonic strategy was linked to a new thinking 
about the possibilities of changing the ZANU PF regime.  
According to Dorman (2003), the constitutional debate in Zimbabwe provided a window 
through which to examine the ambiguity and complexity of state society relations. The 
constitutional debate provided a forum where there was more open political debate than at 
any other time in the history of the country. A regime previously based on demobilisation, 
de-participation attempted to respond to the demands from civil society by capturing the 
process of inclusive consultation (Dorman 2003). The government’s politics of the early 
years of independence was rhetorically supported by a discourse that emphasised 
reconciliation and unity, development and nationalism in a complex mixture of policy and 
symbolism (Dorman 2003).  
In order to achieve the goal of development, all groups had to work together in this early 
post independence rhetoric in unity and under the umbrella of the ruling party. Churches, 
unions and other groups were reminded again and again that inclusion was the route to 
peace and prosperity and the undoubted importance of bringing development to the new 
nation and the success of the developmental policies reinforced and legitimised the 
message. By simply bringing up the issue of the constitution and encouraging public debate, 
the NCA catalysed and regularised a debate that until then had had no formal place in the 
public domain. The NCA capitalised on both the latent critique of the government and the 
newly expanded independent media. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 NCA Strategies in the fight for a new constitution 
The NCA was founded to lobby the government for a new constitution through a people 
driven constitutional reform process but with time they adopted some radical resistance 
strategies that were a response to the way the government reacted. At the beginning the 
government accepted the need for a home grown constitution and agreed to set up a 
constitutional review commission. However the NCA refused to participate arguing that the 
commission was dominated by one political party (ZANU PF) and that it was also at the 
mercy of the president who could alter the final draft. It would thus seem that the NCA had 
some principles of their own which they did not want to compromise even if it meant being 
on a collision course with the government as well as the donors. However this could have 
been a lost chance as events later showed that the country had to go for another decade to 
have a new constitution that was not in any way democratic or people driven in its making. 
During the post referendum period, the NCA’s primary strategy was that of mass action in 
different manifestations such as protests and stay-aways. The violence that engulfed the 
country following the ‘no’ vote referendum in 2000 accompanied by land invasions by the 
war veterans and landless rural peasants made it very difficult for the NCA to penetrate the 
rural areas. The government dealt with all forms of dissent in a heavy handed manner and it 
became very difficult for the NCA to protest in the streets. Furthermore, the failure by the 
NCA to embrace the necessity of the land reform in the aftermaths of the land invasions 
gave credence to claims that civil society’s neoliberal views are anti-state and nationalist 
development especially redistributive programmes. 
After the NCA AGA in 2000, the NCA members vowed to undertake a confrontational 
approach if dialogue failed. Indeed the government was no longer in the mood to dialogue 
with the NCA accusing it of being a puppet organisation. In 2001, the NCA held an all 
stakeholder conference meeting to approve and adopt the NCA draft constitution for the 
country. The conference adopted the draft and resolved to use every form of legitimate 
mass pressure to force the government to adopt it as the country’s constitution. From then 
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on the NCA embarked on a two pronged approach, first to get the draft viewed by the 
government and put it to a referendum and secondly to force the government to revisit the 
constitutional issues by agreeing to a process to rewrite the country’s constitution. The 
government through the minister of justice refused to meet the NCA insisting that it had no 
time to entertain a foreign funded draft constitution. The government’s position was that 
the NCA’s opinions and programs were against the interests of the country. 
At first the NCA began the process of trying to force the government through the courts. In 
the courts, the NCA was frustrated further as their cases were either thrown out or 
postponed indefinitely. To counter the legal process, the NCA organised civil unrest 
especially crafted to oppose laws that were being proposed by the government. Laws such 
as the Electoral Bill that meant to ban local independent monitors and forbid non-
governmental organisations from conducting civic education on electoral matters, the Public 
Order and Security Act (POSA) that outlawed any form of public gatherings and the Access 
to Information and Privacy Act (AIPPA) that aimed to curtail access to and publication of 
information were used as a rallying point by the NCA. In March 2002 both POSA and AIPPA 
were passed into law dealing a massive blow on civic organising, mobilisation, freedom of 
assembly and rights to protest. The NCA continued to resist these laws, mobilising and 
carrying out street protests. Most of these protests would be carried out spontaneously so 
as to circumvent the law enforcement authorities. The government ruthlessly dealt with 
these protest with the police beating up and arresting the protestors resulting in the 
numbers of those willing to participate in NCA activities dwindling with each protest. The 
NCA continued to get court injunctions but those had little effect on the police actions. 
Eventually as the economic crisis deepened the NCA would no longer attract meaningful 
crowds but to their credit they continued to protest. The strategy then it would seem was to 
try and raise NCA profile internationally as well as to continually expose Zimbabwe on the 
international scene. One respondent alluded to the fact that it was the NCA which managed 
to put and sustain Zimbabwe’s deepening crisis of governance at the international stage. 
The NCA also partnered with other civic organisations such as the ZCTU to undertake 
protests. At one of those protest that was dubbed a prayer meeting, the police broke up the 
meeting arrested and severely assaulted the leaders of the NCA, ZCTU and MDC. This was 
met with an international outcry and SADC began to initiate the inter-party dialogue that 
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culminated in the inclusive government of 2009. Some interviewees felt that the reasons for 
poor turnout at NCA protest marches were due to poor consultation among the 
stakeholders. Others felt that the NCA profile was no longer appealing to the masses who 
had grown frustrated by the economic meltdown in the country. As the economic situation 
worsened in Zimbabwe, a number of people left the country and according to the NCA this 
affected their membership as well. It was now difficult to organise and mobilise for street 
protests as those who had remained were demoralised and recruiting a new energy was a 
challenge. 
At the height of the economic meltdown, the NCA urged the public to protest regularly and 
consistently every week until a resolution to the political crisis engulfing the country is 
found and implemented. The protests also included a call for a transitional arrangement or 
authority with the mandate to see the immediate redress of the humanitarian and 
economic crisis and facilitating the writing by the people of a democratic constitution. Once 
a democratic constitution was in place, elections could be held in a free and fair manner to 
elect the country’s political leadership under the terms of the envisaged new constitution. 
The strategy of alienating institutional members from the NCA seems to have backfired. The 
organisation failed to benefit from the other organisations’ capacities in the different areas 
of relevance to the constitutional reform process. In the end, the NCA had to fight a lone 
battle with the government where they became increasingly isolated and therefore easy 
targets for rebuke and constant attack from the government. As noted in the later years the 
NCA suffered from deep financial difficulties with the pulling out of most of its donors and 
this had a negative impact of its programmes, a situation which could have been avoided if 
they had institutional members as programmes and activities could be harnessed.    
The NCA and government led constitutional review of both 2000 and 2013 debate catalysed 
a broad set of questions about the role of NGOs/civil society and their relationship with the 
state. The existence of the NCA challenged the previously dominant rhetoric and practice of 
the state which assumed that it must initiate and control such consultations. The 
government tagged the NCA as political, foreign funded and anti-unity. The NCA was also 
accused of failing to support national consensus building and of disrupting the national 
process especially when it refused to participate in both processes of 2000 and 2013. 
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However, it would seem that the confrontational attitude of the NCA clouded its judgement 
on its advocacy. The period from 1999 after the formation of the inclusive government 
offered a political environment that had a greater opportunity for constructive engagement 
between civil society and the government. Thus the NCA’s hard-line stance undermined 
serious efforts to make some meaningful contributions to the constitutional reform process. 
By doing so they risked being made redundant and failing to achieve its long time goals and 
this could be the reason why after the adoption of the new constitution in 2013, the NCA 
decided to abandon the civil society status by transforming into a political party.  
5.2 Perceptions on the NCA 
There is a general agreement among various stakeholders that the NCA contributed to the 
raising of the awareness of constitutional issues and human rights. Respondents in this 
study agreed that the NCA had raised public awareness on good governance premised on 
the need for a new people driven constitution. The respondents further noted that the NCA 
contributed to the enhancement of public awareness of constitutional issues. There was a 
general feeling among respondents that what had seemed a taboo of people openly 
questioning the way they are being governed had been made common talk among the 
people. In response to the question on the respondents’ own assessment of the NCA’s 
contribution in raising public awareness of constitutional issues as a baseline for good 
governance and development, 60% of the respondents noted that the NCA’s contribution 
was excellent, 28% said very good, 10% good and 2% said it was bad as illustrated by the 
Table 6 below. 
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Table 6: NCA’s contributions to the public awareness on the role of constitution in 
development and good governance. 
 
Although most respondents credited the NCA’s role in raising the awareness, the researcher 
could not ascertain for sure if the same picture exists in the rural areas. There was also a 
general perception that the NCA should have remained as a civil society organisation rather 
that venturing into politics by converting into a political party with most respondents 
lamenting that the gains made in the past fifteen years could be eroded as there was no one 
to act in filling that role. Some respondents felt that the reason the NCA had converted into 
a political party was because they had been too rigid and failed to appreciate change in 
strategies especially after the coming in of the inclusive government. Surely there were 
opportunities offered by Article X1 of the GPA to take the agenda of constitutional reform 
forward. 
It is important to caution that the level of awareness on constitutional matters in Zimbabwe 
cannot sorely be attributed to the NCA because there are still some organisations that have 
been working on the subject. The role of political developments in the country can also not 
be under estimated as they have also played an important role in keeping the issue as a 
national agenda. However there is no doubt that the NCA was the leading light in 
constitutional reform in the country since its formation and has featured prominently in the 
mass media. 
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Findings of the Evaluation of the NCA in 2009 indicate that there was a widely held 
perception that the NCA had a tremendous contribution to the raising of the awareness of 
constitutional and human rights issues in Zimbabwe (Lumina 2009). Most respondents 
agreed that the NCA had a big role and could have continued to be an independent 
watchdog on constitutional matters and the implementation of the new constitution 
especially the realignment of laws to the new constitution. Many felt that the NCA had a 
role after the adoption of the new constitution through an inclusive and participatory 
process. 
5.3 Effectiveness of the NCA 
The NCA’s enduring campaign for constitutional reform contributed to an improved political 
commitment to the constitutional reform agenda as reflected by Article XI of the GPA and 
the time frames for a new constitution. The fact that Article XI acknowledged the need for a 
people driven and democratic constitutional reform process as demanded by the NCA over 
the years shows that the NCA had been very effective in its work. The language and tone of 
Article XI of the GPA was reminiscent of that of the NCA’s constitutional reform message. 
For example Article XI stated that ‘it is a fundamental right and duty of the Zimbabwean 
people to make a constitution by themselves’ and that the ‘process of making this 
constitution must be owned and driven by the people and must be inclusive and 
democratic’. It further refers to public consultation in the constitution making process, the 
holding of an All Stakeholder’s Conference and a referendum on the new draft for the 
people to approve it. 
The NCA played a central role in engendering a sense of participatory democracy in 
Zimbabwe and as a result the people became in charge of their destiny. Of the people 
interviewed during this research 21% were of the view that the NCA’s effectiveness was 
excellent, while 30% lamented the egocentric nature of the NCA though they were just 
average. They argued that the NCA had not been successful in being at the centre of 
constitutional reform as they would have wanted. 37% of the respondents said the 
effectiveness was very good arguing that the fact that the constitutional reform was on the 
agenda for such a long time was attributable to the NCA. 4% argued that the NCA was not 
effective at all because they were counterproductive in their activities, failing to work with 
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the state.8% said the effectiveness was good. The effectiveness perception of the 
respondents is shown on Table 7 below; 
 
Table 7: Effectiveness of the NCA 
5.4 Relevance of the NCA 
The results of a survey carried out by the respected and independent opinion institute in 
Zimbabwe, the Mass Public Opinion Institute (2009) indicated that very few people were not 
aware of the existence of any other constitutional reform advocacy organisations other than 
the NCA. According to the research, 52% of the respondents had heard of the NCA while 
48% had not heard of the NCA (MPOI 2009). 
The NCA had the capacity to play a key role in the constitutional making process ushered in 
by the Inclusive government as well as playing a monitoring role for the new constitution 
through a participatory and inclusive process. Several people were concerned by the failure 
by the NCA to recognise the opportunities proffered by the inclusive government political 
environment. There was concern for the monopolisation of the constitutional reform 
debate and marginalisation of other organisations on the constitutional reform issue. 
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Nevertheless, the majority of the respondents stated that the NCA had been a relevant 
player in the struggle for good governance in Zimbabwe. 18% rated NCA’s relevance as 
excellent and argued that without the NCA, Zimbabwe would not have managed to have a 
new constitution. 40% argued the relevance as very good while 10% said it was good. 22% 
of the respondent thought the NCA relevance was just average while 10% said it was bad 
arguing that the government eventually managed to write a new constitution without the 
NCA and that everything was dependent on the government. The results are illustrated by 
the Table 8 below; 
 
Table 8: Relevance of the NCA 
5.5 Lessons from Zimbabwe’s Constitutional Making Process 
Developing an effective procedure to prevent those with power from manipulating a 
constitution making process is a considerable challenge, one that can be helped by 
articulating the principles and mechanisms that govern such a process. Such articulation 
would have enhanced the process’ quality and increase the possibility of success. The 
process leading to the 1980 Lancaster House Constitution would have benefited from 
separating the constitution making process from the process of securing cease-fire as this 
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would have helped prevent the dominant and belligerent groups from having an 
overwhelming influence on producing the country’s constitution. Such a separation enables 
or gives time for public participation where possible or where there is willingness to develop 
a vision for the future (Mdulo 2010).  
The 1999 constitution making process failed because it came about as a government 
attempt to undercut while appearing to satisfy civil society as well as opposition demands. It 
was not part of a larger political renewal process. The government also lacked the credibility 
to spearhead the process, in that civil society demands for constitutional reform coincided 
with the emergence of a very strong opposition party in the history of the country. The 2013 
COPAC constitutional reform though it succeeded was largely void of meaningful grassroots 
participation. The mere fact that the document had to be negotiated between the political 
parties involved in the process negating the views of the grassroots is proof enough that the 
‘people driven’ process failed. 
The Zimbabwean experience demonstrates that when leadership resists change and openly 
engages in repressive practices to prevent public participation or discussion of reforms, it 
has already squandered the public good will towards believing that constitutional change is 
genuine. Before any post conflict society launches a constitutional reform process, society 
must debate and come to an understanding about what kind of society it wants to create. 
The constitution must be an exercise in building national consensus on the values and 
provisions to be included in the document. The thrust for a new constitution can thus be 
seen as a response to demands for democratic political systems of governance. The 
Zimbabwean case was a response to the need to build political institutions of good 
governance distorted by years of violence and impunity. Thus the future of good 
governance and development in Zimbabwe was predicated on the development of 
constitutional arrangements that guarantee viable institutions in which to conduct the 
business of governance through the development of a constitutional order that channels 
conflict into non violent settlement of differences, preserves the ability of individuals and 
groups that participate in continuing dialogue about policy as well as politics that guarantee 
accountable government and focuses attention on shared aspirations. 
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According to DuPree (2012) the founders of the NCA saw it as a way to channel frustration 
in a constructive direction that could recreate the political regime from the ground up. The 
interest in the constitution shows the awareness within civil society that the agreement 
between the government and its citizens needed to be reconstructed. This is borne out by 
the focus on civic education and dialogue that would connect people to a process of 
constitution building. The NCA thus emerged as an effort to create the bridge to political 
ideals, purposely not contesting party politics directly while attempting to get at the 
constitutional causes behind political corruption and malfeasance, namely a formal 
constitution and informal constitutional culture that enabled the political class to be 
sheltered from the demands of civil society (DuPree 2012). 
The NCA was built on lessons learned by a broad coalition organised around labour, church, 
human rights and economic and political objectives. Each of these organisations came to the 
table because they believed that the ZANU PF government was the main impediment that 
stood in the way of realising developmental progress against their objectives and had began 
to see the problem as the corruption of the party and its practice of squelching public 
participation in its policies. The balance of strategies between the promotion of civic 
education and dialogue around the constitution and the work to construct the new 
constitution demonstrates a commitment not just to the introduction of the new and better 
social contract but to a process to engage as many stakeholders as possible and to arrive at 
a better end by incorporating the diverse perspectives of the governed. 
The experience of the NCA shows that ultimate success of the civil society to recreate the 
constitutional order was weakened by; 
a) Contradiction of representation 
 
The creation and execution of a new social order required that the two legitimate parties 
come to the table that is the government and the NCA. While the NCA certainly counted on 
the broad support from the coalition of several organizations it lacked the organizational 
capacity and the legitimacy to be a representative of everyone in the country as well as that 
of engaging all stakeholders for a new constitutional order. According to DuPree (2012) 
despite the idealism of the founders, it is not clear that the NCA success in drafting and 
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submitting a constitution could have been legitimate to put on the people. On the other 
hand, the government could not have carried out its own process in the manner it did in 
2000 without recourse to the ideals and processes pioneered by the NCA (DuPree 2012). 
Furthermore the NCA’s civic education and watchdog role over the government led process 
in both the 2000 and 2013 referendum provided important pressure for a more democratic 
vision and were informed by a membership that was engaged in ongoing civic education 
efforts. The pressure for the need of constitutional reform and the fact that constitutional 
reform remained on the agenda for over a decade shows the impact of the NCA. However, it 
should not have gotten carried away in thinking that only them have the legitimacy of being 
at the epi-centre of constitutional reform. 
 
b) Divided Civil Society 
 
In 2000, whilst the NCA managed to aggregate several civil society organizations, the church 
which had been crucial in forming the NCA moved out to participate in the government led 
constitutional commission in the 1999-2000 constitutional reform process. Another crucial 
civic body that did not join the NCA then was the Zimbabwe National Liberation War 
Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) who had demonstrated earlier that the government was 
now reneging from fulfilling the revolutionary war ideals and custom. The revolutionary 
ideals that should have been prioritized by the government was retaking the land and giving 
it to the landless poor according to the ZNLWA. The NCA being focused on the neoliberal 
rights based approach to any changes failed to embrace the ZNLWA. When the government 
sponsored draft constitution was rejected at the referendum in 2000, the ZNLWVA saw it as 
a direct attack on the need for land reform. Thus the intensification of the land occupations 
immediately after the triumph of the ‘no vote’ was a vote for an alternative constitutional 
order in which the largely economic remnants of colonial structure would be eradicated 
along with the perceived un-African imports such as homosexuality and universal human 
rights. 
Furthermore, as noted in this research, the post 2000 NCA alienated most of its institutional 
members to the detriment of the organisation’s advocacy and programming activities. It 
further led to question about the legitimacy of the NCA in advocating for constitutional 
reform. The question was who do the NCA represent? Instead, the NCA should have worked 
135 
 
hand in hand with other civil society organizations for it to be representative enough. As 
noted during the constitutional reform process of 2000, some members of the civil society 
participated and the situation was the same in 2010-2013 (COPAC process) when the 
majority of civil society organization thought it was better to participate in the process 
rather than rejecting and be left out in the process. The refusal by the NCA to participate in 
the COPAC process had severe repercussions for the organization as a constitution was 
adopted sadly without the input of an organization that was formed and had been at the 
forefront for constitutional reform. 
 
c) The Dependency Conundrum 
The NCA and the government were interdependent on each other throughout the 
constitutional process in both the 2000 and the 2013 phases. In order to carry out its 
objectives, the NCA needed the minimal conditions of the rule of law for the conditions of 
peace to reach out and the approval for meetings as well as the enabling institutional 
framework on the things necessary for associative action such as registration, oversight, 
funding etc. The NCA needed to be able to access large constituencies and carry out a broad 
social dialogue, all of which were directly restricted by the government through the limiting 
of media access and challenged by the creation of parallel constitutional process that was 
enabled to better accomplish the NCA objectives. Likewise the government relied on the 
NCA not only to educate the participatory conditions that would legitimize its process but 
also to promote the passage of the results, a condition that it ignored to its own detriment 
at the end (DuPree 2012).  
5.6 Conclusion 
Civil society in Zimbabwe has been a contested terrain. The neo-liberal understanding of 
civil society in which this research is conceptually framed states that the understanding of 
civil society is state centric and exists firmly with the logic of state discourses and state 
politics. This thinking asserts that civil society is a progressive social force that struggles 
against the modern state with its democratic deficits and often authoritarian rule. The state 
entails totalizing compulsions contrary to voluntary and contractual civility of civil society 
(Helliker 2013). Thus civil society is the universalizing logic that opposes the particularistic 
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interests of the state and becomes the driving force behind the process of development and 
democratic modernity. Civil society is described as progressive and the state as antagonistic 
and regressive which could fit into the relationship between the NCA and the government. 
A universalising civil society wages war against a particularistic and centralising state and is 
supposed to recover for a society a range of powers and activities that the state has usurped 
in previous decades (Helliker 2013). Thus the operations of civil society are contained with 
the relationalities of the liberal democratic state politics. Any antagonism between the state 
and civil society is based on the consensual framework on the rule of law through which the 
liberal state delimits and structures what is acceptable (civil society) politics. Ultimately civil 
society is supportive specifically of the liberal democratic state form leading to state-civil 
society collaborative and partnership arrangements that facilitate overall social domination. 
Thus civil society in Zimbabwe has operated in the neo-liberal fashion and this has created a 
friction with the state. Instead of working together with the state, it would seem that civil 
society was set up to provide an alternative centre of power. 
At the same time, civil society in Africa and Zimbabwe in particular has been criticised by 
nationalist and marxist scholars as mere instruments of global donors that seeks to 
challenge the state as part of conscious conspiracy. Politics beyond this consensual domain 
are viewed by both the state and the civil society as outside the realm of authentic politics, 
hence illegitimate if not outright criminal. Thus nationalist and marxist scholars view civil 
society as in alliance with donors and foreign elements to engage in social crisis strategy 
that sought to make Zimbabwe ungovernable by prioritising issues of governance and 
democracy. Thus the NCA was viewed as anti land reform and more of a local representative 
of global capital and donors pursuing a craft imperialistic agenda. However, as this research 
has noted the NCA programmes and activities were not entirely designed to satisfy the 
donors. In fact the NCA lost funding from the donors because they refused to bow down to 
pressure from the donors in participating in both the CC and the COPAC constitutional 
reform process. The liberal notion involves highlighting the institutional make up or 
organisation and structure of civil society and its progressive character in nature and this 
neo liberal notion has failed to do justice to the varied kinds of textures of sociability in the 
rural fast track land reform in Zimbabwe.  
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Civil society organisations such as the NCA are regularly and sadly undemocratic (Makumbe 
1998) and their internal processes are often characterised by unconstitutional procedures 
(Dorman 2001, McCandless 2011) as exemplified by the outline on the conflicts in the way 
the NCA constitution was amended to serve the interest of one person. One critic argued 
that Zimbabwean civil society have shown durable standards and have internalised the 
image of the ruling party in its tactics and general guidelines and is therefore fearful of 
exercising universally accepted freedoms and any meaning full change to strategies and 
leadership.  (Mhlanga 2008). 
Overall the aim of Zimbabwean civil society as exemplified by the NCA is to democratise the 
state because the state should be the guarantor of democracy. Therefore the NCA has 
sought to defend and advance political and civil liberties. The fact that at one time the NCA 
led to the formation of the opposition MDC and publicly declared their support for them in 
elections could have been a strategy to achieve power through the MDC in the contest for 
state hegemony. 
5.7 Recommendations 
There is no doubt that the NCA made so much progress in the fourteen years of its existence 
as a civil society organisation. The NCA successfully used the language of and politics of 
constitutionalism to expand the meaning of development in Zimbabwe. However there are 
some who will always argue that the NCA could have done better. This research has shown 
that the relationship between the state and civil society should be of mutual respect and in 
that way it will be easy to work together. Zimbabwe was heavily polarised especially in the 
aftermath of the 2000 ‘No’ vote and this had serious regression to the thrust of working 
together as the NCA and the government became very antagonistic dealing a blow to 
societal relations in the country and delaying the agenda of constitutional reform for over a 
decade.  
The research recommends the following; 
 The neo-liberal notion of civil society being anti-state should be examined with the 
view that they should be complementary and work closely with each other. 
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 Governments in the developing countries (including Zimbabwe) should not feel 
threatened by civil society and label them stooges of the west simply because they 
receive funding from the West. As seen in this study at both stages of constitutional 
reform process even the government received funding from the West. The NCA even 
resisted pressure from the donors and stood principally for their own beliefs. 
Therefore receiving funds does not take away civil society values and ideals. 
 Civil society should not be political players. The NCA facilitated the formation of the 
opposition MDC and even made pronouncements urging their members to vote for 
the opposition. This compromises the impartiality of civil society. 
 Civil society should make sure their house is in order and are champions of 
democracy, accountability and good governance within their organizations. This 
research has shown that there were problems in the way the NCA was managed with 
allegations of financial mismanagement. 
 Civil society should not be dogmatic and should realise that in as much as they claim 
to be the people’s representatives, they are not everyone. The NCA as the research 
has shown had members who could have been a quarter or less of the population 
and therefore for them to have expected to be the crafters of the constitution would 
have been a misnomer. The idea of a people driven process was perfect but this had 
to be as inclusive as possible. 
 The NCA should not have transformed itself into a political party as this gives the 
impression that civil society is political and are only after political office. Already the 
country has had a gap with the coming in of the new constitution and the NCA could 
have capitalised on educating the people the contents and meaning of the new 
constitution. The population hardly know about the contents and meaning of the 
new constitution as they were rail-roaded to vote for the document by the political 
leaders. 
 The government should be as inclusive as possible in its dealing with the people 
especially on developmental and governance issues rather than to take people for 
granted. The rejection of the government sponsored draft constitution in 2000 
should have reminded the government that people ought to be fully consulted and 
their views respected.  
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5.8 Suggestions for Further Research 
This study of sought to offer an examination of the role played by civil society by looking at 
the struggle for constitutional reform as a way of in promoting good governance and 
development in Zimbabwe. There are other roles and angles that civil society can play in 
promoting good governance and development. Further research can therefore explore 
these other ways because the issue of good governance and development is very broad. 
This research makes a modest contribution to the literature on civil society, comparative 
democratisation, good governance and development. It is not exhaustive though and 
further research could be done considering the fact that constitutional development is just 
but one way of exploring the study of good governance and development. Other researches 
could explore on the roles of other facets such as participation, accountability, 
transparency, rule of law, equity, effectiveness and efficiency in promoting good governance 
and development. 
This research looked at civil society from a neo-liberal perspective. Given the fact that neo-
liberalism has courted so much criticism for not being responsive to the development needs 
of the developing countries and that it is part of the neo-colonial agenda of the west, it is 
suggested here that further researches needs to be done from a Marxist, nationalistic and 
post colonialist point of view.  
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW SHEET 
MA RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Dear Respondent 
 
My name is Donald Chokuda Zhou and l am studying towards a Masters of Arts Degree in 
Development Studies with UNISA. My research focus is on the Role of Civil Society 
Organisations in Promoting Good Governance and Development. I have identified the 
National Constitutional Assembly as my case study as it will help with practical ideas and 
examples on the role of civil society in promoting good governance and development. The 
responses to this questionnaire will prove valuable to this research. As part of the 
requirements of the Masters Course on Development Studies, this questionnaire serves to 
gather relevant information for the purposes of completion of the thesis on the role of civil 
society in promoting good governance and development.  
This questionnaire forms part of the research process and in cases where information 
required exceeds the space provided, please attach relevant documents and indicate the 
section to which it belongs. 
Please answer all questions and where you do not know indicate as such.  
The research findings will be analysed and documented for the purposes of submission to 
UNISA and will be available at the UNISA library. Copies can be made available on request. 
 
I thank you for your valuable contribution. 
 
QUESTIONS 
 
1. Can you in general list three roles of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in developing 
countries and Zimbabwe in particular? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…..………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………..…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………..……..………………………………………………………………………………………
………………..…..…………................………………………………………………………………
……………………..…………………………..………………………………………………………
………………………….. 
2. Do CSOs have a role in socio-economic and political issues affecting a country? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………… 
3. Who is NCA? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………… 
4. What is the structure of the NCA? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
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……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………… 
5. What are the aims of NCA? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………… 
6. What are the objectives of the NCA? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………. 
7. What do you understand by good governance and development? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………....... 
8. What has been the role played by the NCA in promoting good governance and 
development in Zimbabwe? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………..............................................................................................................................
....................... 
9. CSOs have been viewed as vital in partnering governments in various issues concerning 
good governance and development in the world. What role has NCA done in promoting 
these values in Zimbabwe? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………… 
10. Since the year 2000, the government of Zimbabwe has viewed CSOs as agents of 
regime change bent on destabilising the country. How has NCA managed to operate and be 
effective in its role and mandate? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
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……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………. 
11. What has been NCA’s relationship with the government? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………… 
12. How has the government position impacted on NCA’s activities? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………… 
13. What are some of the obstacles that NCA has faced in conducting their activities? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………… 
14. What role did NCA play in oppositional politics? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………… 
15. In what ways has the NCA influenced good governance and development in Zimbabwe? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………… 
16. Since 2000, Zimbabwe has been sliding down in the good governance and development 
index (the Mo Ibrahim and World Bank good governance index). How can NCA justify its 
existence? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………… 
17. How has NCA contributed to the Zimbabwe crisis? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………… 
18. Has the government ever taken NCA’s views into consideration? 
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……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………. 
19. Why has the government been hostile to CSOs? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………… 
20. Do the government consider CSOs as partners in promoting good governance and 
development? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………. 
21. What are the government’s expectations on CSOs? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………… 
22. What is the NCA’s expectation of the government? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
